Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)

Arizona Seeks to Improve FinTech Sandbox with HB 2177

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A&B ABstract: Arizona launched a first-in-the-nation FinTech Sandbox in August 2018, which has been a successful venture by the state. Arizona seeks to improve this program with the enactment of HB 2177 and the Arizona Attorney General Office’s involvement in the CFPB’s American Consumer Financial Innovation Network.

Arizona’s FinTech Sandbox

In August 2018, Arizona was the first state to launch its “FinTech Sandbox” to ease state regulatory burdens for persons offering innovative financial technologies. (The July 2019 Alston & Bird LLP Structured Finance Spectrum provides further details).  This program allows such persons to register with the Attorney General’s Office and conduct limited tests of their technologies under its supervision without otherwise complying with more burdensome licensing and regulatory requirements. Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich has touted the success of this program, stating that it is “the most active and successful regulatory sandbox in North America.”

House Bill 2177

To improve this program, Arizona enacted HB 2177, which:

  • Makes businesses that provide a “substantial component of a financial product or service” eligible to participate, which will (i) allow for tests of products that affect how financial services are provided in the marketplace even if the product itself is not regulated and (ii) enable regulatory technology (“RegTech”) products to now seek entry into the program as stand-alone participants;
  • Requires applicants to demonstrate the cybersecurity measures they will undertake as part of a sandbox test to ensure consumer data remains private and protected; and
  • No longer requires that sandbox tests involving payments involve the participation of Arizona residents, as long as the transaction occurs in Arizona.

In a recent announcement regarding HB 2177, Attorney General Brnovich also announced his office’s participation in the American Consumer Financial Innovation Network (“ACFIN”).  ACFIN is a new CFPB initiative that seeks to bring together state and federal financial services regulators to collaborate on innovation-fostering programs like the FinTech Sandbox.  Given his office’s experience administering the program, Brnvich is encouraged by the federal efforts evident in ACFIN.

Takeaway

In addition to Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and Utah are members of ACFIN. We are keeping our eyes on ACFIN, as we believe this to be an important initiative, and look forward to what is to come.

CFPB Changes Tack on For-Cause Removal Provision

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A&B ABstract: In a reversal of its previous position on the issue, the CFPB publicly asserted last month in two separate venues that the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act is unconstitutional.

On September 17, 2019, CFPB Director Kathleen Kraninger sent two letters (the “Letters”) to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.  In the Letters, Director Kraninger explained that the CFPB had about‑faced in its position on the constitutionality of what is known as the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”).  This provision permits the President to remove the Director of the CFPB, but only for cause.  Previously, the CFPB defended this provision’s constitutionality.  The CFPB now asserts that the provision is unconstitutional.  Further, the CFPB has asserted this new position in a brief filed before the Supreme Court in response to a petition for certiorari filed in CFPB v. Seila Law, No. 19-7 (S. Ct.) (filed September 17, 2019) (the “Seila Law brief”).

CFPB v. Seila Law

In Seila Law, the Seila Law firm refused a CFPB civil investigative demand (“CID”).  Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand under 12 U.S.C. § 5562(f) and 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e).  The Director of the CFPB denied the request, and Seila Law submitted partial responses, reiterated its objections, and declined to provide further information or documents.  The CFPB filed a petition to enforce the CID in federal district court and prevailed.  Seila law appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed based primarily on the majority opinion from the D.C. Circuit en banc decision PHH Corp. v. CFPB, and then Seila Law filed its petition for certiorari.  On September 17, 2019, the DOJ filed the Seila Law brief on behalf of the CFPB.

Various Positions Taken in Seila Law

In the Letters, Kraninger summarized the arguments made in the Seila Law brief and explained that she has “directed the Bureau’s attorneys to refrain from defending the for-cause removal provision in the lower courts.”  Given this major concession regarding the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure, it is unclear whether parties subject to CFPB investigation may successfully resist CFPB authority.

The CFPB has taken the position that “a Supreme Court decision holding that the for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional should not affect the Bureau’s ability to carry out its important mission [of consumer protection,” because “if the Court holds the for-cause removal provision unconstitutional, the CFPA should remain ‘fully operative’ and the Bureau would ‘continue to function as before, just with a Direct who ‘may be removed at will by the President.’”  See Letters (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010)).  As a result, even if the Supreme Court held that the for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional, Seila Law (and others) would still be required to respond to CFPB CIDs.

Others, however, have taken the position that if the provision is unconstitutional, then the CFPB’s authority is severely diminished.  For example, the State of Texas’s amicus brief in Seila Law took the position that the for-cause removal provision renders the CFPB unconstitutional; as a result, there is no obligation for Seila Law to answer the CFPB’s CID.  See Texas Amicus Br. at 16.

Takeaway

Despite the CFPB’s reversed position, it remains unclear whether the for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional, and if so, what affect that has on the CFPB’s authority.  For now, we will be monitoring the case for developments, including to see if the Supreme Court will take the question.

CFPB Rules Permit Qualified Mortgage “Cures”

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A&B Abstract:

What happens when a proposed qualified mortgage is later discovered to have points and fees in excess of the statutory threshold?  The answer lies in a cure provision scheduled to sunset on January 21, 2021.

 CFPB Rules Permit Qualified Mortgage “Cures”

What happens to an originator or assignee of a “qualified mortgage” who discovers after the loan has been consummated that the points and fees charged in connection with the transaction exceed the permitted 3% threshold?  Such a change not only jeopardizes the QM status of the loan, but also prevents the mortgage from being considered a “qualified residential mortgage” (and, therefore, from being exempt from risk retention requirements) if it is intended to be securitized.  Is the loan irrevocably relegated to non-QM and non-QRM status?  Under certain circumstances, the answer is “no”.

A little-known provision in the CFPB’s qualified mortgage/ability-to-repay rules provides a “cure” for loans consummated before January 10, 2021.  When the creditor or assignee determines after consummation that the transaction’s total points and fees exceed the applicable limit (in most situations, 3% of the total loan amount), the creditor or assignee may “cure” the error and preserve and the QM status of the loan.

The “cure” is available if the following conditions are met:

  • Within 210 days of consummation, the creditor or assignee refunds the excess fees to the borrower;
  • The loan otherwise complies with the other QM requirements;
  • The loan is not 60 days past due;
  • The borrower has not instituted an action in connection with the loan or apprised the creditor, assignee or servicer that the points and fees exceed the applicable threshold; and
  • The creditor or assignee, as applicable, maintains and follows policies and procedures for post-consummation review of the points and fees charged to borrowers.

The Take Away       

This “cure” provision is a valuable tool for creditors and their assignees and may be used under the circumstances described above to salvage the QM and QRM status of a mortgage loan.  However, this limited “cure” provision does not remedy other errors that could jeopardize the loan’s QM status, such as failure to adhere to Appendix Q underwriting standards.

In order to take advantage of this cure provision, it is imperative that creditors and their assignees develop post-closing quality control mechanisms to ensure that the points and fees charged in connection with loans intended to be QMs do not exceed the prescribed thresholds.   Note, however, that unless extended, this cure mechanism sunsets on January 21, 2021.

CFPB Issues New Edition of Supervisory Highlights

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A&B Abstract:

The Summer 2019 edition of the CFPB’s Supervisory Highlights indicates recent examination focuses for several categories of consumer credit products.

CFPB Issues New Edition of Supervisory Highlights

On September 19, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued the Summer 2019 edition of Supervisory Highlights, detailing examination findings relating to automobile loan origination, credit card account management, debt collection, credit reporting, and mortgage origination.

Automobile Loan Origination

In the auto loan origination context, the CFPB discusses when the selling of add-on guaranteed asset protection (“GAP”) products may constitute an abusive act or practice as prohibited under the Consumer Financial Protection Act.  (In the event of theft of or damage to a vehicle, GAP products cover the difference between the amount the consumer owes on an auto loan and the amount received from the insurer.)  Specifically, the CFPB indicates that the selling of GAP products to consumers with a low LTV may be an abusive practice, as such consumers are unlikely to benefit from the product.

Credit Card Account Management

The Supervisory Highlights focuses on four sets of practices in connection with credit cards:

  • Failure to provide clear and conspicuous disclosures for certain pricing terms in online advertisements;
  • Disclosures required under Regulation Z in order for a credit card issuer to obtain or enforce a consensual security interest in funds that a consumer has on deposit with the issuer in order to offset credit card debt;
  • The use of deceptive threats of repossession or foreclosure in credit card collections; and
  • Deceptive acts and practices in the marketing of secured credit card accounts.

Debt Collection

In the debt collection context, the CFPB reports examination findings that debt collectors have claimed and collected from consumers “interest not authorized by the underlying contracts between the debt collectors and the creditors.”  By misrepresenting the amount due on a debt, such conduct violate Section 807 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Furnishing

The Supervisory Highlights includes five sets of findings relating to the furnishing of consumer information to consumer reporting companies (“CRCs”).  Specifically, CFPB examiners identified failures of furnishers to:

  • timely conduct an investigation of, or respond to, notice of a dispute from CRC, in violation of Section 623(b)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act;
  • report the results of dispute investigations to all CRCs to which they provided information about consumers;
  • promptly correct and update information previously furnished to a CRC that is incomplete or inaccurate;
  • provide notice to CRCs in connection with the reporting of information whose accuracy or completeness is disputed by a consumer; and
  • implement reasonable policies and procedures regarding the accuracy and integrity of information relating to consumers that is furnished to CRCs.

Mortgage Origination

Finally, the Supervisory Highlights discusses examination findings relating to the inaccurate disclosure of APR and total annual loan cost information for closed-end reverse mortgage transactions, in violation of Regulation Z.

Takeaway

Each edition of the Supervisory Highlights provides related industries a glimpse into the Bureau’s current examination priorities.  Entities should take the opportunity to review the issues discussed above, as applicable to their business practices, to help ensure their own compliance with federal laws and regulations.

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Five: The Devil is in the Details, Purgatory is what is Left Unsaid

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A&B Abstract

This blog post is part five of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (the “Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

The idiom “the devil is in the details” refers to catching something hidden in the details. At 538 pages, there is a lot to catch.  The prior four blog posts described the requirements of the Proposed Rule.  In part one, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  In part three, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers.  In part four, we discussed certain additional conduct provisions under the Proposed Rule, such as provisions relating to decedent debt, the collection of time-barred debt, credit reporting restrictions, and restrictions on a debt collector’s ability to transfer, sell, or place a debt for collection.  This post examines noteworthy issues that the Proposed Rule does not address, such as:

  • Clarification of the definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA and the scope of certain exemptions from that definition
  • Implications for first party collectors
  • Ability to pass through actual third-party convenience fees
  • Implications of phone recordings, in light of the Proposed Rule’s record retention requirements
  • Interplay with state debt collection laws

Clarification of the Definition of, and Exemptions from, the Term “Debt Collector”

The purpose of the Proposed Rule is to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA.  A debt collector under the FDCPA is any person: (i) “who uses instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” prong), or (ii) “who regularly collects, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another” (the “regularly collects” prong). The FDCPA also includes several exclusions from this definition.  Other than specifying that the term “debt collector” excludes certain private entities that operate certain bad check enforcement programs, the Proposed Rule restates the statutory definition of “debt collector” without addressing certain key issues that have been subject to uncertainty for far too long.  By way of example:

  • Who is a debt buyer and are all purchasers of loans or servicing rights debt collectors?   In the case of Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, the Supreme Court recently examined whether someone who purchased a whole loan while it was already in default would be considered a debt collector. The Court concluded that such an entity would not be a debt collector because the debt would not be “owed” to another.  The Court explicitly avoided ruling on whether such an entity that purchases defaulted debt could meet the principal purpose prong of the definition of debt collector.  As a result, questions remain on the application of the definition of debt collector to debt buyers.  Equally unclear is the application of this definition to servicers and subservicers who do not own the whole loan but service the loan for another entity.  While the Proposed Rule does not address such important issues, the preamble notes “[c]onsistent with the Court’s holding in Henson, the proposed definition thus could include a debt buyer collecting debts that it purchased and owned, if the debt buyer either met the ‘principal purpose’ prong of the definition or regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owed by others, in addition to collecting debts that it purchased and owned.”
  • Meaning of “in default.”  Under the FDCPA, the term debt collector excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due to another, to the extent such debt collection activity . . . concerns a debt that was not in default at the time such person obtained it.”  The important phrase “in default” is not defined under the FDCPA. An influential FTC staff opinion letter from 2002 opined that whether a debt is “in default” is generally controlled by the terms of the contract creating the debt and applicable state and federal law but “in the absence of a contractual definition or conclusive state or federal law, a creditor’s reasonable written guidelines may be used to determine when an account is “in default.” In the context of mortgage servicing, the CFPB recognized in the preamble to its mortgage servicing rules that servicers may distinguish loans that are delinquent from loans in default (“[s]ervicers may use different definitions of ‘delinquency’ for operational purposes.  Servicers may also use different or additional terminology when referring borrowers who are late or behind on their payments – for example, servicers may refer to borrowers as “past due” or “in default” and may distinguish between borrowers who are “delinquent and seriously delinquent”).  It is not clear why the Bureau declined to clarify a key term such as “in default” in the Proposed Rule.
  • Scope of “de facto employee.”  The FDCPA also excludes from the definition of the term debt collector “any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor.”  That influential 2002 FTC staff opinion letter opined the de facto employee exemption is limited to “those collection agency employees who are treated essentially the same as creditor employees. . .Whether the agency employees – working on the creditor’s premises or on the agency’s premises – are treated enough like creditor employees to become de facto employees of the creditor will depend on the degree of control and supervision exercised by the creditor over the agency employees’ collection activity, and how similar that control and supervision is to that exercised by the creditor over its own employees.”  Twice the CFPB has referred to this FTC staff opinion letter.  It is, thus, unclear why the CFPB does not address this known issue.

First Party Collectors

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the FDCPA to provide the Bureau with substantial rulemaking authority “with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors.”  This is the primary authority upon which the Bureau has promulgated the Proposed Rule.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Bureau with the authority to prescribe rules applicable to prevent unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”) by “covered persons”.  “Covered persons” includes persons who are engaging in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.  As noted in the preamble to Regulation F, “[c]overed persons under the Dodd-Frank Act thus include many FDCPA-covered debt collectors, as well as many creditors and their servicers who are collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service.”  Several requirements in the Proposed Rule are promulgated under the Bureau’s UDAAP authority.  By way of example, with respect to a debt collector who is collecting a consumer financial product or service debt, Proposed Rule 1006.14 provides that it is an unfair act or practice place telephone calls or engage any person in telephone conversations repeatedly or continuously in connection with the collection of such debt, such that the natural consequence is to harass, oppress or abuse any person at the called number.  The Bureau proposes to set the frequency limit at 7 telephone calls within 7 consecutive days to a particular person about a particular debt.  The CFPB believes that such a limit bears a reasonable relationship to prevent an unfair practice. Would telephone calls in excess of the 7 calls within 7 consecutive day limit constitute an unfair act or practice if engaged in by persons other than FDCPA-debt collectors?  The Bureau, unfortunately, declined to say, thus leaving open the question of what, if anything, in the Proposed Rule could be relevant to first party creditors and their servicers.

Convenience Fees

There has been an uptick in consumer class actions following the CFPB’s guidance on Pay by Phone Fees (Compliance Bulletin 2017-01).  Both the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule provide that a debt collector cannot use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt including the collecting of any amount unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. It is unfortunate that the CFPB elected not to provide clarification on the application of this restriction to convenience fees, as intimated in its Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) report.  That report notes that the CFPB considered two potential clarifications.  First, consistent with Compliance Bulleting 2017-01, the Bureau considered providing that incidental fees, including payment method convenience fees would be permissible only if: (a) state law expressly permits them, or (b) the customer expressly agreed to them in the contract that created the underlying debt and state law neither expressly permits nor prohibits the fee,  The Bureau further considered clarifying that fees charged in full by, and paid directly to, a third party payment processor, would not be collected directly or indirectly by the collector and would not be covered by the rule.  It is not clear why such clarifications did not make it into the Proposed Rule.

Record Retention

Proposed 1006.100 requires a debt collector to retain evidence of compliance with the Proposed Rule starting on the date that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt and extending until three years after (i) the debt collector’s last communication or attempted communication in connection with the collection of the debt, or (ii) the debt is settled, discharged, or transferred to the debt owner or another debt collector.  The commentary to the Proposed Rule provides that debt collectors are not required to record telephone calls.  However, a debt collector must retain recordings if the recordings are “evidence of compliance.”  Does this mean that collectors who record phone calls for a short period of time for quality control purposes would now be required to maintain such recordings for the 3-year record retention period?  Moreover, what else is required to maintain “evidence of compliance”? Would it encompass all records the debt collector relied upon for the information in the validation notice and to support claims of indebtedness, such as the information the debt collector obtained before beginning to collect and the records the debt collector relied upon in responding to a dispute?  Would it encompass all records related to the debt collector’s interactions with the consumer, such as written and oral communications to and from the consumer, individual collection notes or communications in litigation?

State Debt Collection Laws

Mirroring the FDCPA, proposed section 1006.104 provides that “[n]either the [FDCPA] nor the corresponding provisions of this part annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part from complying with the laws of any state with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provisions of the [FDCPA] or the corresponding provisions of this part, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”  Moreover, the Proposed Rule provides that a State law is not inconsistent if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by the FDCPA or the Proposed Rule.

State debt collection laws vary.  Approximately 30 states mandate licensure or registration of collection agencies and impose practice restrictions.  Three states impose more minimal notification requirements before operating as a collection agency.  Five states have no licensing/notification requirements but impose practice requirements.  Thirteen states require neither licensure or notification requirements nor impose agency-specific practice restrictions.  Three municipalities also have collection agency laws.  Some of these laws apply to debts not covered by the FDCPA such as original creditor debts or loans acquired when current that subsequently go into default.  States may have more extensive disclosure requirements or restrictive communication requirements.

One of the stated purposes of the FDCPA is to promote consistent action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.  This, apparently, does not include consistent regulation of debt collectors, as it appears that so long as it isn’t inconsistent, state regulation above and beyond the FDCPA is acceptable.

Takeaway

The Proposed Rule reflects the investment of significant time and consideration by the Bureau and an attempt to address some of the most significant issues facing the debt collection industry as it adapts to modern collection practices.  However, a number of important issues remain unresolved.  As a result, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders must pay close attention both to what is in the Proposed Rule and what is not.