Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Servicing

Highlights of Washington Department of Financial Institutions’ Recent Mortgage Industry Webinar

A&B ABstract: In a webinar earlier this month, the Washington Department of Financial Institutions provided updates on licensing, rulemaking, and recent examination findings.

On June 2, the Washington Department of Financial Institutions (“DFI”) held a webinar covering mortgage industry updates in the state.  Among the topics discussed were:

Licensing Updates

Between May 2020 and May 2021, the DFI has seen a substantial increase in licensing activities involving issuances and renewals for both mortgage loan originators and companies, including MLO temporary authority to operate.

Rulemaking Updates

On June 15, the DFI will hold an industry stakeholders meeting to consider amending the rules under the Consumer Loan Act (“CLA,” WAC 208-620) and the Mortgage Broker Practices Act (“MBPA,” WAC 620-660) to allow MLOs to work from home without licensing the residence as a branch office.  The proposed rules will implement enacted Senate Bill 5077 (2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 15), which takes effect on July 25.

Examination Updates

During the first quarter of 2021, the DFI conducted examinations for the review period of October 2020 through April 2021.  Commonly identified violations included:

For mortgage loan servicing:
  • Failure to file accurate annual assessments;
  • Failure to suppress adverse credit reporting for CARES Act forbearances, most often during the initial months of forbearance;
  • Failure to maintain records (typically involving subservicers);
  • Inaccurate adjustable rate change information (i.e., incorrect margin or index); and
  • Inaccurate consolidated annual reports.
For mortgage loan origination, under the CLA:
  • Failure to update surety bond amounts as required by WAC 208-620-320;
  • Failure to date residential mortgage loan applications (initial and revised) as required by WAC 208-620-550(18);
  • Failure to have day-to-day operations managers licensed as an MLO; and
  • Failure to have a written supervisory plan in place.
For mortgage loan origination, under the MBPA:
  • With respect to quarterly mortgage condition reports (“MCRs”), failure to timely file and/or failure to file accurate MCRs;
  • Failure to develop and implement an adequate Anti-Money Laundering program;
  • Failure to provide updated lock-in agreements when lock terms change;
  • Failure to include a link to the company’s NMLS consumer access website on all internet advertisements; and
  • Advertising violations, namely using disallowed phrases (such as “best” or “lowest” when describing rates, fees, and programs) or advertising “no closing costs” or that something is “free”.

Takeaways

The webinar suggests that the pandemic has created both a surge in license applications and renewals, as well as increases in the volume of mortgage loans, for Washington licensees.

The examination findings serve as a reminder to Washington State licensees to be mindful of their own compliance management and quality control processes, in order to ensure that they are conducting business activities in compliance with all statutes and regulations (to include the CLA and MBPA).

The Hunstein Case: Upending Servicing and Debt Collection?

A&B Abstract:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, covering Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, recently decided in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management, Inc., that a debt collector’s communication with its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), which prohibits a debt collector for communicating, in connection with the collection of any debt, with an unauthorized third party.

The FDCPA and Regulation F

 In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.  Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA generally provides that, except with respect to seeking location information:

without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

The FDCPA defines “communication” to mean “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”

For decades the FDCPA was enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).  However, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, no federal regulator had rulemaking authority under the FDCPA.  The Dodd-Frank Act empowered the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) with rulemaking authority with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined by the FDCPA.  Prior to finalizing Regulation F, the CFPB conducted market outreach to better understand how debt collectors attempt to collect on accounts.  In July 2016, the CFPB published a study of third-party debt collection operations (“Operations Study”) that recognized debt collection firms’ reliance on vendors (such as print mail services, predictive dialers, voice analytics, payment processes and data servers).  In fact, the CFPB noted that most respondents use an outside vendor for sending written communications.

On November 30, 2020, amended Regulation F,  implementing the FDCPA, was published in the Federal Register with an effective date of November 30, 2021 (which has subsequently been delayed to January 29, 2022).  Regulation F does not specifically address the use of third-party vendors, such as print mail services, although the Operations Study was cited in the preamble to Regulation F.

With regard to civil liability, section 1692k of the FDCPA states that “[n]o provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.”

The Hunstein Case

Despite the CFPB’s implicit recognition of debt collectors’ use of print and other vendors,  a recent court decision suggests that use of certain vendors could violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on third-party communications.  In Hunstein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that (1) a violation of section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA confers Article III standing; and (2) a debt collector’s transmittal of a consumer’s personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” within the meaning of section 1692c(b).

The facts in this case are not unusual, and reflect the typical interactions between a debt collector and their third-party vendors. Specifically, the debt collector, Preferred Collection and Management Services Inc. (“Preferred”), electronically transmitted information concerning Hunstein’s debt (his name and his status as a debtor, the entity to which he owed the debt, the outstanding balance, the fact that his debt resulted from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name) to its third-party vendor. In turn, the vendor used that information to create, print, and mail a dunning letter to Hunstein.  As a result, Hunstein sued alleging that by sending his personal information to the third-party vendor, Preferred had violated section 1692c(b). The district court dismissed Hunstein’s action for failure to state a claim, holding that Hunstein had not sufficiently alleged that Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b), because it was not a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt.”  Hunstein appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed both the issues of Article III standing and whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.”

The court first considered the threshold issue of whether a violation of section 1692c(b) confers Article III standing. Specifically, the court focused on whether Hunstein had suffered an injury in fact, which requires an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The court indicated that the “standing question here implicates the concreteness sub-element.”  The court explained that a plaintiff can satisfy the concreteness requirement in one of three ways. A plaintiff can meet this requirement by (1) alleging a tangible harm (e.g., physical injury, financial loss, and emotional distress), (2) alleging a risk of real harm, or (3) identifying a statutory violation that gives rise to an “intangible-but-nonetheless-concrete injury.”  The court ultimately concluded that Hunstein had met the concreteness requirement “[b]ecause (1) § 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a harm that American courts have long recognized as cognizable and (2) Congress’s judgment indicates that violations of §1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury.”

After concluding that Hunstein had standing to sue, the court considered whether Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor was a “communication in connection with the collection of any debt.” At the outset, the court noted that the parties were in agreement that Preferred was a “debt collector,” that Hunstein was a “consumer,” and that the debt at issue was a “consumer debt,” as contemplated under the FDCPA. Moreover, the parties agreed that Preferred’s transmittal of Hunstein’s information to the third-party vendor constituted a “communication” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Thus, the only question remaining before the court was whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The court began its analysis by reviewing the plain meaning of the phrase “in connection with” and the word “connection,” and determined that “in connection with” and “connection” are generally defined to mean “with reference to or concerning” and “relationship or association,” respectively.  Based on these definitions, and the facts at issue, the court found it “inescapable that Preferred’s communication to [its third-party vendor] as least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship or association’ to its collection of Hunstein’s debt.”  Accordingly, the court held that Hunstein had alleged a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” as that phrase is commonly understood.

The court next considered, and rejected, Preferred’s three arguments that its communication was not “in connection with the collection of any debt.” First, the court found Preferred’s reliance on prior Eleventh Circuit decisions interpreting the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt,” as used under section 1692e, to be misplaced. The court explained that in those line of cases, the court had focused on the language of the underlying communications that were at issue. However, the court found that the district court’s conclusion that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” necessarily entails a demand for payment “defies the language and structure of § 1692c(b) for two separate but related reasons—neither of which applies to § 1692e.” First, the court explained that the “demand-for-payment interpretation would render superfluous the exceptions spelled out in §§ 1692c(b) and 1692b.” The court noted that under section 1692c(b), “[c]ommunications with four of the six excepted parties—a consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, and the attorney of the debt collector—would never include a demand for payment,” and that the “same is true of the parties covered by § 1692b and, by textual cross-reference, excluded from § 1692c(b)’s coverage.” Accordingly, the court held that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” in section 1692c(b) must mean something more than a mere demand for payment, so as not to render “Congress’s enumerated exceptions…redundant.”

The court also rejected Preferred’s argument that the court adopt a holistic, multi-factoring balancing test that was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in its unpublished opinion in Goodson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 600 Fed. Appx. 422 (6th Cir. 2015), for two reasons: (1) “Goodson and the cases that have relied on it concern § 1692e—not § 1692c(b),” and (2) sections 1692c(b) and 1692e differ both “linguistically, in that the former includes a series of exceptions that an atextual reading risks rendering meaningless, while the latter does not, and…operationally, in that they ordinarily involve different parties.” Moreover, the court found that “in the context of § 1692c(b), the phrase ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ has a discernible ordinary meaning that obviates the need for resort to extratextual ‘factors.’”

Finally, the court rejected Preferred’s “industry practice” argument—namely that there is widespread use of mail vendors and a relative dearth of FDCPA suits against them—holding that simply because “this is (or may be) the first case in which a debtor has sued a debt collector for disclosing his personal information to a mail vendor hardly proves that such disclosures are lawful.”

In holding that Preferred’s communication with its third-party vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt,” the court acknowledged that its “interpretation of § 1692c(b) runs the risk of upsetting the status quo in the debt-collection industry…[and that its] reading of § 1692c(b) may well require debt collectors (at least in the short term) to in-source many of the services that they had previously outsourced, potentially at great cost.” Moreover, the court recognized that “those costs may not purchase much in the way of ‘real’ consumer privacy.” Nevertheless, the court noted that its “obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.”

Takeaway 

The court’s textual reading of the statute fails to account for the technological changes to the industry since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977.

The CFPB has the authority to take a more pragmatic view, either through its advisory opinion program or formal rulemaking to recognize the important role of vendors while also putting in proper guardrails to protect consumers’ privacy.  Such a view would be consistent with the FTC’s treatment of this issue.  The FTC previously indicated that a debt collector could contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer. Presumably, a debt collector would have to transmit much the same information for purposes of communicating with the debtor through a letter vendor.

Congress also has the authority to modernize the FDCPA.  The House of Representatives recently passed a comprehensive debt collection bill (H.R. 2547, the Comprehensive Debt Collection Improvement Act, sponsored by Chairwoman Waters). While this bill currently doesn’t address the issue in Hunstein, that could be remedied in the Senate.

The consumer finance industry will be closely watching the Hunstein case as it works through the appeal process, as well as how other courts, Congress, CFPB and other regulators react.

The CFPB is Sending Mixed Messages on COVID-19 Flexibility

A&B ABstract: The CFPB’s inconsistent statements about the need for flexibility to address the pandemic suggest a deeper game afoot.

 CFPB warns that continued COVID flexibility for financial institutions is not prudent…

On March 31, 2021, the CFPB announced it would be rescinding seven policy statements issued last year that provided financial institutions with flexibilities regarding certain regulatory filings or compliance with consumer financial laws and regulations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the rescinded statements, for example, encouraged financial institutions to “work constructively with borrowers and other customers affected by COVID-19 to meet their financial needs” and to that end, “when conducting examinations and other supervisory activities and in determining whether to take enforcement action, the Bureau will consider the circumstances that entities may face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and will be sensitive to good-faith efforts demonstrably designed to assist consumers.”

In explaining the rescissions, Acting CFPB Director Uejio reasoned: “Because many financial institutions have developed more robust remote capabilities and demonstrated improved operations, it is no longer prudent to maintain these flexibilities.” Accordingly, the CFPB provided notice that it “intends to exercise the full scope of the supervisory and enforcement authority provided under the Dodd-Frank Act.”

To further drive home its point, on April 1, 2021, the CFPB issued a press release and compliance bulletin warning mortgage servicers that “unprepared is unacceptable” with regard to the treatment of mortgage borrowers exiting extended forbearances this fall. The CFPB stated it is “committed to using its authorities, including its authority under Regulation X mortgage servicing requirements and under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), to ensure that homeowners facing the ongoing economic impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) national emergency receive the benefits of critical legal protections and that avoidable foreclosures are avoided.”

Except when it is!

On March 2, 2021, the CFPB issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to delay the mandatory compliance date of the General Qualified Mortgage (QM) final rule from July 1, 2021 to October 1, 2022. The reason cited by the CFPB for the compliance delay is the “need to provide maximum flexibility [to financial institutions] to address the effects of the pandemic.” In particular, the CFPB’s proposal states:

“The Bureau is concerned that the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mortgage market may continue for longer than anticipated at the time the Bureau issued the General QM Final Rule, and so could warrant additional flexibility in the QM market to ensure creditors are able to accommodate struggling consumers.”

Additionally, on April 7, 2021, the CFPB proposed to delay the effective date of two recent debt collection rules by sixty days, from November 30, 2021 until January 29, 2022. The reason cited by the CFPB for its proposed delay is “to give affected parties more time to comply due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.” In particular, the CFPB’s proposal states:

“Since the Debt Collection Final Rules were published, the global COVID-19 pandemic has continued to cause widespread societal disruption, with effects extending into 2021. In light of that disruption, the Bureau believes that providing additional time for stakeholders to review and, if applicable, to implement the final rules may be warranted. The Bureau believes that extending the rules’ effective date by 60 days, to January 29, 2022, may provide stakeholders with sufficient time for review and implementation.”

What is really going on?

 Both of the CFPB’s delay NPRMs are curious. With respect to the QM delay proposal, a broad coalition of both housing and mortgage industry and consumer and civil rights groups files a joint comment letter stating that the recent enhancements to the General QM definition will replace loans that were designated QM under the temporary GSE Patch, and as a result, the organizations do not believe that extending the July 1 mandatory compliance date is necessary. And as our colleague Stephen Ornstein explained, recent FHFA actions will effectively sunset the GSE Patch on July 1 with or without the CFPB taking action. Further, with respect to the debt collection delay proposal, it is unlikely that 60 extra days before the rules take effect will make any appreciable difference to most market participants, considering that they were already given a full year to implement the rules, and they still won’t take effect for seven months.

The CFPB clearly has a strong desire to revisit both the underlying QM and debt collection final rules issued last year. For instance, as early as February 4, 2021, Acting Director Uejio stated that the CFPB would “[e]xplore options for preserving the status quo with respect to QM and debt collection rules.” And Diane Thompson, the Biden Administration political appointee now overseeing CFPB rulemaking efforts, publicly declared her hatred for the CFPB’s new General QM rule. If the CFPB does revisit these rules, it makes sense to do so soon; completing new rulemakings before the old ones take effect or require compliance could provide the CFPB a significant advantage in framing its mandatory Section 1022 cost-benefit analysis, depending upon the economic baseline established for analyzing the effects of its proposals. However, delaying rules simply for the purpose of changing them in light of the policy preferences of an incoming administration can be viewed skeptically by reviewing courts, since such actions tend to undermine the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. Perhaps that is the reason why the CFPB is disclaiming its plans to revisit the underlying rules in its delay NPRMs and, contrary to its own recent policy pronouncements, is relying instead upon the need for institutional flexibility to deal with the pandemic in the limited context of these two rules alone. Given the time constraints involved, the CFPB can be expected to show its full hand and propose changes to the QM and debt collection rules soon after it finalizes its associated delay rules.

CFPB Issues Warning to Mortgage Servicing Industry

A&B ABstract: On April 1, 2021, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) issued a Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance (the “Bulletin”) on the Bureau’s supervision and enforcement priorities with regard to housing insecurity in light of heightened risks to consumers needing loss mitigation assistance once COVID-19 foreclosure moratoriums and forbearances end.  The Bulletin warns mortgage servicers to begin taking appropriate steps now to prevent “a wave of avoidable foreclosures” once borrowers begin exiting COVID-19 forbearance plans later this Fall, and also highlights the areas on which the CFPB will focus in assessing a mortgage servicer’s compliance with applicable consumer financial laws and regulations.

The Bulletin

The Bulletin warns mortgage servicers of the Bureau’s “commit[ment] to using its authorities, including its authority under Regulation X mortgage servicing requirements and under the Consumer Financial Protection Act” to ensure borrowers impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic “receive the benefits of critical legal protections and that avoidable foreclosures are avoided.”

Specifically, the Bureau highlighted two populations of borrowers as being at heightened risk of referral to foreclosure following the expiration of the foreclosure moratoriums if they do not resolve their delinquency or enter into a loss mitigation option, namely, borrowers in a COVID-19-related forbearance and delinquent borrowers who are not in forbearance programs.

As consumers near the end of their forbearance plans, the CFPB expects “an extraordinarily high volume of loans needing loss mitigation assistance at relatively the same time.” The Bureau specifically expressed its concern that some borrowers may not receive effective communication from their servicers and that some borrowers may be at an increased risk of not having their loss mitigation applications adequately processed. To that end, the Bureau plans to monitor servicer engagement with borrowers “at all stages in the process” and prioritize its oversight of mortgage servicers in deploying its enforcement and supervision resources over the next year.

Servicers are expected to plan for the anticipated increase in loans exiting forbearance programs and related loss mitigation applications, as well as applications from borrowers who are delinquent but not in forbearance. Specifically, the Bureau expects servicers to devote sufficient resources and staff to ensure they are able to clearly communicate with affected borrowers and effectively manage borrower requests for assistance in order to reduce foreclosures. To that end, the Bureau intends to assess servicers’ overall effectiveness in assisting consumers to manage loss mitigation, and other relevant factors, in using its discretion to address potential violations of Federal consumer financial law.

In light of the foregoing, the Bureau plans to focus its attention on how well servicers are:

  • Being proactive. Servicers should contact borrowers in forbearance before the end of the forbearance period, so they have time to apply for help.
  • Working with borrowers. Servicers should work to ensure borrowers have all necessary information and should help borrowers in obtaining documents and other information needed to evaluate the borrowers for assistance.
  • Addressing language access. The CFPB will look carefully at how servicers manage communications with borrowers with limited English proficiency (LEP) and maintain compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and other laws. It is worth noting that the Bureau issued a notice in January 2021 encouraging financial institutions to better serve LEP borrowers in a language other than English and providing key considerations and guidelines.
  • Evaluating income fairly. Where servicers use income in determining eligibility for loss mitigation options, servicers should evaluate borrowers’ income from public assistance, child-support, alimony or other sources in accordance with the ECOA’s anti-discrimination protections.
  • Handling inquiries promptly. The CFPB will closely examine servicer conduct where hold times are longer than industry averages.
  • Preventing avoidable foreclosures. The CFPB will expect servicers to comply with foreclosure restrictions in Regulation X and other federal and state restrictions in order to ensure that all homeowners have an opportunity to save their homes before foreclosure is initiated.

Takeaway

As more and more borrowers begin to near the end of their COVID-19-related forbearance plans, and as applicable foreclosure moratoriums near their anticipated expiration dates, mortgage servicers should consider evaluating their mortgage servicing operations, including applicable policies, procedures, controls, staffing and other resources, to ensure impacted loans are handled in accordance with applicable Federal and state servicing laws and regulations.

Consolidated Appropriations Act Includes Temporary Provisions That May Affect Servicers

Among the myriad provisions of H.R. 133, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, is Division FF, Title X, Section 1001, of which mortgage holders and servicers should take note because it may affect activities with respect to borrowers in bankruptcy.  These temporary provisions expire December 27, 2021.

First, Section 1001 provides that a debtor under a Chapter 13 plan may seek (and a court may grant) a discharge if (1) the debtor has missed three or fewer mortgage payments on or after March 13, 2020 because of a “material financial hardship due, directly or indirectly, by the coronavirus disease 2019 COVID-19) pandemic”; or (2) the debtor’s plan provides for the curing of a default and maintenance of payments, and the debtor has entered into a loan forbearance or modification agreement, and. Importantly, unpaid mortgage payments are not discharged if the debtor is granted a discharge, and thus remain owed to the mortgage holder or servicer.

Second, Section 1001 provides that a consumer cannot be denied a CARES Act forbearance or other applicable CARES Act relief if they are a debtor in a pending bankruptcy case.

Third, Section 1001 permits servicers of federally backed mortgage loans to file supplemental proofs of claim for the amounts forborne under a CARES Act forbearance, provided that they are filed no later than 120 days after the expiration of the forbearance. Mortgage holders or servicers may also move to modify the debtor’s bankruptcy plan to provide for the supplemental CARES forbearance claim within thirty days after filing the supplemental claim.

Takeaway

Servicers may wish to consult counsel to determine whether these provisions will affect 2021 operations.