Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Supreme Court Cases Threaten a “Cornerstone” of the FTC’s Enforcement Program – Disgorgement

A&B ABstract:   

For decades, the FTC has pursued defendants allegedly engaged in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” in violation of the FTC Act.[i]  Specifically, the FTC has used Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to file dozens of lawsuits in federal court each year and recover billions of dollars in disgorgement against such defendants.  The FTC recently referred to its efforts to obtain disgorgement under Section 13(b) as “a cornerstone of the FTC’s enforcement program for more than 30 years.”[ii]  Depending on how the Supreme Court rules on forthcoming cases, the FTC may lose this “cornerstone” absent future Congressional action.

Discussion:

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act provides that, where the FTC “has reason to believe” that a person “is violating or is about to violate” the FTC Act or a law enforced by the FTC, it can pursue a preliminary or permanent injunction in federal court.[iii]  The text of Section 13(b) mentions only injunctive relief, and does not mention disgorgement or restitution.  Courts for years, however, have held that Section 13(b) provides a broad grant of equitable authority, which included disgorgement as an equitable remedy.[iv]  As one district court described it, “[t]his is not supported by the plain text of the statute, but has been read into it by well-meaning judicial efforts to effect the ‘purpose’ of the statute.”[v]  Just a few years ago, the FTC obtained its largest ever disgorgement award in a litigated case – $1.27 billion in FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC.[vi]  And, until August 2019, the circuit courts were unanimous in allowing the FTC to obtain disgorgement in actions under Section 13(b).

FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC

On August 21, 2019, the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, overturned prior precedent and held for the first time that “[S]ection 13(b)’s permanent injunction provision does not authorize monetary relief.”[vii]  The court “recognize[d] that this conclusion departs from the consensus view of our sister circuits,” but nonetheless held that the “plain text” of Section 13(b) does not provide for disgorgement.  To date, the FTC has not sought Supreme Court review of this decision, although it stated that it and the Office of the Solicitor General “are currently evaluating whether to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.”[viii] The FTC recently obtained an extension until December 19, 2019 to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center followed a December 2018 concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit case of FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, where two of the three judges on the panel urged the court to rehear the case en banc to overturn the circuit’s prior precedent allowing the FTC to obtain disgorgement under Section 13(b).[ix]  Rehearing was denied, and as a result, the FTC’s $1.27 billion disgorgement award was affirmed.

The FTC’s decision whether or not to seek Supreme Court review in Credit Center Bureau will be informed by the fact that AMG Capital has made its way onto the Supreme Court’s certiorari petition docket.  On October 18, 2019, the defendants in AMG Capital filed their petition for a writ of a certiorari with the Supreme Court.[x]  The petitioners relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Center Bureau and the text of Section 13(b).  The petitioners argued that Section 13(b) “nowhere mentions monetary relief” and the statute stands in stark contrast to Section 19 of the FTC Act.  That section specifically allows for, among other things, “the refund of money or return of property, [and] the payment of damages” (1) when the FTC shows that the conduct at issue violates an existing FTC rule or (2) when the defendant violates a prior cease-and-desist order.[xi]  The FTC requested an extension until December 20, 2019 to file its response to this certiorari petition.  Therefore, the FTC has some significant decisions to make in the coming few weeks.

Liu v. SEC

Regardless of whether the Supreme Court reviews either the Seventh Circuit decision in Credit Bureau Center or the Ninth Circuit decision in AMG Capital, the Supreme Court is set to review the question of whether disgorgement constitutes “equitable relief” in the context of a securities law violation.  On November 1, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Liu v. SEC and will determine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission can obtain disgorgement as an equitable remedy in an enforcement action.[xii]  A decision in Liu is expected by June 2020.

While Liu involves the SEC and its enforcement statutes, and not the FTC and the FCT Act, the decision in Liu is nonetheless likely to impact the FTC’s ability to obtain disgorgement under the FTC Act.  Much like the FTC, the SEC has for many years sought disgorgement in enforcement proceedings.  “Beginning in the 1970’s, courts ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings in order to deprive …defendants of their profits in order to remove any monetary reward for violating securities laws and to protect the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.”[xiii]  Courts have done so, even though by statute, the SEC can only obtain injunctive relief, equitable relief or civil monetary penalties.[xiv]

Kokesh v. SEC

Liu follows the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC.[xv]  In that case, the Supreme Court held that “SEC disgorgement … bears all the hallmarks of a penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate.  The 5-year statute of limitations in [15 U.S.C.] § 2462 therefore applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement.”[xvi]  The Supreme Court, however, was careful to note in a footnote that “[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or whether courts have properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.”[xvii]

The Supreme Court will now specifically answer that question in Liu and determine whether disgorgement constitutes an equitable remedy following its holding that disgorgement is a “penalty.”  The oral argument from Kokesh showed that five Justices at the time questioned the statutory authority for the disgorgement remedy given that the enforcement statutes do not specifically provide for such a remedy.

Justice Gorsuch – “Well, here we don’t know [when the disgorged money goes to the victim], because there’s no statute governing it.  We’re just making it up.”

Chief Justice Roberts – “[T]he SEC devised this [disgorgement] remedy or relied on this remedy without any support from Congress.”

Justice Alito – “[I]t would certainly be helpful and maybe essential to know what the authority for [disgorgement] is.”

Justice Sotomayor – “Can we go back to the authority? …[I]f they’re not doing restitution, how could that be the basis of disgorgement?”

Justice Kennedy – “Is it clear that the district court has statutory authority to do this? …[I]s there specific statutory authority that makes it clear that the district court can entertain this remedy?”[xviii]

In addition, then Circuit Judge Kavanaugh wrote in Saad v. SEC that Kokesh “overturned a line of cases from [the D.C. Circuit] that had concluded that disgorgement was remedial and not punitive” and “the Court’s reasoning in Kokesh was not limited to the specific statute at issue there.”[xix]  All of this suggests that there is a likelihood that the Supreme Court will hold that disgorgement – in the SEC context – which has already been held to be a “penalty,” does not constitute “equitable relief.”

Takeaways:

 

The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the appeal in Liu would seem to increase the chance the Supreme Court accepts the pending certiorari petition in AMG Capital given the similarity between the disgorgement issues in the context of the SEC and the FTC.  Similarly, as a result of Liu and the pending certiorari petition in AMG Capital, the FTC may elect to seek certiorari from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center.  Therefore, there is at least an increased likelihood that the Supreme Court will specifically take an appeal on the direct issue of whether the FTC can obtain disgorgement under Section 13(b).  Given the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokesh that disgorgement is a penalty for statute of limitations purposes and the Justices comments at oral argument, such an appeal creates a risk to the FTC that the Supreme Court will similarly rule that disgorgement under the FTC Act is also a penalty, and thus does not fall within the scope of equitable relief allowed by Section 13(b).

Even if the Supreme Court does not take the appeal in AMG Capital (or Credit Bureau Center, if a petition is filed), a ruling in Liu that the SEC cannot seek and obtain disgorgement as “equitable relief” would nonetheless have consequences for the FTC and its ability to obtain disgorgement under the FTC Act.  Indeed, the FTC has recognized that the SEC statutory framework is similar to the FTC Act in that neither expressly mention monetary relief, but courts have nonetheless allowed disgorgement as a remedy.  Thus, an adverse ruling in Liu in the SEC context would provide defendants with arguments in the district courts and circuit courts that prior precedent allowing disgorgement as a form of equitable relief to the FTC is no longer tenable.  In such a case, the lower courts would have a new legal basis upon which to follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead from Credit Bureau Center and foreclose the FTC from continuing to use disgorgement as the “cornerstone” of its enforcement program.  The strength of such arguments will be determined in the next several months as these cases get decided.

 

[i] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

[ii] Motion to Stay the Mandate at 5, FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, No. 18-2847, ECF No. 61 (7th Cir. Sept., 17, 2019).

[iii] 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

[iv] See, e.g., FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2016); FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2nd Cir. 2011); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).

[v] FTC v. Hornbeam Special Situations, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-3094, 2018 WL 6254580 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018).

[vi] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/10/record-13-billion-ruling-against-scott-tucker-others-behind; FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018).

[vii] 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019).

[viii] Motion to Stay the Mandate at 3, Credit Bureau Ctr., No. 18-2847, ECF No. 61 (7th Cir. Sept., 17, 2019).

[ix] AMG Capital, 910 F.3d at 421.

[x] AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, No. 19-508 (U.S.).

[xi] 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a).

[xii] Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Liu v. SEC, No. 18-1501 (petition granted, Nov. 1, 2019).

[xiii] Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017).

[xiv] 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (d), 78u(d)(1), (3) and (5).

[xv] Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1635.

[xvi] Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1644.

[xvii] Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1642 n3.

[xviii] Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, Liu v. SEC, No. 18-1501 (citing oral argument transcript at 7-9, 13, 31, 52, Kokesh v. SEC, No. 16-529 (Apr. 18, 2017)).

[xix] Saad v. SEC, 873 F.3d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Five: The Devil is in the Details, Purgatory is what is Left Unsaid

A&B Abstract

This blog post is part five of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (the “Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

The idiom “the devil is in the details” refers to catching something hidden in the details. At 538 pages, there is a lot to catch.  The prior four blog posts described the requirements of the Proposed Rule.  In part one, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  In part three, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers.  In part four, we discussed certain additional conduct provisions under the Proposed Rule, such as provisions relating to decedent debt, the collection of time-barred debt, credit reporting restrictions, and restrictions on a debt collector’s ability to transfer, sell, or place a debt for collection.  This post examines noteworthy issues that the Proposed Rule does not address, such as:

  • Clarification of the definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA and the scope of certain exemptions from that definition
  • Implications for first party collectors
  • Ability to pass through actual third-party convenience fees
  • Implications of phone recordings, in light of the Proposed Rule’s record retention requirements
  • Interplay with state debt collection laws

Clarification of the Definition of, and Exemptions from, the Term “Debt Collector”

The purpose of the Proposed Rule is to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA.  A debt collector under the FDCPA is any person: (i) “who uses instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” prong), or (ii) “who regularly collects, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another” (the “regularly collects” prong). The FDCPA also includes several exclusions from this definition.  Other than specifying that the term “debt collector” excludes certain private entities that operate certain bad check enforcement programs, the Proposed Rule restates the statutory definition of “debt collector” without addressing certain key issues that have been subject to uncertainty for far too long.  By way of example:

  • Who is a debt buyer and are all purchasers of loans or servicing rights debt collectors?   In the case of Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, the Supreme Court recently examined whether someone who purchased a whole loan while it was already in default would be considered a debt collector. The Court concluded that such an entity would not be a debt collector because the debt would not be “owed” to another.  The Court explicitly avoided ruling on whether such an entity that purchases defaulted debt could meet the principal purpose prong of the definition of debt collector.  As a result, questions remain on the application of the definition of debt collector to debt buyers.  Equally unclear is the application of this definition to servicers and subservicers who do not own the whole loan but service the loan for another entity.  While the Proposed Rule does not address such important issues, the preamble notes “[c]onsistent with the Court’s holding in Henson, the proposed definition thus could include a debt buyer collecting debts that it purchased and owned, if the debt buyer either met the ‘principal purpose’ prong of the definition or regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owed by others, in addition to collecting debts that it purchased and owned.”
  • Meaning of “in default.”  Under the FDCPA, the term debt collector excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due to another, to the extent such debt collection activity . . . concerns a debt that was not in default at the time such person obtained it.”  The important phrase “in default” is not defined under the FDCPA. An influential FTC staff opinion letter from 2002 opined that whether a debt is “in default” is generally controlled by the terms of the contract creating the debt and applicable state and federal law but “in the absence of a contractual definition or conclusive state or federal law, a creditor’s reasonable written guidelines may be used to determine when an account is “in default.” In the context of mortgage servicing, the CFPB recognized in the preamble to its mortgage servicing rules that servicers may distinguish loans that are delinquent from loans in default (“[s]ervicers may use different definitions of ‘delinquency’ for operational purposes.  Servicers may also use different or additional terminology when referring borrowers who are late or behind on their payments – for example, servicers may refer to borrowers as “past due” or “in default” and may distinguish between borrowers who are “delinquent and seriously delinquent”).  It is not clear why the Bureau declined to clarify a key term such as “in default” in the Proposed Rule.
  • Scope of “de facto employee.”  The FDCPA also excludes from the definition of the term debt collector “any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor.”  That influential 2002 FTC staff opinion letter opined the de facto employee exemption is limited to “those collection agency employees who are treated essentially the same as creditor employees. . .Whether the agency employees – working on the creditor’s premises or on the agency’s premises – are treated enough like creditor employees to become de facto employees of the creditor will depend on the degree of control and supervision exercised by the creditor over the agency employees’ collection activity, and how similar that control and supervision is to that exercised by the creditor over its own employees.”  Twice the CFPB has referred to this FTC staff opinion letter.  It is, thus, unclear why the CFPB does not address this known issue.

First Party Collectors

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the FDCPA to provide the Bureau with substantial rulemaking authority “with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors.”  This is the primary authority upon which the Bureau has promulgated the Proposed Rule.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Bureau with the authority to prescribe rules applicable to prevent unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”) by “covered persons”.  “Covered persons” includes persons who are engaging in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.  As noted in the preamble to Regulation F, “[c]overed persons under the Dodd-Frank Act thus include many FDCPA-covered debt collectors, as well as many creditors and their servicers who are collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service.”  Several requirements in the Proposed Rule are promulgated under the Bureau’s UDAAP authority.  By way of example, with respect to a debt collector who is collecting a consumer financial product or service debt, Proposed Rule 1006.14 provides that it is an unfair act or practice place telephone calls or engage any person in telephone conversations repeatedly or continuously in connection with the collection of such debt, such that the natural consequence is to harass, oppress or abuse any person at the called number.  The Bureau proposes to set the frequency limit at 7 telephone calls within 7 consecutive days to a particular person about a particular debt.  The CFPB believes that such a limit bears a reasonable relationship to prevent an unfair practice. Would telephone calls in excess of the 7 calls within 7 consecutive day limit constitute an unfair act or practice if engaged in by persons other than FDCPA-debt collectors?  The Bureau, unfortunately, declined to say, thus leaving open the question of what, if anything, in the Proposed Rule could be relevant to first party creditors and their servicers.

Convenience Fees

There has been an uptick in consumer class actions following the CFPB’s guidance on Pay by Phone Fees (Compliance Bulletin 2017-01).  Both the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule provide that a debt collector cannot use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt including the collecting of any amount unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. It is unfortunate that the CFPB elected not to provide clarification on the application of this restriction to convenience fees, as intimated in its Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) report.  That report notes that the CFPB considered two potential clarifications.  First, consistent with Compliance Bulleting 2017-01, the Bureau considered providing that incidental fees, including payment method convenience fees would be permissible only if: (a) state law expressly permits them, or (b) the customer expressly agreed to them in the contract that created the underlying debt and state law neither expressly permits nor prohibits the fee,  The Bureau further considered clarifying that fees charged in full by, and paid directly to, a third party payment processor, would not be collected directly or indirectly by the collector and would not be covered by the rule.  It is not clear why such clarifications did not make it into the Proposed Rule.

Record Retention

Proposed 1006.100 requires a debt collector to retain evidence of compliance with the Proposed Rule starting on the date that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt and extending until three years after (i) the debt collector’s last communication or attempted communication in connection with the collection of the debt, or (ii) the debt is settled, discharged, or transferred to the debt owner or another debt collector.  The commentary to the Proposed Rule provides that debt collectors are not required to record telephone calls.  However, a debt collector must retain recordings if the recordings are “evidence of compliance.”  Does this mean that collectors who record phone calls for a short period of time for quality control purposes would now be required to maintain such recordings for the 3-year record retention period?  Moreover, what else is required to maintain “evidence of compliance”? Would it encompass all records the debt collector relied upon for the information in the validation notice and to support claims of indebtedness, such as the information the debt collector obtained before beginning to collect and the records the debt collector relied upon in responding to a dispute?  Would it encompass all records related to the debt collector’s interactions with the consumer, such as written and oral communications to and from the consumer, individual collection notes or communications in litigation?

State Debt Collection Laws

Mirroring the FDCPA, proposed section 1006.104 provides that “[n]either the [FDCPA] nor the corresponding provisions of this part annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part from complying with the laws of any state with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”  Moreover, the Proposed Rule provides that a State law is not inconsistent if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by the FDCPA or the Proposed Rule.

State debt collection laws vary.  Approximately 30 states mandate licensure or registration of collection agencies and impose practice restrictions.  Three states impose more minimal notification requirements before operating as a collection agency.  Five states have no licensing/notification requirements but impose practice requirements.  Thirteen states require neither licensure or notification requirements nor impose agency-specific practice restrictions.  Three municipalities also have collection agency laws.  Some of these laws apply to debts not covered by the FDCPA such as original creditor debts or loans acquired when current that subsequently go into default.  States may have more extensive disclosure requirements or restrictive communication requirements.

One of the stated purposes of the FDCPA is to promote consistent action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.  This, apparently, does not include consistent regulation of debt collectors, as it appears that so long as it isn’t inconsistent, state regulation above and beyond the FDCPA is acceptable.

Takeaway

The Proposed Rule reflects the investment of significant time and consideration by the Bureau and an attempt to address some of the most significant issues facing the debt collection industry as it adapts to modern collection practices.  However, a number of important issues remain unresolved.  As a result, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders must pay close attention both to what is in the Proposed Rule and what is not.

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Four: Other Conduct Provisions

A&B Abstract

This blog post is part four of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (“Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

In part one of this series, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  In part three, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers.  This post summarizes certain additional conduct provisions under the Proposed Rule.  These include provisions relating to decedent debt, the collection of time-barred debt, credit reporting restrictions, and restrictions on a debt collector’s ability to transfer, sell, or place a debt for collection.

Proposed Provisions Related to Decedent Debt

The FDCPA defines a “consumer” as any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.  Under the Proposed Rule, this definition would be revised to make clear that a “consumer” includes any natural person, whether living or deceased, obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.  In addition, for purposes of the Proposed Rule’s provisions regarding communications in connection with debt collection (proposed section 1006.6) and the prohibition on communicating through a medium of communication that the consumer has requested the debt collector not use (proposed section 1006.14(h)), proposed section 1006.6(a)(5) would interpret FDCPA section 805(d)’s definition of the term consumer to include:

  1. The consumer’s spouse;
  2. The consumer’s parent, if the consumer is a minor;
  3. The consumer’s legal guardian;
  4. The executor or administrator of the consumer’s estate, if the consumer is deceased; and
  5. A confirmed successor in interest, as defined in Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024.31, and Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(27)(ii).

Under Regulations X and Z, a successor in interest is a person to whom a borrower transfers an ownership interest either in a property securing a mortgage loan subject to subpart C of Regulation X, or in a dwelling securing a closed-end consumer credit transaction under Regulation Z, provided that the transfer is:

  1. A transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety;
  2. A transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
  3. A transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of the property;
  4. A transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner of the property; or
  5. A transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property.

A confirmed successor in interest, in turn, means a successor in interest whose identity, and ownership interest in the relevant property type, have been confirmed by the servicer of the loan.

The Bureau has previously explained that the word “includes” in FDCPA section 805(d) indicates that section 805(d) is an exemplary, rather than an exhaustive, list of the categories of individuals who are consumers for purposes of that section. The Bureau has further explained that, “given their relationship to the individual who owes or allegedly owes the debt, confirmed successors in interest are—like the narrow categories of persons enumerated in FDCPA section 805(d)—the type of individuals with whom a debt collector needs to communicate about the debt.”  The Bureau is seeking comment on the proposed definition of “consumer” under section 1006.6(a)(5), including on the benefits and risks of communications about debts between debt collectors and confirmed successors in interest.

In addition, proposed comment 6(a)(4) would clarify that the terms “executor or administrator” also include the personal representative of the consumer’s estate.  The proposed commentary would explain that a personal representative is any person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate.  Persons with such authority may include personal representatives under the informal probate and summary administration procedures of many states, persons appointed as universal successors, persons who sign declarations or affidavits to effectuate the transfer of estate assets, and persons who dispose of the deceased consumer’s assets extrajudicially.

The proposed comment would adapt the general description of the term personal representative from Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.11(c), comment 11(c)-1 (persons “authorized to act on behalf of the estate”) rather than the general description found in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Policy Statement on Decedent Debt (persons with the “authority to pay the decedent’s debts from the assets of the decedent’s estate.”). The Bureau has indicated that it believes this change is non-substantive. The Bureau is requesting comment on the scope of the definition of personal representative in proposed comment 6(a)(4)-1 and on any ambiguity in the illustrative descriptions of personal representatives.  Interested stakeholders should consider the potential operational challenges associated with validating and documenting whether a person is in fact the personal representative of a deceased consumer’s estate, given that disclosure regarding a consumer’s debt to the wrong person could result in a prohibited third-party disclosure.  Thus, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should determine whether additional guidance from the Bureau is needed.

In addition, we note proposed section 1006.18’s general prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading representations, which the Bureau has indicated would apply to express or implied misrepresentations that a personal representative is liable for the deceased consumer’s debts.  The Bureau is requesting comment on whether the general prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading representations in proposed section 1006.18 is sufficient to protect individuals who communicate with debt collectors about a deceased consumer’s debts, or whether affirmative disclosures in the decedent debt context are needed.

Proposed Provisions Regulating the Collection of Time-Barred Debts

Under current law, multiple courts have held that suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt violate the FDCPA, reasoning that such practices violate FDCPA section 807’s prohibition on false or misleading representations, FDCPA section 808’s prohibition on unfair practices, or both.  The FTC has similarly concluded that the FDCPA bars actual and threatened suits on time-barred debt.

Nevertheless, the Bureau has indicated that its enforcement experience suggests that some debt collectors may continue to sue or threaten to sue on time-barred debts.  Furthermore, in response to its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, issued in November 2013, the Bureau indicated that some consumer advocacy groups and State Attorneys General observed that consumers are often uncertain about their rights concerning time-barred debt and that those observations have been borne out by the Bureau’s own consumer testing.

Consequently, the Proposed Rule would interpret FDCPA section 807 to provide that a debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a debt that the debt collector “knows or should know” is a time-barred debt because such suits and threats of suit explicitly or implicitly misrepresent, and may cause consumers to believe, that the debts are legally enforceable. The Bureau has indicated that the Proposed Rule “may provide debt collectors with greater certainty as to what the law prohibits while also protecting consumers and enabling them to prove legal violations without having to litigate in each case whether lawsuits and threats of lawsuits on time-barred debt violate the FDCPA.”  However, it is unclear how the “knows or should know” standard will be applied.  The Bureau appears to have acknowledged as much, indicating that “sometimes [it] may be difficult…to determine whether a ‘know or should have known’ standard has been met” and that “[s]uch uncertainty could increase litigation costs and make enforcement of proposed section 1006.26(b) more difficult.”  Therefore, the Bureau has specifically requested comment on using a “knows or should know” standard in proposed section 1006.26(b) as well as on the advantages of using a strict liability standard in its place.

While it is notable that the Bureau did not take the additional step of prohibiting the collection of time-barred debt in a non-judicial setting, it has indicated that it is “likely to propose that debt collectors must provide disclosures to consumers when collecting time-barred debts.” The Bureau has indicated that it is currently completing its evaluation of “whether consumers take away from non-litigation collection efforts that they can or may be sued on a debt and, if so, whether that take-away changes depending on the age of the debt.” The Bureau is also evaluating how a time-barred debt disclosure might affect consumers’ understanding of whether debts can be revived. Specifically, the Bureau is considering disclosures that would inform a consumer that, because of the age of the debt, the debt collector cannot sue to recover it, and would also include, where applicable, a disclosure that would inform a consumer that the right to sue on a time-barred debt can be revived in certain circumstances.

The Bureau has indicated that it plans to conduct additional consumer testing of possible time-barred debt and revival disclosures to further inform its evaluation of any time-barred debt disclosures. The Bureau intends to issue a report on such testing and any disclosure proposals related to the collection of time-barred debt and will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on such testing if the Bureau does in fact intend to use it to support disclosure requirements in a final rule.

Proposed Restrictions on Credit Reporting

The Bureau noted that some debt collectors engage in so-called “passive” collections by furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies without first communicating with consumers.  Accordingly, in order to mitigate the perceived harm that a consumer may suffer if a debt collector furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency without first communicating with the consumer, proposed section 1006.30(a) would prohibit a debt collector from furnishing information regarding a debt to a consumer reporting agency before communicating with the consumer about the debt.

In addition, the Bureau noted that during the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) process, industry stakeholders expressed concern over the potential burden associated with documenting, such as by using certified mail, that a consumer received a communication and recommended that the Bureau consider clarifying the type of communication that would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement, including clarifying that debt collectors do not need to send the validation notice by certified mail.

To address the recommendation that came out of the SBREFA process, the Bureau is proposing comment 30(a)-1.  In particular, proposed comment 30(a)-1 would clarify that a debt collector would satisfy proposed section 1006.30(a)’s requirement to communicate if the debt collector conveyed information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to the consumer through any medium, but a debt collector would not satisfy the communication requirement if the debt collector attempted to communicate with the consumer but no communication occurred.  By way of example, a debt collector would be considered to have communicated with the consumer if the debt collector provides a validation notice to the consumer, but a debt collector would not be considered to have communicated with the consumer by leaving a limited-content message for the consumer.

The Bureau is seeking comment on proposed section 1006.30(a) and its related commentary.  In light of the record retention requirements that would be imposed under the Proposed Rule—which would require a debt collector to retain evidence of compliance with the Proposed Rule for three years—debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should consider whether additional guidance is needed regarding the level of documentation or other evidence of compliance needed to satisfy proposed section 1006.30(a) and the record retention requirements under proposed section 1006.100.

Proposed Provisions Governing Transfers of Debt

In promulgating the Proposed Rule, the Bureau noted that the “sale, transfer, and placement for collection of debts that have been paid or settled or discharged in bankruptcy, or that are subject to an identity report creates risk of consumer harm.”  Specifically, if a debt is paid or settled, or discharged in bankruptcy, the debt is either extinguished or uncollectible, and if a debt is listed on an identity theft report, the debt likely resulted from fraud, in which case the consumer may not have a legal obligation to repay it.

The Bureau has noted that when the FDCPA became law, debt sales and related transfers were uncommon. However, in more recent years, debt sales and transfers have become more frequent. As a result, the Bureau has noted that the “general growth in debt sales and transfers may have increased the likelihood that a debt that has been paid, settled, or discharged in bankruptcy may be transferred or sold.”  Additionally, identity theft may increase the number of debts that are created if consumers’ identities are stolen and their personal information is misused.

To address these perceived risks, proposed section 1006.30(b)(1)(i) generally would prohibit a debt collector from selling, transferring, or placing for collection a debt if the debt collector “knows or should know” that the debt has been paid or settled, discharged in bankruptcy, or that an identity theft report has been filed with respect to the debt.

Moreover, with respect to a debt collector that is collecting a consumer financial product or service debt, proposed section 1006.30(b)(ii) would identify as an unfair act or practice under Dodd-Frank the sale, transfer, or placement for collection of such debt.

The Proposed Rule would provide an exemption from this general prohibition for transfers made to the debt’s owner.  The Bureau is also proposing the following three additional exemptions that parallel the exemptions found in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, including:

  1. Transferring the debt to a previous owner of the debt if transfer is authorized under the terms of the original contract between the debt collector and the previous owner;
  2. Securitizing the debt or pledging a portfolio of such debt as collateral in connection with a borrowing; or
  3. Transferring the debt as a result of a merger, acquisition, purchase and assumption transaction, or transfer of substantially all of the debt collector’s assets.

The Bureau is seeking comment on several issues related to this proposal, including:

  • On whether additional categories of debt, such as debt currently subject to litigation and debt lacking clear evidence of ownership, should be included in any prohibition adopted in a final rule;
  • On how frequently consumers identify a specific debt when filing an identity theft report, and on how frequently debt collectors learn that an identity theft report was filed in error and proceed to sell or transfer the debt;
  • On any potential disruptions that proposed section 1006.30(b)(1)(i) would cause for secured debts, such as by preventing servicing transfers or foreclosure activity related to mortgage loans; and
  • On whether any of the currently proposed categories of debts should be clarified and, if so, how; and on whether additional clarification is needed regarding the proposed “know or should know” standard.

Takeaway

While the Bureau appears to be cognizant of the potential compliance issues associated with several of the aforementioned provisions of the Proposed Rule, it is unclear how the “knows or should know” standard will be interpreted and enforced or whether the standard will result in more litigation than otherwise anticipated.  Accordingly, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should consider commenting on these and other provisions of the Proposed Rule.

 

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Three: Important Details Relating to Disclosures and Debt Validation Notices

A&B Abstract

This blog post is part three of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (“Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

In part one of this series, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  This post summarizes the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers. These include provisions relating to key proposed disclosures, namely the requirements relating to debt validation notices, and the electronic provision of required disclosures.

Background

Section 809(a) of the FDCPA requires that within five days after the initial communication with the consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector must provide the consumer with a validation notice (unless the required information is contained in the initial communication, or the consumer has paid the debt). The statute requires the notice to include:

  • The amount of the debt;
  • The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
  • A statement that unless the consumer disputes the validity of the debt (or any portion thereof) within 30 days after receipt of the notice, the debt collector will assume the debt to be valid;
  • A statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing during the 30-day period that the debt (or any portion thereof) is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer, and the debt collector will mail the consumer a copy of the verification or judgment; and
  • A statement that, upon the consumer’s request within the 30-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

Proposed Debt Validation Notice Requirements

To address perceived inadequacies in the processes relating to validation and verification, the Bureau has proposed Section 1006.34 to clarify what validation information debt collectors must provide to consumers.

First, the Proposed Rule would clarify that a debt collector may satisfy the initial disclosure requirement by sending a consumer a validation notice that satisfies the delivery requirements of proposed Section 1006.42(a): (1) in the initial communication; or (2) within five days thereafter.  However, as under Section 809(a), the disclosure requirement does not apply if the consumer has paid the debt prior to the time the notice is required to be sent.  As these provisions are largely consistent with the statute, they do not appear to present significant challenges for implementation.

Second, the Proposed Rule would require the validation information to be “clear and conspicuous,” which the CFPB would define consistent with how that term is used in other consumer financial services laws and implementing regulations.  Accordingly, for a disclosure to satisfy the standard, it would have to be: (1) readily understandable; (2) for a written or electronic disclosure, in a location and type size that are readily noticeable to consumers; and (3) for and oral disclosure, given at a volume and speed that are sufficient for a consumer to hear and comprehend it.

Third, the Proposed Rule would require a debt collector to include in the validation notice information about the debt that would be sufficient to enable the consumer to identify, and determine whether they owe, the debt.  Specifically, such information would include:

  • the consumer’s name and mailing address, which would have to be the most complete information the debt collector obtained from the creditor or another source;
  • the name of the creditor, which the CFPB proposes to make the creditor as of the itemization date;
  • the account number;
  • the amount of the debt;
  • information about consumer protections, including the right to dispute a debt and to request the name and address of the original creditor, as provided under Section 809(b) of the FDCPA; and
  • a consumer response form that a consumer may use to exercise such rights (e.g., submitting a dispute or requesting original creditor information), which would include express elective statements that a consumer could use to ensure that debt collectors provide the appropriate information.

Fourth, to comply with the validation disclosure requirements of Section 809(a) of the FDCPA and 12 C.F.R. § 1006.34 of the Proposed Rule, the CFPB has proposed a Model Validation Form (B-3).  The Bureau would permit a debt collector to adjust the content, format and placement of certain validation information within the model form, provided that the resulting disclosures are substantially similar to the model.

Disclosure of the Amount of Debt

The proposed requirements relating to the amount of the debt are worth note.  First, the Proposed Rule would require a debt collector to disclose both: (1) the current amount of the debt; and (2) the amount of the debt as of the “itemization date.”  The amount would have to be presented in tabular format, and reflect interest, fees, payments, and credits (or, if applicable, a disclosure that no interest, fees, payments, or credits were assessed or applied to a debt).  The Bureau has requested comment on whether the itemization should be more detailed, whether itemization is practicable for all categories of debt, and whether the proposed itemization would cause conflicts with other applicable laws and requirements.

Second, the Proposed Rule would define the “itemization date” as any of the following reference dates on which the debt collector can ascertain the amount of the debt: (1) the last statement date; (2) the charge-off date; (3) the last payment date; or (4) the transaction date;  Notably, while the Proposed Rule would allow a debt collector flexibility in determining which reference date to choose as the “itemization date,” it would require a debt collector to use the same date consistently for disclosures for that same consumer, to ensure that changes in the reference do not undermine the Bureau’s purpose of providing clear and consistent information in disclosures under proposed Section 1006.34.  Additionally, debt collectors would have to take care to identify the creditor as of the chosen itemization date.  The CFPB has requested comments on whether: (1) the proposed definition of “itemization date” will facilitate disclosure, (2) would capture all debt types; (3) whether additional clarification is needed; and (4) whether the potential reference dates should be ordered in a hierarchy in order to improve consumer understanding of the required disclosures.

Third, the Proposed Rule includes special disclosure requirements for the amount of the debt for debt collectors collecting mortgage debt that is subject to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41.  Given that that regulation requires the delivery of regular periodic statements that includes itemized fee information, the CFPB’s proposal reflects that for such loans the “amount of the debt” information that would otherwise be required under the Proposed Rule would already be delivered to consumers.  Accordingly, the Proposed Rule would permit a debt collector collecting a mortgage debt subject to the periodic statements requirement of Regulation Z a copy of the most recent periodic statement provided to the consumer at the same time as the validation notice, and refer to the periodic statement in the notice, in order to satisfy the itemization requirement.  In doing so, the Proposed Rule would provide flexibility to mortgage servicers in complying with the “amount due” itemization requirement.  The Bureau is requesting comment on how this exemption would apply to servicers exempt from the periodic statement requirement (e.g., for borrowers in bankruptcy).  However, we note that the periodic statement requirements also do not apply to open-end and reverse mortgage loans.  Thus, it appears that servicers of open-end and reverse mortgage loans would not be given the same flexibility in complying with the “amount due” itemization requirement.  In addition, it is unclear whether the provision of a periodic statement, in lieu of the itemized amount due, could create borrower confusion to the extent the amount listed on the periodic statement materially differs from the “current amount of the debt,” which must continue to be disclosed.

Proposed Validation Period Requirements

In addition to the validation notice requirements discussed above, Section 809 of the FDCPA requires a debt collector to satisfy certain requirements if a consumer, within the 30-day validation period: (1) disputes a debt; or (2) requests the name and address of the original creditor.  To ensure that consumers can take advantage of this protection, the Proposed Rule would require a debt collector to disclose to a consumer the date on which the verification right expires (i.e., the date on which the 30-day period ends).

The Proposed Rule would define the validation period as beginning on the date on which a debt collector provides the validation information, and ending 30 days after the consumer receives or is assumed to receive such information.  Under the Proposed Rule, the latter date would be any date that is at least five business days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the debt collector provides the validation information.  If a consumer does not receive the original validation notice, and the debt collector sends a subsequent notice, the Proposed Rule would calculate the validation period from the date of receipt (or assumed receipt) of the subsequent notice.

The Bureau is seeking comment on how debt collectors determine the end of the validation period, and on whether the timing presumption should be modified (including to account for differences in mail versus electronic delivery).

Proposed Provisions Relating to Translation of Disclosures

To address concerns regarding LEP consumers, the Proposed Rule would include provisions relating to the translation of information from validation notices.

Specifically, the Bureau proposes to permit a debt collector to include in a validation notice optional information (in Spanish) on how a consumer may request the notice in Spanish, if the debt collector chooses to provide a Spanish-language translation.  To determine the potential impact of this provision, the CFPB has requested comments on: (1) debt collectors’ current Spanish-language, and other non-English language, collection activities; (2) examples of supplemental Spanish-language instructions to request a translated validation notice; and (3) the benefits and risks of such an approach.

Further, the Proposed Rule would allow a debt collector to provide a translation of the validation notice in any language other than English if the debt collector: (1) also sends an English-language validation notice in the same transmittal; or (2) previously sent an English-language validation notice.  This provision of the proposal recognizes, but does not mirror, obligations that may arise under state law regarding the provision of translated documents to LEP consumers.  By declining to mandate multiple translations, the Bureau’s proposal would avoid imposing significant costs on debt collectors who may not deal with significant LEP populations.  However, the Bureau is seeking comment on whether a debt collector should be required to provide a translated non-English validation notice (in a language other than Spanish) at the request of the consumer.  Such a requirement could expand the cost of compliance with the Proposed Rule, particularly for debt collectors whose exposure to LEP consumers is more limited.

Electronic Disclosure Requirements

To recognize the role that electronic communications play in debt collection activities, the Proposed Rule would:

  • Permit debt collectors to include electronic contact information (website and email address) in the validation notice;
  • If a debt collector sends a validation notice electronically, require the debt collector to include a statement regarding how a consumer can take responsive actions (e.g., disputing the debt) electronically, and permit the debt collector to include such information in a disclosure that is not provided electronically;
  • Require a debt collector to provide required disclosures in a manner that is reasonably expected to provide actual notice and in a form that the consumer can keep and access later; and
  • If a debt collector provides required disclosures electronically, mandate compliance with the federal E-SIGN Act or equivalent processes.

The Bureau is giving particular consideration to how consumers might respond to electronic validation notices.  Specifically, the Proposed Rule considers how a debt collector may include prompts and hyperlinks in validation notices to facilitate consumer responses.  The former director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, David Vladeck, recently published an opinion article in which he highlighted several cybersecurity concerns related to the permissible use of hyperlinks under the Proposed Rule.  Specifically, the former director noted that:

Encouraging use of hyperlinks by unknown parties undermines government warnings about the risks of doing so and exposes consumers to criminal exploitation. Scammers pushing links with viruses, malware, and identity theft scams are almost certain to impersonate debt collectors. Consumers will face a catch-22: Click and risk a virus or a scam, or don’t click and miss potentially legitimate information about why a debt collector is going after you and how to dispute the debt.

In light of the risks highlighted by the former director, and other consumer advocates, it is unclear whether the Proposed Rule’s provisions on the use of hyperlinks will make their way into a Final Rule.

Takeaway

While the Proposed Rule would provide debt collectors some flexibility in determining how to comply with the validation notice requirements, the scope of issues on which the Bureau has requested comment in connection with these provisions leaves open the possibility that the new requirements could be significantly more burdensome to implement. As parts four and five of this blog series will discuss in greater depth, the final requirements that the Proposed Rule would impose, and its nuances, are important to note for debt collectors.

Alston & Bird Issues Client Alert on New Cybersecurity Requirements As Recently Announced by the Federal Trade Commission

On April 3 , Alston & Bird Senior Associate Michael Young issued a Client Alert on a recent announcement made by the Federal Trade Commission on proposed rule updates to two key privacy and security regulations of the Safeguards Rule and the Privacy Rule that address new cybersecurity requirements.  The Client Alert provides key highlights of the proposed rule updates for both rules as follows.  Under the Safeguards Rule, the proposal seeks to partially model itself after New York’s Cybersecurity Regulations, and would include a number of information security requirements.  Under the Privacy Rule, the proposal seeks to update the Privacy Rule to address annual privacy notice requirements.  In addition, the proposal seeks to provide clarification of the limited scope of the rulemaking authority of the FTC under Gramm Leach Bliley. The Client Alert also points out that the requirements set forth in the proposals may significantly impact various entities in the financial services industry and its activities under the authority of the FTC.

The Client Alert can be found here on the Alston & Bird Privacy Blog.