Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

The Hunstein Case: Upending Servicing and Debt Collection?

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A&B Abstract:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, covering Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, recently decided in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management, Inc., that a debt collector’s communication with its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), which prohibits a debt collector for communicating, in connection with the collection of any debt, with an unauthorized third party.

The FDCPA and Regulation F

 In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.  Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA generally provides that, except with respect to seeking location information:

without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

The FDCPA defines “communication” to mean “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”

For decades the FDCPA was enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).  However, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, no federal regulator had rulemaking authority under the FDCPA.  The Dodd-Frank Act empowered the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) with rulemaking authority with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined by the FDCPA.  Prior to finalizing Regulation F, the CFPB conducted market outreach to better understand how debt collectors attempt to collect on accounts.  In July 2016, the CFPB published a study of third-party debt collection operations (“Operations Study”) that recognized debt collection firms’ reliance on vendors (such as print mail services, predictive dialers, voice analytics, payment processes and data servers).  In fact, the CFPB noted that most respondents use an outside vendor for sending written communications.

On November 30, 2020, amended Regulation F,  implementing the FDCPA, was published in the Federal Register with an effective date of November 30, 2021 (which has subsequently been delayed to January 29, 2022).  Regulation F does not specifically address the use of third-party vendors, such as print mail services, although the Operations Study was cited in the preamble to Regulation F.

With regard to civil liability, section 1692k of the FDCPA states that “[n]o provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.”

The Hunstein Case

Despite the CFPB’s implicit recognition of debt collectors’ use of print and other vendors,  a recent court decision suggests that use of certain vendors could violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on third-party communications.  In Hunstein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that (1) a violation of section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA confers Article III standing; and (2) a debt collector’s transmittal of a consumer’s personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” within the meaning of section 1692c(b).

The facts in this case are not unusual, and reflect the typical interactions between a debt collector and their third-party vendors. Specifically, the debt collector, Preferred Collection and Management Services Inc. (“Preferred”), electronically transmitted information concerning Hunstein’s debt (his name and his status as a debtor, the entity to which he owed the debt, the outstanding balance, the fact that his debt resulted from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name) to its third-party vendor. In turn, the vendor used that information to create, print, and mail a dunning letter to Hunstein.  As a result, Hunstein sued alleging that by sending his personal information to the third-party vendor, Preferred had violated section 1692c(b). The district court dismissed Hunstein’s action for failure to state a claim, holding that Hunstein had not sufficiently alleged that Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b), because it was not a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt.”  Hunstein appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed both the issues of Article III standing and whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.”

The court first considered the threshold issue of whether a violation of section 1692c(b) confers Article III standing. Specifically, the court focused on whether Hunstein had suffered an injury in fact, which requires an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The court indicated that the “standing question here implicates the concreteness sub-element.”  The court explained that a plaintiff can satisfy the concreteness requirement in one of three ways. A plaintiff can meet this requirement by (1) alleging a tangible harm (e.g., physical injury, financial loss, and emotional distress), (2) alleging a risk of real harm, or (3) identifying a statutory violation that gives rise to an “intangible-but-nonetheless-concrete injury.”  The court ultimately concluded that Hunstein had met the concreteness requirement “[b]ecause (1) § 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a harm that American courts have long recognized as cognizable and (2) Congress’s judgment indicates that violations of §1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury.”

After concluding that Hunstein had standing to sue, the court considered whether Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor was a “communication in connection with the collection of any debt.” At the outset, the court noted that the parties were in agreement that Preferred was a “debt collector,” that Hunstein was a “consumer,” and that the debt at issue was a “consumer debt,” as contemplated under the FDCPA. Moreover, the parties agreed that Preferred’s transmittal of Hunstein’s information to the third-party vendor constituted a “communication” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Thus, the only question remaining before the court was whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The court began its analysis by reviewing the plain meaning of the phrase “in connection with” and the word “connection,” and determined that “in connection with” and “connection” are generally defined to mean “with reference to or concerning” and “relationship or association,” respectively.  Based on these definitions, and the facts at issue, the court found it “inescapable that Preferred’s communication to [its third-party vendor] as least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship or association’ to its collection of Hunstein’s debt.”  Accordingly, the court held that Hunstein had alleged a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” as that phrase is commonly understood.

The court next considered, and rejected, Preferred’s three arguments that its communication was not “in connection with the collection of any debt.” First, the court found Preferred’s reliance on prior Eleventh Circuit decisions interpreting the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt,” as used under section 1692e, to be misplaced. The court explained that in those line of cases, the court had focused on the language of the underlying communications that were at issue. However, the court found that the district court’s conclusion that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” necessarily entails a demand for payment “defies the language and structure of § 1692c(b) for two separate but related reasons—neither of which applies to § 1692e.” First, the court explained that the “demand-for-payment interpretation would render superfluous the exceptions spelled out in §§ 1692c(b) and 1692b.” The court noted that under section 1692c(b), “[c]ommunications with four of the six excepted parties—a consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, and the attorney of the debt collector—would never include a demand for payment,” and that the “same is true of the parties covered by § 1692b and, by textual cross-reference, excluded from § 1692c(b)’s coverage.” Accordingly, the court held that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” in section 1692c(b) must mean something more than a mere demand for payment, so as not to render “Congress’s enumerated exceptions…redundant.”

The court also rejected Preferred’s argument that the court adopt a holistic, multi-factoring balancing test that was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in its unpublished opinion in Goodson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 600 Fed. Appx. 422 (6th Cir. 2015), for two reasons: (1) “Goodson and the cases that have relied on it concern § 1692e—not § 1692c(b),” and (2) sections 1692c(b) and 1692e differ both “linguistically, in that the former includes a series of exceptions that an atextual reading risks rendering meaningless, while the latter does not, and…operationally, in that they ordinarily involve different parties.” Moreover, the court found that “in the context of § 1692c(b), the phrase ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ has a discernible ordinary meaning that obviates the need for resort to extratextual ‘factors.’”

Finally, the court rejected Preferred’s “industry practice” argument—namely that there is widespread use of mail vendors and a relative dearth of FDCPA suits against them—holding that simply because “this is (or may be) the first case in which a debtor has sued a debt collector for disclosing his personal information to a mail vendor hardly proves that such disclosures are lawful.”

In holding that Preferred’s communication with its third-party vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt,” the court acknowledged that its “interpretation of § 1692c(b) runs the risk of upsetting the status quo in the debt-collection industry…[and that its] reading of § 1692c(b) may well require debt collectors (at least in the short term) to in-source many of the services that they had previously outsourced, potentially at great cost.” Moreover, the court recognized that “those costs may not purchase much in the way of ‘real’ consumer privacy.” Nevertheless, the court noted that its “obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.”

Takeaway 

The court’s textual reading of the statute fails to account for the technological changes to the industry since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977.

The CFPB has the authority to take a more pragmatic view, either through its advisory opinion program or formal rulemaking to recognize the important role of vendors while also putting in proper guardrails to protect consumers’ privacy.  Such a view would be consistent with the FTC’s treatment of this issue.  The FTC previously indicated that a debt collector could contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer. Presumably, a debt collector would have to transmit much the same information for purposes of communicating with the debtor through a letter vendor.

Congress also has the authority to modernize the FDCPA.  The House of Representatives recently passed a comprehensive debt collection bill (H.R. 2547, the Comprehensive Debt Collection Improvement Act, sponsored by Chairwoman Waters). While this bill currently doesn’t address the issue in Hunstein, that could be remedied in the Senate.

The consumer finance industry will be closely watching the Hunstein case as it works through the appeal process, as well as how other courts, Congress, CFPB and other regulators react.

What Do the CFPB’s and FTC’s 2020 Debt Collection Activity Forecast for 2021?

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On March 22, 2021, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released its 2020 annual report to Congress on the administration of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The CFPB’s annual report follows the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) annual letter to the CFPB regarding the FDCPA, publicly released on March 19, 2021. The annual report highlights both agencies’ efforts to protect and provide debt collection relief to consumers, particularly in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic hardship.

In the latest Consumer Protection/FTC / Financial Services Litigation Advisory, Kathleen Benway, Kelley Connolly Barnaby, and Laura Komarek explore the reports from the CFPB and FTC on their work in 2020 and anticipate a tougher environment for debt collectors going forward.

FTC Seeks Comment on Proposed Changes to FCRA Rules for Motor Vehicle Dealers

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A&B ABstract: The FTC is seeking public comment on proposed changes to five FCRA rules aimed at clarifying that these rules, as promulgated by the FTC, apply only to motor vehicle dealers, as equivalent rules promulgated by the CFPB will apply to other entities.

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced it is seeking public comment on proposed changes to existing rules implementing parts of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). According to the FTC, the proposed changes would clarify that five FCRA rules promulgated by the FTC apply only to motor vehicle dealers.

This clarification is needed because after the Dodd-Frank Act transferred to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) the FTC’s rulemaking authority under certain portions of the FCRA, the FTC rescinded several of its FCRA rules, which had been replaced by rules issued by the CFPB. However, the FTC retained rulemaking authority for other rules to the extent the rules apply to motor vehicle dealers (as defined in the Dodd-Frank Act) that are predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both.

In particular, the rule changes (each of which are addressed in separate Notices of Proposed Rule Making) would apply to the following five rules:

  1. The Address Discrepancy Rule (16 CFR Part 641), which outlines the obligations of users of consumer reports when they receive a notice of address discrepancy from a nationwide consumer reporting agency (“CRA”);
  2. The Affiliate Marketing Rule (16 CFR Part 680), which gives consumers the right to restrict a person from using certain information obtained from an affiliate to make solicitations to the consumer;
  3. The Furnisher Rule (16 CFR Part 660), which requires entities that furnish information to CRAs to establish and implement reasonable written policies and procedures regarding the accuracy and integrity of the information relating to consumers provided to a CRA;
  4. The Pre-screen Opt-Out Notice Rule (16 CFR Parts 642 and 698), which outlines requirements for those who use consumer report information to make unsolicited credit or insurance offers to consumers; and
  5. The Risk-Based Pricing Rule (16 CFR Part 640), which requires those who use information from a consumer report to offer less favorable terms to consumers to provide them with a notice about the use of such data.

Each of these FTC rules, as revised, will be limited in scope to apply only in relation to motor vehicle dealers, subject to certain exceptions, and those persons and entities originally covered by these rules who are not motor vehicle dealers remain subject to similar rulemakings promulgated by the CFPB. For example, with regard to the Pre-screen Opt-Out Notice Rule, the proposed amendment would replace the general term “person” with the term “motor vehicle dealers,” as defined, thus narrowing the scope of the rule to entities that are “predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, excluding those dealers that directly extend credit to consumers and do not routinely assign the extensions of credit to an unaffiliated third party.” The proposed rule amendments also reinstate certain model notices that are otherwise identical to the CFPB’s model notices applicable to certain entities that are not motor vehicle dealers.

Additionally, the FTC is seeking comment on the effectiveness of these five rules including the following considerations:

  • whether there is a continuing need for specific provisions of each rule;
  • the benefits each rule has provided to consumers;
  • what modifications, if any, should be made to each rule to benefit consumers and businesses; and
  • what modifications, if any, should be made to each rule to account for changes in relevant technology or economic conditions.

Takeaways: These proposed amendments to the relevant FCRA rules will serve to clarify the distinction between the rules applicable to motor vehicle dealers – promulgated by the FTC ­– and rules applicable to other entities, which have been issued by the CFPB.  Comments on these issues must be submitted to the FTC within 75 days from the date the notices of proposed rulemaking are published in the Federal Register. Instructions on how to file comments will be included in the notices published in the Federal Register.

FTC Brings its First Case Alleging ECOA Violations in More than a Decade

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A&B ABstract:

On May 27, 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a complaint and settlement against a New York auto dealer alleging that it charged higher rates to African American and Hispanic customers, advertised prices it refused to honor, and fabricated fees in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Section 5 of the FTC Act.   This is the first time the FTC has alleged ECOA violations against an auto dealer.

The FTC’s Case

The Complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York, alleges that Bronx Honda instructed salespeople to charge higher financing markups and fees to African American and Hispanic customers. The Complaint also alleges Bronx Honda advertised deceptive offers for vehicles, which were not honored when customers visited the dealership, and charged unauthorized fees. As part of the settlement, Bronx Honda will pay $1.5 million in equitable monetary relief, agreed to a ceiling on the dealer markup, and will implement a Fair Lending Program.

The vote in favor of the complaint and settlement was 5-0, with the two Democratic commissioners, Rohit Chopra and Rebecca Kelley Slaughter each issuing a concurring statement. Both commissioners called on the agency to use the authority granted under the Dodd Frank Act to promulgate rules to address abuses in the auto lending industry.  Commissioner Chopra also advocates use of disparate impact analysis for detecting unlawful discrimination, given what he describes as the difficulties of uncovering direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

The Complaint:

A summary of the FTC’s complaint counts follows:

Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Reg. B)

The Complaint alleges Bronx Honda charged the average African American borrower approximately $163 more in interest, and the average Hispanic borrower approximately $211 more in interest, than similarly situated non-Hispanic white borrowers.

According to the Complaint, African American and Hispanic borrowers received the maximum dealer interest rate markup permitted by the financing entity 50% more often than similarly situated non-Hispanic white borrowers. Further, according to the Complaint, employees of Bronx Honda instructed sales personnel to charge higher markups and additional fees to African American and Hispanic customers only.

Violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act

The Complaint alleges Bronx Honda’s website advertised vehicles at specific prices but sales representatives refused to sell those vehicles at those prices when customers came to the dealership. The Complaint also alleges Bronx Honda represented as required certain charges and fees that were either not authorized by customers or were not required.

For example, according to the Complaint, Bronx Honda’s website listed vehicles with a specific price and monthly payment amounts, but in numerous cases sales representatives told customers the price advertised was in error and the vehicle could only be purchased for a higher price.

Further, Bronx Honda charged customers hundreds or thousands of dollars for warranties and repairs to “Certified Pre-Owned” vehicles, which were already covered by the manufacturer. In addition, Bronx Honda changed customers up to $695 in documentation fees that are statutorily capped at $75 by the state of New York and would unilaterally increase the price of finance contracts at closing without disclosing the change to the customer.

Violation of the Truth in Lending Act (Reg. Z)

The Complaint alleges Bronx Honda advertised monthly payment amounts without disclosing required terms and advertised a rate of finance for closed-end credit without using the term “annual percentage rate.” According to the Complaint, Bronx Honda’s online vehicle listings included the monthly payment amounts without disclosing any of the other required terms.

Relief:

In addition to paying the $1.5 million financial judgement, Bronx Honda must adopt a Fair Lending Program which includes written guidance establishing objective, non-discriminatory criteria for assessing (or not assessing) fees and charges. Bronx Honda must designate a qualified senior manager to be responsible for the program, mandate employee training once a year and report its compliance with those requirements to the FTC for the next fifteen years. Finally, Bronx Honda is barred from entering into retail installment contracts that carry an interest rate higher than 185 basis points above the “buy rate,” except for specific, documented reasons.

Takeaways:

This case breaks new ground for the FTC, charging an auto dealer with illegal racial discrimination under ECOA for the first time. Companies should ensure employees are trained to treat all customers equally and review sales data to ensure no class of customer is getting a worse deal. The fact that both Democratic commissioners have called on the FTC to issue rules to address unfair and deceptive abuse and discrimination in auto lending may signal that the agency will become more active in this area.

In addition, this case represents the FTC’s latest effort to enforce advertising disclosure requirements mandated by TILA. The FTC has brought many cases over the last several years against auto dealers for failing to properly disclose credit related terms. If a company advertises vehicle financing along with a “triggering term” (like a sample monthly payment amount or nominal interest rate), it must also clearly and conspicuously disclose addition information like annual percentage rate, term of the loan and any balloon payments.

 

Misrepresentation and Deception: Government Enforcement Agencies Ready to Litigate

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A&B ABstract:  The COVID-19 pandemic appears to be drafting the attention to consumer protection regulators to products that were active after the 2008 recession.

In the midst of the global pandemic, with unemployment rates surging to unprecedented levels, consumer protection regulators appear focused on areas where cash-strapped consumers may turn,  such as credit repair, payday loans, and mortgage and other debt relief.

Notably, these are the same areas that consumer protection regulators were active in during the post-2008 recession. For example, on May 22, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit alleging that defendants misrepresented that they can offer solutions that will or likely will substantially increase consumers’ credit scores despite not achieving those results.

In addition, on May 19, 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was granted a temporary restraining order and asset freeze against a payday lending operation alleging that it deceptively overcharged consumers millions of dollars and withdrew money repeatedly from consumers’ bank accounts without their permission.

These lawsuits are just two of many efforts that government enforcement agencies have undertaken recently to combat fraud and protect consumers. Businesses should be aware that agencies are actively pursuing litigation as a means to remedy potential consumer harm.

CFPB and Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Commonwealth Equity Group d/b/a Key Credit Repair and Nikitas Tsoukales

The CFPB and Massachusetts allege that Commonwealth Equity Group d/b/a Key Credit Repair (KCR) and its president, Nikitas Tsoukales violated §§ 1031 and 1036 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), the Telemarketing Sales Rule’s (TSR) prohibition on deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or practices, and the Massachusetts Credit Services Organization Law. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3 & 310.4; M.G.L. c. 93, §§ 68A-E (MA-CSO). KCR markets to consumers a service for supposedly removing harmful information from the consumer’s credit history, credit record, or credit scores or ratings.  Since 2011, KCR has collected at least $23 million in fees from tens of thousands of consumers through its telemarketing services.

The Complaint

According to the complaint, consumers pay KCR a “first work fee” upon enrolling with the company and then charges an additional monthly fee. KCR allegedly collects these fees from consumers before performing any service. KCR markets to consumers that “on average it can raise a person’s credit score by 90 points in 90 days” and that clients start “seeing removals of bad credit history in 45 days.”  However, “consumers did not see credit scores with an average 90-point increase in 90 days,” nor did they see “removals on their credit reports within 45 days” of enrolling with KCR in many instances.

The Complaint alleges that this scheme constitutes an abusive telemarking act because it is an improper advance fee to remove derogatory information from, or improve, a person’s credit history, credit record, or credit rating.

Further, the Complaint alleges that KCR’s conduct violates the CFPA because KCR allegedly misrepresented the material aspects of its services. Therefore, the CFPB and Massachusetts are seeking injunctive and monetary relief as well as civil monetary penalties.

FTC v. Lead Express, Inc., et al.

On May 11, 2020, the FTC filed an ex parte emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and sought other relief including an asset freeze against 11 payday lenders operating as a common enterprise through websites and telemarketing.  The FTC alleged that the entities were engaging in the deceptive, unfair, and unlawful marketing tactics in violation of the FTC Act, the TSR, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) , and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA).

The Complaint

According to the FTC’s complaint, despite claiming that consumers’ loans would be repaid after a fixed number of payments, the defendants typically initiated repeated finance-charge-only withdrawals without crediting the withdrawals to the consumers’ principal balances. Thus, consumers allegedly paid significantly more than what they were told they would pay. These misrepresentations violate Section 5(a) of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) as well as the TSR (16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iii)).  Additionally, the defendants allegedly made recurring withdrawals from consumers’ bank accounts without proper authorization which violates Section 907(a) of EFTA (15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a)) and illegally used remotely created checks, which under the TSR (16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(9)) are a prohibited form of payment in telemarketing.

The complaint also alleges that the defendants often failed to make required credit transaction disclosures in violation of Section 121 and 128 of TILA (15 U.S.C. §§ 1631 and 1638), and Sections 1026.17 and 1026.18 of Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17 and 1026.18).

The Court Order

On May 22, 2020, the District Court of Nevada granted an emergency motion for temporary restraining order against all eleven defendants. The order restrains the defendants from: (1) engaging in prohibited business activities in connection with advertising, marketing, promoting, or offering any loan or extension of credit, (2) releasing or using customer information, and (3) destroying, erasing falsifying documents relating to the business.  Furthermore, the defendants’ assets are frozen pending the show-cause hearing or further court order which will take place via videoconferencing on June 2, 2020.

Takeaway

With these two cases, government enforcement agencies support their statements that as the global pandemic continues, they are watching for deceptive or fraudulent practices in the financial services industry. Businesses should remain vigilant in their compliance with existing and new laws and regulations.