Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Servicing

Application Deadline Looms Under California Debt Collection Licensing Act

On September 25, 2020, California Governor Gavin Newsom approved Senate Bill 908 – enacting the Debt Collection Licensing Act (DCLA). The DCLA, which takes effect January 1, 2022, requires a person or entity engaging in the business of debt collection in California to be licensed and provides for regulatory oversight of debt collectors by the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI). Pursuant to the DCLA, debt collectors who submit an application by Dec. 31, 2021 may continue to operate in California pending the denial or approval of their application. On April 23, 2021, the Commissioner of the DFPI (the Commissioner) issued proposed regulations (the Regulations) to adopt procedures for applying for a debt collection license under the DCLA. On June 23, 2021, after consideration of public comments, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Modifications to the Regulations (the Modifications). On November 15, 2021, the Commissioner issued a second Notice of Modifications to the Regulations (the Additional Modifications).

The Regulations

The Regulations – among other things –  define relevant terms, include information regarding application procedures, and contain other miscellaneous information regarding licensing. The definition of “debt collector” was substantially the same as the broad definition under the enacted DCLA (which in turn is very similar to the Rosenthal FDCPA definition) and encompasses a wide array of activity in relation to consumer debt, including mortgage debt. Likewise, the regulations define “debt buyer” identical to the existing definition in Section 1788.50 of the Civil Code, which contains an exception for purchasers of a loan portfolio predominantly consisting of consumer debt that has not been charged off. See our prior post on the DCLA for more information regarding the scope of the licensure requirement.

The Regulations designate NMLS for the submission and processing of applications and reference and rely upon uniform NMLS forms and procedures. The application process includes completion of the NMLS uniform licensing form (MU1), including by any affiliates to be licensed under the same license. The application process includes collection of information regarding other trade names, web addresses used by the applicant, contact employees, organizational information (including information on any indirect owners), a detailed statement of business activities, certificates of good standing, and sample dunning letters. Applicants do not need to provide bank account information in Section 10 of Form MU1 or information on a qualifying individual in Section 17 of Form MU1. Fingerprinting (which is processed outside of NMLS), criminal history checks, and credit report authorizations are required for certain related individuals, including officers, directors, managing members, trustees, responsible individuals, and any individual owning directly or indirectly 10% or more of the applicant. An investigative background report is also required for any such individual who is not residing in the United States. Branches must also be licensed through NMLS uniform forms (MU3). Notice and additional filing requirements apply upon any change in the information submitted. The Regulations also contain surety bond requirements and outline the Commissioner’s authority in reviewing and examining applicants.

First Notice of Modification to the Regulations

On June 23, 2021 the Commissioner issued the Modifications which made several changes to the Regulations including, revising the definition of “applicant” to make clear that an affiliate who is not applying for a license is not an “applicant” – this revision, however, does not seem to impact the ability of applicants to include affiliates under a single license. Further, the Modifications added an English language requirement for documents filed with the DFPI. The Modifications also eliminated certain requirements to provide the Commissioner with additional copies of documents submitted through NMLS and otherwise revised requirements to allow information to be processed predominately through NMLS. The Modifications also eliminated the need to file certain fingerprinting documents in NMLS. Additionally, the Modifications added a requirement to explain derogatory credit accounts for any individual subject to credit reporting requirements. The Modifications also removed requirements that applicants provide information concerning compliance reporting and audit structure, the extent to which they intend to use third parties to perform any of their debt collection functions, that applicants file a copy of their policies and procedures with the NMLS, and certain annually collected financial information. The Modifications also eliminate the Commissioner’s ability to modify surety bond amounts.

Second Notice of Modification to the Regulations

On November 15, 2021 the Commissioner issued the Additional Modifications to the Regulations which amended the definitions of “branch office” and “debt collector.” “Branch office” was amended to mean any location other than the applicant’s or licensee’s principal place of business so long as “activity related to debt collection occurs” at that location and that the location is “held out to the public as a business location or money is received at the location or held at the location.” The Additional Modifications state that “holding a location out to the public” includes the receipt of postal correspondence and meeting with the public at the location, placing the location on letterhead, business cards, and signage, or making “any other representation to the public that the location is a business location.”

The definition of “debt collector” was amended to reference the definition set forth in the DCLA, rather than actually defining the term. Thus, any future revisions to the DCLA definition will automatically apply to the regulations as well.

Conclusion  

Debt Collection agencies and participants in California should anticipate additional regulations from the DFPI as aspects of the DCLA continue to be hammered out – in the interim any entity subject to licensing who has not done so already should submit an application before end of year to ensure continued operations.

New CFPB Chief Rohit Chopra Confirmed by Senate and Takes Immediate Action Against Big Tech Firms

A&B Abstract:

On September 30, 2021, the Senate confirmed Rohit Chopra to serve as director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in a 50-48 vote along party lines. He had been serving as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) where he had been a vocal critic of big tech companies and advocated for increased restitution for consumers. He previously served as the CFPB’s private education loan ombudsman under former CFPB Director Richard Cordray. Prior to that, he had worked closely with Sen. Elizabeth Warren on the CFPB’s establishment. Consistent with his past practices, Chopra’s CFPB has now ordered six Big Tech companies to turn over information regarding their payment platforms.

Expectations for Chopra’s CFPB

President-elect Biden announced Chopra as his choice to lead the CFPB before Inauguration Day, and the Biden Administration subsequently referred his nomination to the Senate in February. Chopra succeeds Kathy Kraninger, who became Director in December 2018 after having served as a senior official at the Office of Management and Budget. She led the CFPB for two years before the incoming Biden Administration demanded her resignation on January 20. It is expected that Chopra will aggressively lead the CFPB and unleash an industry crack down. The October 21, 2021 order issued to Big Tech regarding payment products appears to be the first step in that plan. Additionally, credit reporting companies, small-dollar lenders, debt collectors, fintech companies, the student loan industry, and mortgage servicers are among the financial institutions expected to face scrutiny from Chopra’s CFPB. Prior to the Big Tech inquiry, the CFPB, under interim leadership, had already taken initial steps to implement pandemic-era regulations and to advance the Biden administration’s priorities. It is also expected that the enforcement practices under former-Director Cordray will be revived under a Chopra-led CFPB.

After his confirmation, Chopra stated an intent to focus on safeguarding household financial stability, echoing prior statements regarding his commitment to ensuring those under foreclosure or eviction protections during the pandemic are able to regain housing security. He has also declared an intent to closely scrutinize the ways that banks use online advertising, as well as take a hard look at data-collection practices at banks. In his remarks related to the market-monitoring order issued to Big Tech, Chopra was critical of the way companies may collect data and his concern that it may be used to “profit from behavioral targeting, particularly around advertising and e-commerce.”

Just one week later, Chopra delivered remarks in his first congressional hearing as Consumer Financial Protection Bureau director. In his prepared statements before both the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, he cited mortgage and rent payments, small business continuity, auto debt, and upcoming CARES Act forbearance expirations as problems he plans to address. He also stated an intent to closely monitor the mortgage market and scrutinize foreclosure activity. And, echoing his action from a week earlier, Chopra reiterated an intent to closely look at Big Tech and emerging payment processing trends. Chopra also noted a lack of competition in the mortgage refinance market and stated an intent to promote competition within the market.

Although appointed to a five year term, the CFPB director serves at the pleasure of the president after a landmark decision last year from the Supreme Court.

Takeaway

Industry participants, including credit reporting companies, small-dollar lenders, debt collectors, fintech companies, the student loan industry, and mortgage lenders and servicers can anticipate additional scrutiny in the coming months and years from the CFPB. As Chopra gets settled into his new role, we will be keenly watching where he turns his attention to next.

Biden-Harris Administration Announces Extension of COVID-19 Foreclosure Moratorium

A&B Abstract:

Today, the Biden Administration announced an extension of the foreclosure moratorium for federally-backed mortgage loans (the “Presidential Announcement”). To implement the Presidential Announcement, the federal agencies (i.e., HUD/FHA, USDA, and VA) and GSEs (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) have announced (or are anticipated to announce) extensions of the foreclosure moratorium until July 31, 2021.

Presidential Announcement

According to the Presidential Announcement, the three federal agencies that back mortgages – the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and Department of Agriculture (USDA) – will extend their respective foreclosure moratorium for one, final month, until July 31, 2021. Similarly, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) will announce that it has extended the foreclosure moratorium for mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac until July 31, 2021.

The Presidential Announcement goes on to provide that once the moratoria end, HUD, VA, and USDA will take additional steps to prevent foreclosures on mortgages backed by those agencies until borrowers are reviewed for COVID-19 streamlined loss mitigation options that are affordable, while FHFA will continue to work with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure that borrowers are evaluated for home retention solutions prior to any referral to foreclosure.

In addition, the Presidential Announcement notes that HUD, VA, and USDA will also continue to allow homeowners who have not taken advantage of forbearance to date to enter into COVID-related forbearance through September 30, 2021, while homeowners with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac-backed mortgages who have COVID-related hardships will also continue to be eligible for COVID-related forbearance.

Finally, the Presidential Announcement indicates that HUD, VA, and USDA will be announcing additional steps in July to offer borrowers payment reduction options that will enable more homeowners to stay in their homes.

Federal Agency and GSE Announcements

In addition to the foregoing, the USDA and the GSEs issued the following guidance today implementing the Presidential Announcement:

  • USDA:  Today, the USDA issued a brief press release announcing a one-month extension, through July 31, 2021, of the moratorium on foreclosure from properties financed by USDA Single-Family Housing Direct and Guaranteed loans. Beyond July 31, 2021, the USDA indicated that it would continue to support homeowners experiencing financial hardship due to the pandemic by making loss mitigation options available to help keep them in their homes.
  • Fannie Mae LL-2021-02:  Today, Fannie Mae updated LL-2021-02 to extend the moratorium on foreclosures with respect to Fannie Mae loans through July 31, 2021.  Specifically, servicers must continue the suspension of the following foreclosure-related activities through July 31, 2021. Servicers may not, except with respect to a vacant or abandoned property: (1) initiate any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, (2) move for a foreclosure judgment or order of sale, or (3) execute a foreclosure sale.  All other guidance set forth in LL-2021-02 remains the same.
  • Freddie Mac Guide Bulletin 2021-23:  Similarly, today Freddie Mac issued Guide Bulletin 2021-23, which announces an extended effective date for the COVID-19 foreclosure moratorium.  Specifically, Freddie Mac is extending the foreclosure moratorium last announced in Guide Bulletin 2021-8. Servicers must suspend all foreclosure actions, including foreclosure sales, through July 31, 2021. This includes initiation of any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, motion for foreclosure judgment or order of sale. This foreclosure suspension does not apply to mortgages on properties that have been determined to be vacant or abandoned.

As of today, we are not aware of any formal announcement by HUD or VA regarding the implementation of the Presidential Announcement. However, we anticipate that both HUD and VA will issue guidance consistent with the above announcement in short order.

Takeaway 

The takeaway from today’s announcements is that, except with respect to vacant and abandoned properties, all foreclosure-related activities that could constitute the initiation of any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, movement for a foreclosure judgement or order of sale, or execution of a foreclosure sale should continue to be paused until the expiration of the extended foreclosure moratorium.  Moreover, the Presidential Announcement suggests that additional guidance will be issued by the federal agencies permitting borrowers who have not yet taken advantage of a COVID-19 forbearance to do so through September 30, 2021 and announcing additional steps in July to offer borrowers additional payment reduction options to enable more homeowners to stay in their homes. Accordingly, servicers should continue to monitor for any additional guidance from the federal agencies and GSEs regarding the foreclosure moratorium or other COVID-19-related borrower relief.

Highlights of Washington Department of Financial Institutions’ Recent Mortgage Industry Webinar

A&B ABstract: In a webinar earlier this month, the Washington Department of Financial Institutions provided updates on licensing, rulemaking, and recent examination findings.

On June 2, the Washington Department of Financial Institutions (“DFI”) held a webinar covering mortgage industry updates in the state.  Among the topics discussed were:

Licensing Updates

Between May 2020 and May 2021, the DFI has seen a substantial increase in licensing activities involving issuances and renewals for both mortgage loan originators and companies, including MLO temporary authority to operate.

Rulemaking Updates

On June 15, the DFI will hold an industry stakeholders meeting to consider amending the rules under the Consumer Loan Act (“CLA,” WAC 208-620) and the Mortgage Broker Practices Act (“MBPA,” WAC 620-660) to allow MLOs to work from home without licensing the residence as a branch office.  The proposed rules will implement enacted Senate Bill 5077 (2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 15), which takes effect on July 25.

Examination Updates

During the first quarter of 2021, the DFI conducted examinations for the review period of October 2020 through April 2021.  Commonly identified violations included:

For mortgage loan servicing:
  • Failure to file accurate annual assessments;
  • Failure to suppress adverse credit reporting for CARES Act forbearances, most often during the initial months of forbearance;
  • Failure to maintain records (typically involving subservicers);
  • Inaccurate adjustable rate change information (i.e., incorrect margin or index); and
  • Inaccurate consolidated annual reports.
For mortgage loan origination, under the CLA:
  • Failure to update surety bond amounts as required by WAC 208-620-320;
  • Failure to date residential mortgage loan applications (initial and revised) as required by WAC 208-620-550(18);
  • Failure to have day-to-day operations managers licensed as an MLO; and
  • Failure to have a written supervisory plan in place.
For mortgage loan origination, under the MBPA:
  • With respect to quarterly mortgage condition reports (“MCRs”), failure to timely file and/or failure to file accurate MCRs;
  • Failure to develop and implement an adequate Anti-Money Laundering program;
  • Failure to provide updated lock-in agreements when lock terms change;
  • Failure to include a link to the company’s NMLS consumer access website on all internet advertisements; and
  • Advertising violations, namely using disallowed phrases (such as “best” or “lowest” when describing rates, fees, and programs) or advertising “no closing costs” or that something is “free”.

Takeaways

The webinar suggests that the pandemic has created both a surge in license applications and renewals, as well as increases in the volume of mortgage loans, for Washington licensees.

The examination findings serve as a reminder to Washington State licensees to be mindful of their own compliance management and quality control processes, in order to ensure that they are conducting business activities in compliance with all statutes and regulations (to include the CLA and MBPA).

The Hunstein Case: Upending Servicing and Debt Collection?

A&B Abstract:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, covering Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, recently decided in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management, Inc., that a debt collector’s communication with its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), which prohibits a debt collector for communicating, in connection with the collection of any debt, with an unauthorized third party.

The FDCPA and Regulation F

 In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.  Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA generally provides that, except with respect to seeking location information:

without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

The FDCPA defines “communication” to mean “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”

For decades the FDCPA was enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).  However, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, no federal regulator had rulemaking authority under the FDCPA.  The Dodd-Frank Act empowered the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) with rulemaking authority with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined by the FDCPA.  Prior to finalizing Regulation F, the CFPB conducted market outreach to better understand how debt collectors attempt to collect on accounts.  In July 2016, the CFPB published a study of third-party debt collection operations (“Operations Study”) that recognized debt collection firms’ reliance on vendors (such as print mail services, predictive dialers, voice analytics, payment processes and data servers).  In fact, the CFPB noted that most respondents use an outside vendor for sending written communications.

On November 30, 2020, amended Regulation F,  implementing the FDCPA, was published in the Federal Register with an effective date of November 30, 2021 (which has subsequently been delayed to January 29, 2022).  Regulation F does not specifically address the use of third-party vendors, such as print mail services, although the Operations Study was cited in the preamble to Regulation F.

With regard to civil liability, section 1692k of the FDCPA states that “[n]o provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.”

The Hunstein Case

Despite the CFPB’s implicit recognition of debt collectors’ use of print and other vendors,  a recent court decision suggests that use of certain vendors could violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on third-party communications.  In Hunstein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that (1) a violation of section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA confers Article III standing; and (2) a debt collector’s transmittal of a consumer’s personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” within the meaning of section 1692c(b).

The facts in this case are not unusual, and reflect the typical interactions between a debt collector and their third-party vendors. Specifically, the debt collector, Preferred Collection and Management Services Inc. (“Preferred”), electronically transmitted information concerning Hunstein’s debt (his name and his status as a debtor, the entity to which he owed the debt, the outstanding balance, the fact that his debt resulted from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name) to its third-party vendor. In turn, the vendor used that information to create, print, and mail a dunning letter to Hunstein.  As a result, Hunstein sued alleging that by sending his personal information to the third-party vendor, Preferred had violated section 1692c(b). The district court dismissed Hunstein’s action for failure to state a claim, holding that Hunstein had not sufficiently alleged that Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor violated section 1692c(b), because it was not a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt.”  Hunstein appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed both the issues of Article III standing and whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.”

The court first considered the threshold issue of whether a violation of section 1692c(b) confers Article III standing. Specifically, the court focused on whether Hunstein had suffered an injury in fact, which requires an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The court indicated that the “standing question here implicates the concreteness sub-element.”  The court explained that a plaintiff can satisfy the concreteness requirement in one of three ways. A plaintiff can meet this requirement by (1) alleging a tangible harm (e.g., physical injury, financial loss, and emotional distress), (2) alleging a risk of real harm, or (3) identifying a statutory violation that gives rise to an “intangible-but-nonetheless-concrete injury.”  The court ultimately concluded that Hunstein had met the concreteness requirement “[b]ecause (1) § 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a harm that American courts have long recognized as cognizable and (2) Congress’s judgment indicates that violations of §1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury.”

After concluding that Hunstein had standing to sue, the court considered whether Preferred’s transmittal to its third-party vendor was a “communication in connection with the collection of any debt.” At the outset, the court noted that the parties were in agreement that Preferred was a “debt collector,” that Hunstein was a “consumer,” and that the debt at issue was a “consumer debt,” as contemplated under the FDCPA. Moreover, the parties agreed that Preferred’s transmittal of Hunstein’s information to the third-party vendor constituted a “communication” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Thus, the only question remaining before the court was whether Preferred’s communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The court began its analysis by reviewing the plain meaning of the phrase “in connection with” and the word “connection,” and determined that “in connection with” and “connection” are generally defined to mean “with reference to or concerning” and “relationship or association,” respectively.  Based on these definitions, and the facts at issue, the court found it “inescapable that Preferred’s communication to [its third-party vendor] as least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship or association’ to its collection of Hunstein’s debt.”  Accordingly, the court held that Hunstein had alleged a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” as that phrase is commonly understood.

The court next considered, and rejected, Preferred’s three arguments that its communication was not “in connection with the collection of any debt.” First, the court found Preferred’s reliance on prior Eleventh Circuit decisions interpreting the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt,” as used under section 1692e, to be misplaced. The court explained that in those line of cases, the court had focused on the language of the underlying communications that were at issue. However, the court found that the district court’s conclusion that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” necessarily entails a demand for payment “defies the language and structure of § 1692c(b) for two separate but related reasons—neither of which applies to § 1692e.” First, the court explained that the “demand-for-payment interpretation would render superfluous the exceptions spelled out in §§ 1692c(b) and 1692b.” The court noted that under section 1692c(b), “[c]ommunications with four of the six excepted parties—a consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, and the attorney of the debt collector—would never include a demand for payment,” and that the “same is true of the parties covered by § 1692b and, by textual cross-reference, excluded from § 1692c(b)’s coverage.” Accordingly, the court held that the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” in section 1692c(b) must mean something more than a mere demand for payment, so as not to render “Congress’s enumerated exceptions…redundant.”

The court also rejected Preferred’s argument that the court adopt a holistic, multi-factoring balancing test that was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in its unpublished opinion in Goodson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 600 Fed. Appx. 422 (6th Cir. 2015), for two reasons: (1) “Goodson and the cases that have relied on it concern § 1692e—not § 1692c(b),” and (2) sections 1692c(b) and 1692e differ both “linguistically, in that the former includes a series of exceptions that an atextual reading risks rendering meaningless, while the latter does not, and…operationally, in that they ordinarily involve different parties.” Moreover, the court found that “in the context of § 1692c(b), the phrase ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ has a discernible ordinary meaning that obviates the need for resort to extratextual ‘factors.’”

Finally, the court rejected Preferred’s “industry practice” argument—namely that there is widespread use of mail vendors and a relative dearth of FDCPA suits against them—holding that simply because “this is (or may be) the first case in which a debtor has sued a debt collector for disclosing his personal information to a mail vendor hardly proves that such disclosures are lawful.”

In holding that Preferred’s communication with its third-party vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt,” the court acknowledged that its “interpretation of § 1692c(b) runs the risk of upsetting the status quo in the debt-collection industry…[and that its] reading of § 1692c(b) may well require debt collectors (at least in the short term) to in-source many of the services that they had previously outsourced, potentially at great cost.” Moreover, the court recognized that “those costs may not purchase much in the way of ‘real’ consumer privacy.” Nevertheless, the court noted that its “obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.”

Takeaway 

The court’s textual reading of the statute fails to account for the technological changes to the industry since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977.

The CFPB has the authority to take a more pragmatic view, either through its advisory opinion program or formal rulemaking to recognize the important role of vendors while also putting in proper guardrails to protect consumers’ privacy.  Such a view would be consistent with the FTC’s treatment of this issue.  The FTC previously indicated that a debt collector could contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer. Presumably, a debt collector would have to transmit much the same information for purposes of communicating with the debtor through a letter vendor.

Congress also has the authority to modernize the FDCPA.  The House of Representatives recently passed a comprehensive debt collection bill (H.R. 2547, the Comprehensive Debt Collection Improvement Act, sponsored by Chairwoman Waters). While this bill currently doesn’t address the issue in Hunstein, that could be remedied in the Senate.

The consumer finance industry will be closely watching the Hunstein case as it works through the appeal process, as well as how other courts, Congress, CFPB and other regulators react.