Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Bank Regulatory

HELOCs On the Rise: Is Your Servicing CMS Ready?

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A&B ABstract:

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) has moved to clarify its regulatory authority at a time when the economic climate is ripe for a resurgence in HELOC lending. In an amicus brief filed by the CFPB on November 30, 2022 (the “Amicus Brief”), the Bureau acknowledged that its Mortgage Servicing Rules, which, in 2013, amended Regulation X, RESPA’s implementing regulation, and Regulation Z, TILA’s implementing regulation, do not apply to home equity lines of credit (“HELOCs”).  This is consistent with the Bureau’s guidance in the preamble to the CFPB Mortgage Servicing Rules under RESPA, wherein the Bureau recognized that HELOCs have a different risk profile, and are serviced differently, than first-lien mortgage loans, and that many of the rules under Regulation X would be “irrelevant to HELOCs” and “would substantially overlap” with the longstanding protections under TILA and Regulation Z that apply to HELOCs.

During this past refinance boom, consumers refinanced mortgage loans at record rates. Moreover, according to a recent report by the Federal Reserve, consumers are sitting on nearly 30 trillion dollars in home equity.  HELOCs allow consumers the opportunity to extract equity from their homes without losing the low interest rate on their first-lien loan. Generally, a HELOC is a revolving line of credit that is secured by a subordinate mortgage on the borrower’s residence that typically has a draw period of 5 or 10 years.  At the end of the draw period, the outstanding loan payment converts to a repayment period of 5 to 25 years with interest and principal payments required that fully amortize the balance.

Issues to Consider in Servicing HELOCs

Servicing HELOCs raise unique issues given the open-end nature of the loan, the typical second lien position, and the different regulatory requirements.  HELOC servicers will need to ensure their compliance management systems (“CMS”) are robust enough to account for a potential uptick in HELOC lending. Among many other issues, servicers will want to ensure their operations comply with several regulatory requirements, including:

Offsets: In the Amicus Brief, the CFPB argues that HELOCs accessible by a credit card are subject to the provisions of TILA and Regulation Z that prohibit card issuers from using deposit account funds to offset indebtedness arising out of a credit card transaction.

Disclosures: Long before the CFPB Mortgage Servicing Rules, TILA and Regulation Z contained disclosures applicable to HELOCs. As a result, the provisions of the CFPB Mortgage Servicing Rules under Regulation Z governing periodic billing statements, adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) interest rate adjustment notices, and payment crediting provisions do not apply to HELOCs as these provisions are specifically limited to closed-end consumer credit transactions. However, the payoff statement requirements under Regulation Z are applicable both to HELOCs and closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling. In addition to certain account-opening disclosures, a HELOC creditor (or its servicer) must make certain subsequent disclosures to the borrower, either annually (e.g., an annual statement) or upon the occurrence of a specific trigger event, such as the addition of a credit access device, a change in terms or change in billing cycle, or a notice to restrict credit. It is also worth noting that Regulation Z’s mortgage transfer notice (commonly referred to as the Section 404 notice) applicable when a loan is transferred, sold or assigned to a third party, applies to HELOCs. In contrast, RESPA’s servicing transfer notice does not apply to HELOCs.

Periodic Statements: TILA and Regulation Z contain a different set of periodic statement requirements, predating the CFPB Mortgage Servicing Rules, which are applicable to HELOCs. Under TILA, a servicer must comply with the open-end periodic statement requirements. That is true even if the HELOC has an open-end draw period followed by a closed-end repayment period, during which no further draws are permitted. Such statements can be complex given that principal repayment and interest accrual vary based on draws; there will be a conversion to scheduled amortization after the draw period ends; and balloon payments may be required at maturity, resulting in the need for servicing system adjustments.

Billing Error Resolution: Instead of having to comply with the Regulation X requirements for notices of error, HELOCs are subject to Regulation Z’s billing error resolution requirements.

Crediting of Payments: A creditor may credit a payment to the consumer’s account, including a HELOC, as of the date of receipt, except when a delay in crediting does not result in a finance or other charge, or except as otherwise provided in 12 C.F.R. § 1026.10(a).

Restrictions on Servicing Fees: Regulation Z restricts certain new servicing fees that may be imposed, where such fees are not provided for in the contract, because the credit may not, by contract or otherwise, change any term except as provided in 12 C.F.R § 1026.40.  With the CFPB’s increased focus on fees, this provision may be an area of focus for the Bureau and state regulators.

Restriction on Changing the APR: The creditor may not, by contract or otherwise, change the APR of a HELOC unless such change is based on an index that is not under the creditor’s control and such index is available to the general public.  However, this requirement does not prohibit rate changes which are specifically set forth in the agreement, such as stepped-rate plans or preferred-rate provisions.

Terminating, Suspending or Reducing a Line of Credit: TILA and Regulation Z restrict the ability of the creditor to prohibit additional extensions of credit or reduce the credit limit applicable to an agreement under those circumstances set forth in 12 C.F.R § 1026.40.  Similarly, TILA and Regulation Z impose restrictions on when the creditor may terminate and accelerate the loan balance.

Rescission: Similar to closed-end loans, the consumer will have a right of rescission on a HELOC; however, the right extends beyond just the initial account opening. During the servicing of a HELOC, the consumer has a right of rescission whenever (i) credit is extended under the plan, or (ii) the credit limit is increased. But there is no right of rescission when credit extensions are made in accordance with the existing credit limit under the plan. If rescission applies, the notice and procedural requirements set forth in TILA and Regulation Z must be followed.

Default: Loss mitigation and default recovery actions may be limited by the firstien loan. That’s because default or acceleration of the first-lien loan immediately triggers loss mitigation and default recovery to protect the second-lien loan.  The protection of the second-lien loan may involve advancing monthly payments on the first-lien loan.  Foreclosure pursued against the first-lien loan will trigger second lien to participate and monitor for protection and recovery. Even though not applicable to HELOCs, some servicers may consider complying with loss mitigation provisions as guidelines or best practices.

ECOA and FCRA: Terminating, suspending, or reducing the credit limit on a HELOC based on declining property values could raise redlining risk, which is a form of illegal disparate treatment in which a lender provides unequal access to credit or unequal terms of credit because of a prohibited characteristic of the residents of the area in which the credit seeker resides or will reside or in which the residential property to be mortgaged is located. Thus, lenders and servicers should have policies and procedures in place to ensure that actions to reduce, terminate or suspend HELOCs are carried out in a non-discriminatory manner.  Relatedly, the CFPB’s authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to prohibit unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices will similarly prohibit certain conduct in connection with the servicing of HELOCs that the CFPB may consider to be harmful to consumers.  It is also important to remember that ECOA requires that a creditor notify an applicant of action taken within 30 days after taking adverse action on an existing account, where the adverse action includes a termination of an account, an unfavorable change in the terms of an account, or a refusal to increase the amount of credit available to an applicant who has made an application for an increase.  Similar to ECOA, FCRA also requires the servicer to provide the consumer with an adverse action notice in certain circumstances.

State Law Considerations: And let’s not forget state law issues. While most of the CFPB’s Mortgage Servicing Rules do not apply to HELOCs, many state provisions may cover HELOCs.  As most HELOCs are subordinate-lien loans, second lien licensing law obligations arise. Also, sourcing, processing and funding draw requests could implicate loan originator and/or money transmitter licensing obligations. Also, at least one state prohibits a licensee from servicing a usurious loan.  For HELOCs, the issue is not only the initial rate but also the adjusted rate (assuming it is an ARM).  There may also be state-specific disclosure obligations, as well as restrictions on product terms (such as balloon payments or lien releases), fees, or credit line access devices, to name a few.

Takeaway

The servicing of HELOCs involve many of the same aspects as servicing first-lien residential mortgage loans.  However, because of the open-end credit line features and the typical second-lien position, there are several unique aspects to servicing HELOCs.  And, because there are no industry standard HELOC agreements, the terms of the HELOC (e.g., the length of draw and amortization periods, interest-only payment features, balloon, credit access, etc.) can vary greatly.  The economic climate is poised for a resurgence in home equity lending.  Now is the time to ensure your CMS is up to the task.

 

Is the DOJ (De Facto) Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act?

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A&B Abstract:

Furthering the Justice Department’s Combating Redlining Initiative, the Department of Justice has announced another redlining settlement.  But this settlement is different – this one involves a bank that has received top marks by its prudential regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for its compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a statute enacted to reduce redlining, for the same years that the DOJ alleged the bank engaged in redlining.

The DOJ’s Allegations

Lakeland Bank is a northern New Jersey-based, state chartered bank with more than $10 billion in assets.  The DOJ alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)/Regulation B, and specifically “that Lakeland engaged in illegal redlining by avoiding providing home loans and other mortgage services, and engaged in discrimination and conduct that would discourage mortgage applications from prospective applicants who are residents of or seeking credit in majority Black and Hispanic census tracts” located in its northern New Jersey assessment area.  In entering the more than $13 million settlement, the Bank did not admit to any of the DOJ’s allegations.  It agreed to various requirements to strengthen its fair lending compliance program, including investing in a loan subsidy fund, opening additional branches, and expanding its CRA assessment area.

The FDIC’s Findings

What is curious, however, is that in its latest CRA performance evaluation, the FDIC determined that Lakeland “exhibits a good record of serving the credit needs of the most economically disadvantaged areas of its assessment area, low-income individuals, and/or very small businesses, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.”  It determined that there is in fact strong competition for lending in the area, but that the bank nonetheless showed good penetration to borrowers of low- and moderate-income levels and in low- and moderate-income areas.  Further, the FDIC determined that the bank “makes extensive use of innovative and/or flexible lending practices in order to serve assessment area credit needs,” noting that the bank’s programs provide lower down payments, lower interest rates, down payment assistance, first-time homebuyer programs, and unsecured small dollar loan programs, for lower-income individuals and small businesses.  The FDIC also called Lakeland “a leader in making community development loans.”  In fact, Lakeland received a rating of “Outstanding,” the highest rating which only a small number of banks achieve, in each of its CRA exams for more than a decade.

CRA versus Fair Lending Laws

The rub is that the CRA is not a fair lending statute, as it focuses on income disparity and not racial disparity, though it often goes hand in glove with the fair lending laws.  For example, a failure to comply with fair lending laws (e.g., the Fair Housing Act, ECOA/Regulation B) can result in a downgrade of a bank’s CRA rating, despite its satisfactory or better performance in its CRA evaluation.  The CRA is enforced by the OCC, FDIC, and Federal Reserve Board.  The fair lending laws are typically enforced by the OCC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, CFPB, NCUA, FTC, and HUD (along with state regulators).  The threshold for an agency’s referral to DOJ for enforcement proceedings is low, requiring reason to believe there is a pattern or practice of discrimination.

Takeaway

In practice, the Lakeland settlement shows how a bank can be susceptible to fair lending risk with respect to redlining, and yet still pass its (anti-redlining) CRA examination with flying colors.  Maybe that is a reason to revise the CRA regulations (spoiler alert: that’s already in the works).  Or maybe it is a reminder to banks to mind the forest and the trees.  Focusing on CRA is necessary but not sufficient, and a bank needs to ensure it is regularly monitoring its lending activity for potential redlining.

CFPB Sues MoneyLion over Membership Program, Uses Military Lending Act as Hook

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A&B Abstract:

On September 29, 2022, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), sued MoneyLion Technologies Inc. and 37 of its subsidiaries (“MoneyLion”) in New York federal court for violations of the Military Lending Act (the “MLA”) and Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”).

The Allegations

The CFPB alleges that MoneyLion offered installment loans that consumers could not access unless they enrolled in a membership program with monthly membership fees.  While MoneyLion represented to consumers that they “had the right to cancel their memberships for any reason,” it “maintained a policy prohibiting consumers with unpaid loan balances from canceling their memberships.”

According to the CFPB, MoneyLion’s membership model resulted in violations of the MLA’s 36% APR cap.  Under the MLA’s implementing regulation, APR is calculated as including “fee[s] imposed for participation in [an] arrangement for consumer credit.”  Based on this, the CFPB argues that the membership fees MoneyLion required servicemembers to pay to gain access to installment loans must be included in those loans’ APR.  If correct, those loans’ APR would unlawfully exceed 36%.

The CFPB also alleges that the installment loans to servicemembers violated the MLA by containing unlawful arbitration clauses and failing to contain required disclosures.

Lastly, the CFPB alleges that MoneyLion’s membership model resulted in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices under the CFPA. Particularly, the CFPB alleges that MoneyLion misled and injured consumers by representing to consumers that they had the right to cancel their memberships when, in fact, they did not.

Takeaways

The MoneyLion suit serves as a good reminder that every lending program should: (i) account for the additional protections provided to uniquely situated borrowers, such as servicemembers under the MLA; (ii) scrutinize any fees paid by consumers that could be viewed as increasing a loan’s APR; and (iii) review representations they make to consumers to align with the commercial realities and the regulatory requirements of the products they offer.

Joint Trade Associations Reject the CFPB’s “Discrimination-Unfairness” Theory

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In a June 28 letter to Director Chopra and accompanying White Paper and press release, the ABA, CBA, ICBA, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have called on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) to rescind recent revisions made to its UDAAP examination manual that had effectuated the CFPB’s controversial theory that alleged discriminatory conduct occurring outside the offering or provision of credit could be addressed using “unfairness” authority. The White Paper characterized the primary legal flaws in the CFPB’s action as follows:

  • The CFPB’s conflation of unfairness and discrimination ignores the text, structure, and legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act discusses “unfairness” and “discrimination” as two separate concepts and defines “unfairness” without mentioning discrimination. The Act’s legislative history refers to the Bureau’s antidiscrimination authority in the context of ECOA and HMDA, while referring to the Bureau’s UDAAP authority separately.
  • The CFPB’s view of “unfairness” is inconsistent with decades of understanding and usage of that term in the Federal Trade Commission Act and with the enactment of ECOA. Congress gave the CFPB the same “unfairness” authority that it gave to the Federal Trade Commission in 1938, which has never included discrimination. It makes no sense that Congress would have enacted ECOA in 1974 to address discrimination in credit transactions if it had already prohibited discrimination through the FTC’s unfairness authority. For the same reason, Congress could not have intended in 1938 for unfairness to “fill gaps” in civil rights laws that did not exist.
  • The CFPB’s view is contrary to Supreme Court precedent regarding disparate impact liability. The CFPB’s actions and statements indicate it conflates unfairness with disparate impact, or unintentional discrimination. The Supreme Court has recognized disparate impact as a theory of liability only when Congress uses certain “results-oriented” language in antidiscrimination laws, e.g., the Fair Housing Act. The Dodd Frank Act neither contains the requisite language, nor is it an antidiscrimination law.
  • The CFPB’s action is subject to review by courts because it constitutes final agency action – a legislative rule – that is invalid, both substantively and procedurally. The CFPB’s action carries the force and effect of law and imposes new substantive duties on supervised institutions. However, the Bureau did not follow Administrative Procedure Act requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Additionally, the CFPB’s interpretation is not in accordance with law and exceeds the CFPB’s statutory authority. The CFPB’s action should be held unlawful and set aside.
  • The CFPB’s action is subject to Congressional disapproval under the Congressional Review Act. A Member of Congress can request a GAO opinion on whether the CFPB’s actions are a rule, which can ultimately trigger Congressional review using the procedures established in the Congressional Review Act.

The White Paper concludes:

“Such sweeping changes that alter the legal duties of so many are the proper province of Congress, not of independent regulatory agencies, and the CFPB cannot ignore the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act and Congressional Review Act. The CFPB may well wish to ‘fill gaps’ it perceives in federal antidiscrimination law. But Congress has simply not authorized the CFPB to fill those gaps. If the CFPB believes it requires additional authority to address alleged discriminatory conduct, it must obtain that authority from Congress, not take the law into its own hands. The associations and our members stand ready to work with Congress and the CFPB to ensure the just administration of the law.”

Take-away:

The position taken in the White Paper that the CFPB’s actions were contrary to law may be an indication that the trade groups intend to mount an APA legal challenge. Alternatively, the arguments made could in theory form a defense to any CFPB supervisory or enforcement action premised upon its new “discrimination-unfairness” theory. Financial institutions subject to CFPB examination would be well-advised to consider the arguments raised by the groups.

CFPB’s SBREFA Outline on Automated Valuation Models Rekindles Debate over Disparate Impact Liability under the ECOA

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Section 1473(q) of the Dodd-Frank Act (now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3354(q)) amended the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) to instruct the CFPB, Fed, OCC, FDIC, NCUA, and FHFA (collectively, the “agencies”) to jointly develop regulations for quality control standards for automated valuation models (“AVMs”), defined as “any computerized model used by mortgage originators and secondary market issuers to determine the collateral worth of a mortgage secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling.” As part of the rulemaking process, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (“SBREFA”) requires the CFPB to convene a Small Business Review Panel to consider whether the rule could have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, on February 23, 2022, the CFPB released an outline of proposals and alternatives under consideration by the agencies to seek informed feedback and recommendations from small businesses likely to be subject to the rule.

As amended, subparts (1) – (4) of FIRREA Section 1125(a) mandate that the agencies establish four specific quality control standards for AVMs. FIRREA Section 1125(a)(5) also affords the agencies discretion to adopt standards designed to “account for any other such factor that the agencies…determine to be appropriate.” As such, the CFPB’s SBREFA outline proposes creating a fifth such discretionary quality control standard “designed to protect against unlawful discrimination.”

In support of its proposal, the CFPB asserts that algorithmic systems such as AVMs are subject to Federal nondiscrimination laws, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), because a lender evaluating an applicant’s collateral could use an AVM “in a way that would treat an applicant differently on a prohibited basis or result in unlawful discrimination against an applicant on a prohibited basis.” The CFPB then notes that it recognizes three different methods of proving discrimination under the ECOA and its implementing regulation (“Regulation B”): (1) overt discrimination; (2) disparate treatment; and (3) disparate impact. It is worth mentioning that overt discrimination has been viewed by federal regulators such as DOJ and the FDIC as a blatant type of disparate treatment that does not require an inference or presumption based on circumstantial evidence. However, it appears that the CFPB considers these theories to be distinct from one another.

The third method of proving discrimination articulated by the CFPB, disparate impact, has been a controversial theory of liability because it imposes liability on a creditor even where the creditor had no intent to discriminate against an applicant. Rather, the theory presumes that the creditor has treated applicants fairly and consistently in accordance with some facially neutral policy or procedure of the creditor. Of course, the disparate impact theory gained traction in the subprime lending cases post-2008 and then loomed large in the CFPB’s enforcement actions against indirect auto lenders, the latter of which were scrutinized by Congress in its decision to rescind the CFPB’s indirect auto lending guidance using the Congressional Review Act. In fact, it remains a legal question whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA since the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) has never considered the issue, though civil rights advocates point to the Supreme Court’s willingness in the 2015 Inclusive Communities case to recognize the theory for discrimination claims brought under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).

Thus, should the agencies adopt a final rule that relies upon disparate impact under the ECOA as a legal basis to justify imposing a quality control standard on AVMs (or muddies the waters by relying upon both the ECOA and the FHA without distinction), it is possible that the rule could be challenged under the Administrative Procedures Act as not in accordance with the law. Alternatively, if the CFPB were to bring an enforcement action against a creditor for allegedly violating either the final rule’s quality control standard or ECOA itself on the basis of disparate impact, the creditor could defend itself by arguing among other things that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ECOA. Indeed, the ECOA lacks any “results-oriented” language like the “otherwise make available” language of the FHA or the “otherwise adversely affect” language of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which the Supreme Court, in decisions issued a decade apart, relied on in recognizing disparate impact liability.

Even if the plain language of the ECOA could not support a disparate impact claim, the CFPB might argue that the statute’s anti-discrimination provision is ambiguous (by asserting, for instance, that the word “discriminate” could be interpreted to encompass both intent-based and effects-based actions), in which case the CFPB may expect the reviewing court to grant its interpretation Chevron deference. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 476 U.S. 837 (1984). But this argument also might prove difficult because Chevron deference is appropriate only when it appears that Congress has “delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and … the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of such authority.” See Public Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 332 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). In examining Regulation B, which was originally issued by the Fed and subsequently readopted by the CFPB, the only references to the concept of disparate impact appear in 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(a) and Official Interpretation 6(a)-2. However, these provisions merely summarize the ECOA’s legislative history and Supreme Court precedent under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and even then, acknowledge only that the ECOA “may” prohibit acts that are discriminatory in effect. The CFPB has articulated its belief that disparate impact is cognizable under the ECOA elsewhere, including in a compliance bulletin and its examination manual, but those materials carry no force of law under the CFPB’s own recently-adopted rule. Thus, a reviewing court could conclude that the mere recitation of legislative history and of a judicial doctrine developed under an unrelated statute was not an actual exercise of rulemaking authority under the ECOA, and therefore that the agencies’ interpretation of the ECOA as expressed in Regulation B is not entitled to Chevron deference. In that circumstance, the reviewing court would be free to resolve any purported ambiguity in the ECOA according to its own construction, affording respect to the agencies’ position only to the extent it is persuasive. And should either of these issues – disparate impact under the ECOA or the availability of Chevron deference – ultimately be appealed to the Supreme Court, there may well be four justices willing to grant certiorari to consider them.

The uncertain outcome of any challenge to the CFPB’s use of disparate impact in a rulemaking or in enforcing the ECOA, given the stakes involved, suggests that the CFPB may seek to resolve matters via settlement rather than risking litigation in federal court. However, only time will tell whether the CFPB is spoiling for a fight.