Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

State Law

Massachusetts Settlement Agreements Highlight AG’s Compliance Expectations

A&B Abstract: In a series of 2019 settlement agreements, the Massachusetts Attorney General has publicly provided insights into her compliance expectations for residential mortgage servicers.  The settlements demonstrate a focus on compliance with the Commonwealth’s Act to Prevent Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures, codified in part as M.G.L. Chapter 244, Section 35B (“Section 35B”) and its unfair and deceptive acts and practices law (the “UDAP law”), found in Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws.

Section 35B and Chapter 93A Expectations

Section 35B prohibits a creditor (defined to include a servicer) from causing publication of notice of a foreclosure sale upon “certain mortgage loans” unless it has first taken reasonable steps and made a good faith effort to avoid foreclosure.  To be considered to have taken reasonable steps and made a good faith effort to avoid foreclosure, a creditor must have provided a statutorily defined notice (“35B Notice”) at the time a borrower is in default.  Additionally, if certain criteria are met, a creditor must conduct a review to determine whether the borrowers are eligible for a loan modification prior to publishing a notice of foreclosure sale pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 244, Section 14. While the requirements may sound simple, they are complex and difficult to operationalize.

To avoid violations of Section 35B and the UDAP law, the Massachusetts Attorney General expects servicers to:

  • Accurately record, capture or note in the servicing system when borrowers exercise their right to pursue a loan modification under Section 35B by returning the mortgage modification options form (“MMO”), as required by 209 CMR 56.09;
  • Complete a timely review of borrowers’ loan modification applications, as required by Section 35B(c), and avoid causing undue delay in the loan modification review process;
  • Disclose to borrowers the servicer’s determination of the income, debts and obligations and the net present value assessment performed by the servicer in the review of the loan modification, as required by Section 35B(c);
  • Offer modifications, including short-term and interest-only modifications that reflect the borrower’s future ability to repay the modified mortgage loan according to its scheduled payments, as required by Section 35B(b);
  • Not deny loan modification applications on the basis that the borrower did not return sufficient documents to be reviewed, if the servicer did not adequately or timely communicate the requirements to the borrowers or identify when all such documents have in fact been submitted;
  • Provide borrowers with notice of their right to present a counter-offer after being offered a loan modification as part of a Section 35B review, as required by Section 35B(c);
  • Take reasonable steps and make a good faith effort to avoid foreclosure when a borrower requested a loan modification;
  • Not record affidavits pursuant to Section 35B(f) attesting compliance with the requirements of Section 35B where deficiencies exist  in the servicers’ Section 35B loan modification review process, including the failure to identify MMO forms returned by the borrower; and
  • Accurately and timely report accurate borrower response rates under Section 35B to the Massachusetts Division of Banks (“DOB”) as required by 35B(g).

Additional Chapter 93A Expectations

To avoid UDAP concerns, servicers should also:

  • Provide borrowers in default meaningful access to a single point of contact (“SPOC”), such that borrowers can (i) reach a person who can provide information about the modification application, foreclosure status or other account information, and (ii) adequately ensure accessibility to company representatives to ensure borrowers do not encounter connectivity issues, including busy signals, long hold times, and multiple transfers without reaching a live representative;
  • Provide successors-in-interest (“SIIs”) information about what documentation is required to access the account, provide SIIs accurate information as to the availability and requirements related to loss mitigation programs, and adequately note in borrower account files a confirmed SII, such that surviving spouses or other types of SIIs are not required to resubmit death certificates or other documentation, when a servicer already has  such documentation;
  • Proactively  communicate with limited English proficiency (“LEP”) borrowers in their native language to provide information related to the mortgage account, adequately notate in the borrower account files a borrowers LEP status such that LEP borrowers do not have to reestablish their language-access needs with each contact with a servicer, and do not make outgoing calls to previously confirmed LEP borrowers without first engaging reasonably available translation services, such that LEP borrowers (i) encounter an English-speaking representative, (ii) face unexplained holds while translation services are engaged, and (iii) become confused about the nature of the call and disconnect;
  • Allow borrowers to complete short sales by (i) approving, explicitly or implicitly, a listing price in connection with a short sale application only after confirming the loan’s investor would accept an offer received at that price, (ii) not countering or rejecting short sale offers that meet the approved listing price due to a failure to obtain investor proceeds requirements prior to explicitly or implicitly approving the listing price, (iii) having adequate processes to resolve disputes in valuation of a property, and (iv) having a standardized or consistent review process such that borrowers attempting to complete a short sale do not have to relist the property to meet the servicer’s requirements; and
  • For in-flight modifications, ensure that loss mitigation applications initiated by a prior servicer are continued and  identify and honor loan modifications offered by previous servicer.

Takeaway:  

These settlement agreements serve as a reminder that Massachusetts continues to be active in mortgage servicing issues and will use its broad and sometimes nebulous UDAP authority to enforce activities that aren’t specifically regulated under existing law.

 

CSBS’s State Examination System Coming Soon

A&B ABstract

The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) revolutionized state licensing with the National Mortgage Licensing System (NMLS) by providing a more uniform approach to state licensing of non-bank financial services companies.  CSBS will bring a similar transformation to supervising such companies.

The New State Examination System

CSBS designed the State Examination System (SES) to be an end-to-end system for scheduling a single or multi-state examination to completion; the system can also be used for investigations, enforcement actions and complaints.

Within the SES, regulators will be able to access an agency library of resources, track examination time and expenses, prepare and send information requests, and engage in collaborative scheduling.  Compliance and examination support staff within companies will be able to schedule examinations, receive and respond to information requests, and receive completed examination reports.  Further, such staff also will be able to access the licensee’s company NMLS record, which should decrease regulator requests for additional information throughout the course of an examination. How the system will work outside the examination context is yet to be seen.

CSBS has announced a pilot of the SES system with 11 agencies and nine mortgage or money servicer examinations.  The pilot is scheduled to run from October 1 to December 31, 2019.  Assuming that the pilot program runs smoothly, CSBS expects to make SES available nationwide early in 2020.

Takeaways

The CSBS should be commended for taking this initiative to modernize the supervision process and make it less burdensome for non-bank financial institutions and regulators alike.  Companies should keep an eye out for training on this new system in the not-so-distant future.

New York Proposes Student Loan Servicing Rules

A&B ABstract

Amid growing concerns over the federal government’s “hands off” approach to regulating the student loan business, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo released 3 NYCRR 409, a proposed regulation aimed at providing significant consumer protections for New York student loan borrowers, to the public for comment. The deadline for comment on the regulation is September 29.

Proposal of Part 409

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo released for public comment a new regulation (“Part 409”) aimed at providing significant consumer protections for New York student loan borrowers. The proposed rules, promulgated pursuant to Section 718 of the New York Banking Law (effective October 9, 2019), are of little surprise, given that Governor Cuomo and the Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), Linda Lacewell, have been quite outspoken about their increasing concerns about the state of the student loan market in New York.

Activities within the Scope of Part 409

To further the NYDFS’ mission, Part 409 provides that, except as otherwise provided in New York laws and regulations, “every person engaged in the business of servicing student loans owed must be licensed by the [NYDFS] as a student loan servicer.”

For purposes of Part 409, “student loan servicer” means “a person engaged in the business of servicing student loans owed by one or more borrowers.” Further, Part 409 defines the term “student loan” as “any loan to a borrower to finance postsecondary education or expenses related to postsecondary education.”

An entity is deemed to be “servicing” if it is:

  • receiving any payment from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any student loan;
  • applying any payment to the borrower’s account pursuant to the terms of a student loan or the contract governing the servicing of any such loan;
  • during a period where a borrower is not required to make a payment on a student loan, maintaining account records for the student loan and communicating with the borrower regarding the student loan on behalf of the owner of the student loan promissory note; or
  • in conjunction with the activities described [above] (a) providing any notification of amounts owed on a student loan by or on account of any borrower; (b) performing other administrative services with respect to a borrower’s student loan; or (c) interacting with a borrower with respect to or regarding any attempt to avoid default on the borrower’s student loan and facilitating the [receipt or application of payments].

Notably, “servicing” excludes “collecting, or attempting to collect, on a defaulted student loan for which no payment has been received for 270 days or more.”

Other Requirements and Restrictions

Part 409 requires entities that “service” New York student loans to:

  • Provide clear and complete information concerning fees, payments due, and terms and conditions of loans;
  • Apply payments in borrowers’ best interest, rather than in ways that maximize servicer fees;
  • Inform borrowers of income-based repayment and loan forgiveness options;
  • Maintain and provide to consumers a detailed history of their account;
  • When a borrower’s loan is transferred to a new servicer, ensure that all necessary servicing information is transferred with the loan so the borrower’s repayment is not disrupted;
  • Provide accurate information to credit reporting agencies;
  • Provide timely and substantive responses to consumer complaints; and
  • Refrain from defrauding or misleading borrowers, engaging in any unfair, deceptive, abusive or predatory act or practice, or misapplying borrowers’ payments.

What’s Next?

Part 409 is open for comment until September 29, 2019. Given the messaging from Governor Cuomo and the NYDFS surrounding the regulation of the New York student loan market and the fact that the NYDFS made its New York Student Loan Servicer license application available to entities engaging in “student loan servicing” through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System & Registry on August 1, 2019, this may only be New York’s first step into regulating student loan servicers.

UPDATE: As a complement to its regulatory efforts, the DFS is also increasing its staffing on student loan servicing issues.  Since our initial post, Superintendent Lacewell has announced: the appointment of Mr. Winston Berkman-Breen as the DFS’s first-ever Student Advocate and Director of Consumer Advocacy; and (2) the formation of the Student Debt Advisory Board. Both appointments, part of the DFS “Step Up for Students” initiative, highlight that safeguarding student loan borrowers is a priority for both Governor Cuomo and Superintendent Lacewell.

California Passes Several Amendments to the California Consumer Privacy Act

The California legislature passed several amendments to the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100 to 1798.190) (the “CCPA”) on September 13, 2019. (For additional background, see Which CCPA Amendments Made the Cut? and Potential Changes to the CCPA; California Senate Considers Amendments). These amendments will soon head to Governor Newsom’s desk for signature. Among other things, the amendments:

  • Revise the definition of personal information;
  • Create limited exemptions for employment-related personal information and personal information involved in business-to-business communications and transactions;
  • Create an exemption for information related to consumer warranties and product recalls and vehicle ownership information;
  • Clarify the exemption for certain personal information used in consumer reports; and
  • Clarify the “value test” established in the CCPA’s anti-discrimination provisions.

Below is a description of the amendments:

Definition of Personal Information.

The California Senate and Assembly approved AB 874, which cabins the definition of “personal information” to that which is “reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” Personal information includes information that is “reasonably” capable of being associated with identifiers listed in the CCPA, including, but not limited to, real name, alias, postal address, internet protocol address, and social security number. AB 874 further amends the CCPA to exclude from personal information deidentified or aggregate consumer information.

Additionally, AB 874 simplifies the definition of publicly available information, which is excluded from personal information. The bill removes the conditions required for information to qualify as public information. Instead the term is amended to mean “information that is lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government records.” However, publicly available information still excludes biometric information collected without the consumer’s knowledge.

Exemptions for Employment Information.

The original version of AB 25 approved by the State Assembly broadly excluded personal information of employees, contractors, and job applicants from the CCPA. The Assembly and Senate approved a modified version which provides a more limited exemption. AB 25 now provides that the statute does not apply to the personal information of job applicants, employees, and contractors that a business collects in the course of employment or the application process, but only to the extent solely used in the context of the job application or the employment relationship. In addition, businesses must inform employees, contractors, and applicants, at or before the point of collection, of the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for which such information will be used. This information also remains subject to the private right of action established in the law for certain security incidents.

The amendment adds an additional exemption for consumer personal information involved in business to business communications or transactions. The exemption does not apply to the right to opt out of data sales, and the information remains subject to a private right of action for certain security incidents. The non-discrimination provisions of the statute also continue to apply.

AB 25 will become inoperative on January 1, 2021. Employment-related information will become subject to the full set of requirements of the CCPA on and after that date unless California first enacts an employee privacy law.

Exemptions for Warranties, Product Recall, and Vehicle Ownership Information.

AB 1146 creates exemptions to the CCPA’s right to delete and right to opt out for certain categories of information. Businesses are no longer required to comply with a consumer’s request to delete personal information if the request pertains to information the business needs to “fulfill the terms of a written warranty or product recall conducted in accordance with federal law.” Businesses are also not required to comply with requests to opt out of sales relating to vehicle ownership information shared between a “new motor vehicle dealer” and the manufacturer regarding vehicle repairs relating to warranty work or recalls provided that the dealer or manufacturer does not sell, share, or use the information for any other purpose.

Exemption for Personal Information in Consumer Reports.

The California legislature amended and passed AB 1355, which clarifies the existing exemption for personal information related to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681) (the “FCRA”). The CCPA currently does not apply to personal information sold to or from a consumer reporting agency if such information is reported or used in a consumer report and covered by the FRCA. AB 1355 clarifies the exemption to apply to activity by consumer reporting agencies, furnishers of information, or users of consumer reports concerning personal information related to a consumer report. Such information includes that “bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living….” The FCRA exemption applies to activity that is regulated under the act and is not “used, communicated, disclosed, or sold except as authorized by the [FCRA].” Information covered by this exemption is subject to the CCPA’s private right of action provision.

Differential Treatment of Consumers.

AB 1355 also modifies the “value test” in the CCPA’s non-discrimination provisions. Prior to this amendment, the CCPA prohibited discrimination against consumers exercising CCPA rights unless the difference in prices or rates charged or the level or quality of goods or services provided to these consumers was “reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data.” This “value test” has been criticized for requiring businesses to complete an impossible task – determining the value of a consumer’s data to each individual consumer. AB 1355 alleviates this situation by clarifying that a business may require consumers who exercise their CCPA rights to pay a different price or rate or provide a different level or quality of goods or services if the difference is “reasonably related to the value provided to the business by the consumer’s data.”

Specific Pieces of Information Clarified.

The CCPA requires businesses that collect personal information about consumers to disclose in their privacy policy the specific pieces of personal information collected about consumers. AB 1355 revises the CCPA to require businesses to disclose that a consumer has the right to request the specific pieces of personal information collected about that consumer. This also makes clear that the obligation in Section 1798.110(a) to disclose the “specific pieces of information” requires the business to disclose a copy of the information, not a description.

Methods for Submitting Consumer Requests.

The CCPA requires businesses to make two or more methods available for a consumer to submit requests pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.110 and 1798.115. Now, pursuant to AB 1564, businesses that operate exclusively online and have a “direct relationship with a consumer from whom” the business collects personal information may provide an email address to support the submission of requests under section 110 and 115 in lieu of a toll-free telephone number. (Note that the underlying requirements to have two channels for requests and the amendments via AB 1564 do not apply to requests submitted pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100 or 1798.105.) Businesses that maintain a website must still make a website available for requests. The amendment also provides that businesses may choose, but are not obligated, to require consumers that have business accounts to submit requests through the accounts.

In addition, AB 1564 clarifies that businesses may verify the identity of consumers who make requests in a reasonable manner considering the nature of the information requested. Businesses may impose more comprehensive or strenuous identity verification processes for consumer requests concerning sensitive personal information.

Private Right of Action.

The CCPA’s current language of “nonencrypted or nonredacted” would allow for a private right of action if the personal information involved was either nonencrypted or nonredacted. In other words, businesses would have to both encrypt and redact personal information to avoid liability. AB 1355 amends the CCPA’s private right of action provision for certain security incidents to apply to personal information that is “nonencrypted and nonredacted.” The amendment allows businesses to defend against a civil action by either encrypting or redacting personal information.

The California legislature also recently passed a bill that impacts the CCPA’s private right of action provision by amending California’s data security law. The CCPA’s private right of action applies to personal information as defined in California’s data security law (Cal Civ. Code § 1798.81.5). California passed Assembly Bill 1130 expanding the categories of personal information covered by the data security law and thereby expanding the data elements covered by CCPA’s private right of action.

Although all amendments discussed above have been passed by the California legislature, the format of the final amendments’ text is undecided. Before the amendments were passed, each bill was revised to incorporate changes proposed by other amendments upon enactment (e.g., AB 1355 incorporates amendments proposed in ABs 25, 874, 1146, and 1564). The final text of the amendments depends on the order in which the bills are enacted. We will provide a link to the final text once the order of enactment has been determined.

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Five: The Devil is in the Details, Purgatory is what is Left Unsaid

A&B Abstract

This blog post is part five of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (the “Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

The idiom “the devil is in the details” refers to catching something hidden in the details. At 538 pages, there is a lot to catch.  The prior four blog posts described the requirements of the Proposed Rule.  In part one, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  In part three, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers.  In part four, we discussed certain additional conduct provisions under the Proposed Rule, such as provisions relating to decedent debt, the collection of time-barred debt, credit reporting restrictions, and restrictions on a debt collector’s ability to transfer, sell, or place a debt for collection.  This post examines noteworthy issues that the Proposed Rule does not address, such as:

  • Clarification of the definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA and the scope of certain exemptions from that definition
  • Implications for first party collectors
  • Ability to pass through actual third-party convenience fees
  • Implications of phone recordings, in light of the Proposed Rule’s record retention requirements
  • Interplay with state debt collection laws

Clarification of the Definition of, and Exemptions from, the Term “Debt Collector”

The purpose of the Proposed Rule is to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA.  A debt collector under the FDCPA is any person: (i) “who uses instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” prong), or (ii) “who regularly collects, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another” (the “regularly collects” prong). The FDCPA also includes several exclusions from this definition.  Other than specifying that the term “debt collector” excludes certain private entities that operate certain bad check enforcement programs, the Proposed Rule restates the statutory definition of “debt collector” without addressing certain key issues that have been subject to uncertainty for far too long.  By way of example:

  • Who is a debt buyer and are all purchasers of loans or servicing rights debt collectors?   In the case of Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, the Supreme Court recently examined whether someone who purchased a whole loan while it was already in default would be considered a debt collector. The Court concluded that such an entity would not be a debt collector because the debt would not be “owed” to another.  The Court explicitly avoided ruling on whether such an entity that purchases defaulted debt could meet the principal purpose prong of the definition of debt collector.  As a result, questions remain on the application of the definition of debt collector to debt buyers.  Equally unclear is the application of this definition to servicers and subservicers who do not own the whole loan but service the loan for another entity.  While the Proposed Rule does not address such important issues, the preamble notes “[c]onsistent with the Court’s holding in Henson, the proposed definition thus could include a debt buyer collecting debts that it purchased and owned, if the debt buyer either met the ‘principal purpose’ prong of the definition or regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owed by others, in addition to collecting debts that it purchased and owned.”
  • Meaning of “in default.”  Under the FDCPA, the term debt collector excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due to another, to the extent such debt collection activity . . . concerns a debt that was not in default at the time such person obtained it.”  The important phrase “in default” is not defined under the FDCPA. An influential FTC staff opinion letter from 2002 opined that whether a debt is “in default” is generally controlled by the terms of the contract creating the debt and applicable state and federal law but “in the absence of a contractual definition or conclusive state or federal law, a creditor’s reasonable written guidelines may be used to determine when an account is “in default.” In the context of mortgage servicing, the CFPB recognized in the preamble to its mortgage servicing rules that servicers may distinguish loans that are delinquent from loans in default (“[s]ervicers may use different definitions of ‘delinquency’ for operational purposes.  Servicers may also use different or additional terminology when referring borrowers who are late or behind on their payments – for example, servicers may refer to borrowers as “past due” or “in default” and may distinguish between borrowers who are “delinquent and seriously delinquent”).  It is not clear why the Bureau declined to clarify a key term such as “in default” in the Proposed Rule.
  • Scope of “de facto employee.”  The FDCPA also excludes from the definition of the term debt collector “any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor.”  That influential 2002 FTC staff opinion letter opined the de facto employee exemption is limited to “those collection agency employees who are treated essentially the same as creditor employees. . .Whether the agency employees – working on the creditor’s premises or on the agency’s premises – are treated enough like creditor employees to become de facto employees of the creditor will depend on the degree of control and supervision exercised by the creditor over the agency employees’ collection activity, and how similar that control and supervision is to that exercised by the creditor over its own employees.”  Twice the CFPB has referred to this FTC staff opinion letter.  It is, thus, unclear why the CFPB does not address this known issue.

First Party Collectors

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the FDCPA to provide the Bureau with substantial rulemaking authority “with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors.”  This is the primary authority upon which the Bureau has promulgated the Proposed Rule.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Bureau with the authority to prescribe rules applicable to prevent unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”) by “covered persons”.  “Covered persons” includes persons who are engaging in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.  As noted in the preamble to Regulation F, “[c]overed persons under the Dodd-Frank Act thus include many FDCPA-covered debt collectors, as well as many creditors and their servicers who are collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service.”  Several requirements in the Proposed Rule are promulgated under the Bureau’s UDAAP authority.  By way of example, with respect to a debt collector who is collecting a consumer financial product or service debt, Proposed Rule 1006.14 provides that it is an unfair act or practice place telephone calls or engage any person in telephone conversations repeatedly or continuously in connection with the collection of such debt, such that the natural consequence is to harass, oppress or abuse any person at the called number.  The Bureau proposes to set the frequency limit at 7 telephone calls within 7 consecutive days to a particular person about a particular debt.  The CFPB believes that such a limit bears a reasonable relationship to prevent an unfair practice. Would telephone calls in excess of the 7 calls within 7 consecutive day limit constitute an unfair act or practice if engaged in by persons other than FDCPA-debt collectors?  The Bureau, unfortunately, declined to say, thus leaving open the question of what, if anything, in the Proposed Rule could be relevant to first party creditors and their servicers.

Convenience Fees

There has been an uptick in consumer class actions following the CFPB’s guidance on Pay by Phone Fees (Compliance Bulletin 2017-01).  Both the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule provide that a debt collector cannot use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt including the collecting of any amount unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. It is unfortunate that the CFPB elected not to provide clarification on the application of this restriction to convenience fees, as intimated in its Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) report.  That report notes that the CFPB considered two potential clarifications.  First, consistent with Compliance Bulleting 2017-01, the Bureau considered providing that incidental fees, including payment method convenience fees would be permissible only if: (a) state law expressly permits them, or (b) the customer expressly agreed to them in the contract that created the underlying debt and state law neither expressly permits nor prohibits the fee,  The Bureau further considered clarifying that fees charged in full by, and paid directly to, a third party payment processor, would not be collected directly or indirectly by the collector and would not be covered by the rule.  It is not clear why such clarifications did not make it into the Proposed Rule.

Record Retention

Proposed 1006.100 requires a debt collector to retain evidence of compliance with the Proposed Rule starting on the date that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt and extending until three years after (i) the debt collector’s last communication or attempted communication in connection with the collection of the debt, or (ii) the debt is settled, discharged, or transferred to the debt owner or another debt collector.  The commentary to the Proposed Rule provides that debt collectors are not required to record telephone calls.  However, a debt collector must retain recordings if the recordings are “evidence of compliance.”  Does this mean that collectors who record phone calls for a short period of time for quality control purposes would now be required to maintain such recordings for the 3-year record retention period?  Moreover, what else is required to maintain “evidence of compliance”? Would it encompass all records the debt collector relied upon for the information in the validation notice and to support claims of indebtedness, such as the information the debt collector obtained before beginning to collect and the records the debt collector relied upon in responding to a dispute?  Would it encompass all records related to the debt collector’s interactions with the consumer, such as written and oral communications to and from the consumer, individual collection notes or communications in litigation?

State Debt Collection Laws

Mirroring the FDCPA, proposed section 1006.104 provides that “[n]either the [FDCPA] nor the corresponding provisions of this part annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part from complying with the laws of any state with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”  Moreover, the Proposed Rule provides that a State law is not inconsistent if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by the FDCPA or the Proposed Rule.

State debt collection laws vary.  Approximately 30 states mandate licensure or registration of collection agencies and impose practice restrictions.  Three states impose more minimal notification requirements before operating as a collection agency.  Five states have no licensing/notification requirements but impose practice requirements.  Thirteen states require neither licensure or notification requirements nor impose agency-specific practice restrictions.  Three municipalities also have collection agency laws.  Some of these laws apply to debts not covered by the FDCPA such as original creditor debts or loans acquired when current that subsequently go into default.  States may have more extensive disclosure requirements or restrictive communication requirements.

One of the stated purposes of the FDCPA is to promote consistent action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.  This, apparently, does not include consistent regulation of debt collectors, as it appears that so long as it isn’t inconsistent, state regulation above and beyond the FDCPA is acceptable.

Takeaway

The Proposed Rule reflects the investment of significant time and consideration by the Bureau and an attempt to address some of the most significant issues facing the debt collection industry as it adapts to modern collection practices.  However, a number of important issues remain unresolved.  As a result, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders must pay close attention both to what is in the Proposed Rule and what is not.