Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Servicing

CFPB’s Message to Mortgage Servicers: Make Sure You Comply with RESPA’s Force-Placed Insurance Requirements

A&B Abstract:

In Case You Missed It:  At the recent Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Symposium on Property Insurance, CFPB Director Rohit Chopra spoke about force-placed insurance and conveyed the following message: “The CFPB will be carefully monitoring mortgage market participants, especially mortgage servicers to ensure they are meeting all of their obligations to consumers under the law.”

The CFPB’s servicing rules set forth in RESPA’s Regulation X specifically regulate force-placed insurance. For purposes of those requirements, the term “force-placed insurance” means hazard insurance obtained by a servicer on behalf of the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan that insures the property securing such loan. In turn, “hazard insurance” means insurance on the property securing a residential mortgage loan that protects the property against loss caused by fire, wind, flood, earthquake, falling objects, freezing, and other similar hazards for which the owner or assignee of such loan requires assistance. However, force-placed insurance excludes, for example, hazard insurance required by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, or hazard insurance obtained by a borrower but renewed by a company in accordance with normal escrow procedures.

Given the Bureau’s announcement, now is a good time to confirm that your company has adequate controls in place to ensure compliance with all of the technical requirements of RESPA’s force-placed insurance provisions.  Set forth below are some of the many questions to consider:

Escrowed Borrowers:

  • When a borrower maintains an escrow account and is more than 30 days past due, does the company ensure that force-placed insurance is only purchased if the company is unable to disburse funds from the borrower’s escrow account?
    • A company will be considered “unable to disburse funds” when the company has a reasonable basis to believe that (i) the borrower’s hazard insurance has been canceled (or was not renewed) for reasons other than nonpayment of premium charges; or (ii) the borrower’s property is vacant.
    • However, a company will not be “unable to disburse funds” only because the escrow account does not contain sufficient funds to pay the hazards insurance charges.

Required Notices:

  • Does the company ensure that the initial, reminder, and renewal notices required for force-placed insurance strictly conform to the timing, content, format, and delivery requirements of Regulation X?

Charges and Fees:

  • Does the company ensure that no premium charge or fee related to force-placed insurance will be assessed to the borrower unless the company has met the waiting periods following the initial and reminder notices to the borrower that the borrower has failed to comply with the mortgage loan contract’s requirements to maintain hazard insurance, and sufficient time has elapsed?
  • Are the company’s fees and charges bona fide and reasonable? Fees and charges should:
    • Be for services actually performed;
    • Bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of providing the service(s); and
    • Not be prohibited by applicable law.
  • Does the company have an adequate basis to assess any premium charge or fee related to force-placed insurance, meaning that the company has a reasonable basis to believe that the borrower has failed to comply with the mortgage loan contract’s requirement to maintain hazard insurance because the borrower’s coverage is expiring, has expired or is insufficient?
  • Does the company have appropriate controls in place to ensure that the company will not assess any premium charge or fee related to force-place insurance to the borrower if the company receives evidence that the borrower has maintained continuous hazard insurance coverage that complies with the fee requirements of the loan contract prior to the expiration of the waiting periods (at least 45 days have elapsed since the company delivered the initial notice and at least 15 days have elapsed since the company delivered the reminder notice)?
  • Will the company accept any of the following as evidence of continuous hazard insurance coverage:
    • A copy of the borrower’s hazard insurance policy declarations page;
    • The borrower’s insurance certificate;
    • The borrower’s insurance policy; or
    • Another similar form of written confirmation?
  • Does the company recognize that the borrower will be considered to have maintained continuous coverage despite a late payment when applicable law or the borrower’s policy contemplates a grace period for the payment of the hazard insurance premium and a premium payment is made within that period and accepted by the insurance company with no lapse in coverage?
  • Within 15 days of receiving evidence (from any source) demonstrating that the borrower has maintained hazard insurance coverage that complies with the hazard insurance requirements in the loan contract, does the company:
    • Cancel any force-placed insurance that the company has purchased to insure the borrower’s property; and
    • Refund to the borrower all force-placed insurance premium charges and related fees paid by such borrower for any period of overlapping insurance coverage and remove from the borrower’s account all force-placed insurance charges and related fees that the company assessed to the borrower for such period?

And let’s not forget that companies must continue to comply with the above requirements if the company is a debt collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) with respect to a borrower and that borrower has exercised a “cease communication” right under the FDCPA.  Of course, failure to comply with the Regulation X requirements could also result in violations of UDAAP and FDCPA provisions.

Takeaway:

Given that the CFPB is telegraphing its upcoming review of servicers’ force-placed insurance practices, now is a good time for companies to ensure that their compliance management programs are robust enough to ensure compliance with all the technical requirements of RESPA’s force-placed insurance requirements. Alston & Bird’s Consumer Financial Services team is happy to assist with such a review.

CFPB Issues Special Edition of Supervisory Highlights Focusing on Junk Fees

A&B ABstract:

In the 29nd edition of its Supervisory Highlights, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) focused on the impact of so-called “junk” fees in the mortgage servicing, auto servicing, and student loan servicing industries, among others.

CFPB Issues New Edition of Supervisory Highlights:

On March 8, the CFPB published a special edition of its Supervisory Highlights, addressing supervisory observations with respect to the imposition of junk fees in the mortgage servicing and auto servicing markets – as well as for deposits, payday and small-dollar lending, and student loan servicing.  The observations cover examinations of participants in these industries that the CFPB conducted between July 1, 2022 and February 1, 2023.

Auto Servicing

With respect to auto servicing, the CFPB noted three principal categories of findings the Bureau claims constitute acts or practices prohibited by the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”).

First, examiners asserted that auto servicers engaged in unfair acts or practices by assessing late fees: (a) that exceeded the maximum amount stated in consumers’ contracts; or (b) after consumers’ vehicles had been repossessed and the full balances were due.  With respect to the latter, the acceleration of the contract balance upon repossession extinguished not only the customers’ contractual obligation to make further periodic payments, but also the servicers’ contractual right to charge late fees on such periodic payments. The report notes that in response to the findings, the servicers ceased their assessment practices, and provided refunds to affected consumers.

Second, examiners alleged that auto servicers engaged in unfair acts or practices by charging estimated repossession fees that were significantly higher than the average repossession cost.  Although servicers returned excess amounts to consumers after being invoiced for the actual costs, the CFPB found that the assessment of the materially higher estimated fees caused or was likely to cause concrete monetary harm – and, thus, “substantial injury” as identified in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices (“UDAAP”) supervisory guidance – to consumers.  Further, consumers could have suffered injury in the form of loss of their vehicles to the extent that they did not want – or could not afford – to pay the higher estimated repossession fees if they sought to reinstate or redeem the vehicle.  Examiners found that such injuries: (a) were not reasonably avoidable by consumers, who could not control the servicers’ fee practices; and (b) were not outweighed by a countervailing benefit to consumers or competition.  The report notes that in response to the findings, the servicers ceased the practice of charging estimated repossession fees that were significantly higher than average actual costs, and also provided refunds to consumers affected by the practice.

Third, examiners claimed that auto servicers engaged in unfair and abusive acts or practices by assessing payment processing fees that exceeded the servicers’ actual costs for processing payments.  CFPB examiners noted that servicers offered consumers two free methods of payment: (a) pre-authorized recurring ACH debits; and (b) mailed checks.  Only consumers with bank accounts can utilize those methods; all those without a bank account, or who chose to use a different payment method, incurred a processing fee.  The CFPB reported that as a result of “pay-to-pay” fees, servicers received millions of dollars in incentive payments totaling approximately half of the total amount of payment processing fees collected by the third party payment processors.

Mortgage Servicing

In examining mortgage servicers, CFPB examiners noted five principal categories of findings that related to the assessment of junk fees, which were alleged to constitute UDAAPs and/or violate Regulation Z.

First, CFPB examiners found that servicers assessed borrowers late fees in excess of the amounts permitted by loan agreements, often by neglecting to input the maximum fee permitted by agreement into their operating systems.   The examiners found that by instead charging the maximum late fees permitted under state laws, servicers engaged in unfair acts or practices.  Further, servicers violated Regulation Z by issuing periodic statements that reflected the charging of fees in excess of those permitted by borrowers’ loan agreements. In response to these findings, servicers took corrective action including: (a) waiving or refunding late fees that were in excess of those permitted under borrowers’ loan agreements; and (b) corrected borrower’s periodic statements to reflect correct late fee amounts.

Second, CFPB examiners found that servicers engaged in unfair acts and practices by repeatedly charged consumers for unnecessary property inspections (such as repeat property preservation visits to known bad addresses). In response to the finding, servicers revised their policies to preclude multiple charges to a known bad address, and waived or refunded the fees that had been assessed to borrowers.

Third, CFPB examiners noted two sets of findings related to private mortgage insurance (“PMI”).  When a loan is originated with lender-paid PMI, PMI premiums should not be billed directly to consumers.  In certain cases, the CFPB found that servicers engaged in deceptive acts or practices by mispresenting to consumers – including on periodic statements and escrow disclosures – that they owed PMI premiums, when in fact the borrowers’ loans had lender-paid PMI.  These misrepresentations led to borrowers’ overpayments reflecting the PMI premiums; in response to the findings, servicers refunded any such overpayments. Similarly, CFPB examiners found that servicers violated the Homeowners Protection Act by failing to terminate PMI on the date that the principal balance of a current loan was scheduled to read a 78 percent LTV ratio, and continuing to accept borrowers’ payments for PMI after that date.  In response to these findings, servicers both issued refunds of excess PMI payments and implemented compliance controls to enhance their PMI handling.

Fourth, CFPB examiners found that servicers engaged in unfair acts or practices by failing to waive charges (including late fees and penalties) accrued outside of forbearance periods for federally backed mortgages subject to the protections of the CARES Act.  The CARES Act generally prohibits the accrual of fees, penalties, or additional interest beyond scheduled monthly payment amounts during a forbearance period; however, the law does not address fees and charges accrued during periods when loans are not in forbearance.  Under certain circumstances, HUD required servicers of FHA-insured mortgages to waive fees and penalties accrued outside of forbearance periods for borrowers exiting forbearances and  entering permanent loss mitigation options.  CFPB examiners found that servicers sometimes failed to complete the required fee waivers, constituting an unfair act or practice under the CFA.

Finally, CFPB examiners found that servicers engaged in deceptive acts and practices by sending consumers in their last month of forbearance periodic statements that incorrectly listed a $0 late fee for the next month’s payment, when a full late fee would be charged if such payment were late.  In response to the finding, servicers updated their periodic statements and either waived or refunded late fees incurred in the referenced payments.

Deposits

The CFPB determined that two overdraft-related practices constitute unfair acts or practices: (i) authorizing transactions when a deposit’s balance was positive but settled negative (APSN fees); and (ii) assessing multiple non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees when merchants present a payment against a customer’s account multiple times despite the lack of sufficient funds in the account.  The CFPB has criticized both fees before in Consumer Financial Protection Circular 2022-06, Unanticipated Overdraft Fee Assessment Practices.

According to the report, tens of millions of dollars in related customer injury are attributable to APSN fee practices, and redress is already underway to more than 170,000 customers.  Many financial institutions have abandoned the practice, but the CFPB noted that even some such institutions had not ceased the practice and were accordingly issued matters requiring attention to correct the problems.  As for NSF fees, the CFPB found millions of dollars of consumer harm to tens of thousands of customers.  It also determined that “virtually all” institutions interacting with the CFPB on the issue have abandoned the practice.

Student Loan Servicing

Turning to student loan servicing, the CFPB found that servicers engaged in unfair acts or practices prohibited by the CFPA where: (a) customer service representative errors delayed consumers from making valid payments on their accounts, and (b) those delays led to consumers owing additional late fees and interest associated with the delinquency.  Contrary to servicers’ state policies against the acceptance of credit cards, customer service representatives accepted and processed credit card payments from consumers over the phone.  The servicers initially processed the credit card payments, but then reversed those payments when the error in payment method was identified.

Payday and Small Dollar Lending

The CFPB determined that lenders, in connection with payday, installment, title, and line-of-credit loans, engaged in a number of unfair acts or practices.  The first conclusion they made was that lenders simultaneously or near-simultaneously re-presented split payments from customers’ accounts without obtaining proper authorization, resulting in multiple overdraft fees, indirect follow-on fees, unauthorized loss of funds, and inability to prioritize payment decisions. The second such conclusion concerned charges to borrowers to retrieve personal property from repossessed vehicles, servicer charges, and withholding subject personal property and vehicles until fees were paid.  The third such determination related to stopping vehicle repossessions before title loan payments were due as previously agreed, and then withholding the vehicles until consumers paid repossession-related fees and refinanced their debts.

Takeaways

The CFPB’s focus on “junk” fees is not new – it follows on an announcement last January that the agency would be focused on the fairness of fees that various industries impose on consumers.  (We have previously discussed how the CFPB’s actions could impact mortgage servicing fee structures.)  Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has previously considered the issue of “junk fees” in connection with auto finance transactions.

By focusing specifically on the issue in a special edition of the Supervisory Highlights, the CFPB is drawing special attention to the issue of these fees in the servicing context.  Mortgage, auto, and student loan servicers might use this as an opportunity to review their current practices and see how they stack up against the CFPB’s findings.

New York Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act Curtails Servicers’ Options

A&B ABstract:

Effective on approval by Governor Kathy Hochul on December 30, 2022, New York Assembly Bill 7737b – the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (the “Act”) became law.  The Act is signifcant because it reverses judicial precedent that permitted a lender, after default, to undo the acceleration of a mortgage and stop the running of the statute of limitations in a foreclosure action through voluntary dismissal, discontinuance of foreclosure actions, or de-acceleration letters. Notably, the Act applies both prospectively and to any foreclosure action filed prior to its effective date that had not been resolved through a final judgment and order of sale. Further, unlike other provisions of New York law, the Act applies to all properties (and not only those that are owner-occupied). Public reaction has been mixed as to whether the measure will benefit consumers – but, regardless, it changes the rules of the game for lenders and servicers in New York State.

Background

Existing New York law establishes a six-year statute of limitations for the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action, triggered when the borrower defaults on the obligation and the lender accelerates the obligation to pay the secured debt. In 2021, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a lender can de-accelerate a loan and reset the statute of limitations.

The court decided four cases (with the opinion rendered in Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 N.Y.3d 1 (2021)), “each turning on the timeliness of a mortgage foreclosure claim.” The court held that the lender’s voluntary dismissal of a foreclosure suit constituted a revocation of the lender’s election to accelerate. Such revocation returned the parties to their pre-acceleration rights, reinstated the borrower’s right to repay via installments, and established a new statute of limitations period for any future default payments. According to the court, “[w]here the maturity of the debt has been validly accelerated by commencement of a foreclosure action,” the court opined, “the noteholder’s voluntary withdrawal of that action revokes the election to accelerate, absent the noteholder’s contemporaneous statement to the contrary.”

In the course of deciding Engel, the court also considered what constituted an “overt unequivocal act” sufficient to trigger a valid acceleration of debt and the six-year statute of limitations. Here, the court held that neither the issuance of a default letter nor the filing of complaints in prior discontinued foreclosure actions that failed to reference the pertinent modified loan were sufficient methods to validly accelerate debt.

The Act

Since the Engel decision, mortgagees in New York State have relied on their ability to voluntarily discontinue a foreclosure action – and effectively reset the statute of limitations– in order to engage distressed borrowers in loss mitigation efforts. However, the Act appears to eliminate a mortgagee’s ability to unilaterally reset the limitations period by voluntarily discontinuing a foreclosure action and deaccelerating the loan.

With the express intent of overturning the Engel decision, the Act amends provisions of New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL,” N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law §§ 1301 et seq.), General Obligations Law (“GOL,” N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 1-101 et seq.), and Civil Practice Law and Rules (“Rules,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 101 et seq.) relating to the rights of parties involved in foreclosure actions.

RPAPL:

Under previous law, Section 1301 of the RPAPL prohibited the commencement or maintenance of any action to recover any part of a mortgage debt while another action to recover part of the mortgage debt is already pending or after final judgment has been made for the plaintiff without leave of the court in which the first action was brought. Beyond clarifying that a foreclosure action falls within the scope of that prohibition, the Act provides that procurement of leave from the first court must be a condition precedent to commencing or maintaining the new action. Thus, failure to comply with the leave of court condition precedent may no longer be excused by finding that the prior action was “de facto discontin(ued)” or “effectively abandoned” (see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Humphrey, 173 AD3d 811, 812 (2d Dept 2019)); or that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Irizarry, 142 AD3d 610, 611 (2d Dept 2016)); nor by deeming the pre-action failure a mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity that could be overlooked or disregarded (see id.).

Moreover, failure to obtain leave is a defense to the new action. If a party brings a new action without leave of the court, the section declares that the previous action is deemed discontinued unless prior to the entry of final judgment in the original action the defendant: (a) raises the failure to comply with the condition precedent, or (b) seeks dismissal of the action based upon one of the grounds set forth in Section 3211(a)(4) of the Rules.

Section 1301 of the RPAPL is further amended to provide that if the mortgage securing the bond or note representing the debt so secured by the mortgage is adjudicated as time barred by a court of competent jurisdiction, any other action to recover any part of the same mortgage debt is equally time barred. As a result, if the statute of limitations acts to bar a foreclosure action or any other action to recover on mortgage debt, an investor or servicer cannot bring any other action to recover the same part of the mortgage debt, including another foreclosure action or an action to recover a personal judgment against the borrower on the note.

GOL:

Under Section 17-105 of the GOL, an agreement to waive the statute of limitations to foreclose on a mortgage is effective if expressly set forth in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

The Act amends Section 17-105 by: (1) clarifying that the GOL is the exclusive means by which parties are enabled to postpone, cancel, reset, toll, revive or otherwise effectuate an extension of the limitations period for the commencement of an action or proceeding upon a mortgage instrument; (2) clarifying that unless effectuated in strict accordance with Section 17-105, the discontinuance of an action upon a mortgage instrument, by any means, shall not, in form or effect, function as a waiver, postponement, cancellation, resetting, tolling, or extension of the statute of limitations; and (3) codifying certain judicial rulings holding as much.

While not included or otherwise referenced in the Act, it is also worth noting that Part 419 of the New York Department of Financial Services’ mortgage loan servicer business conduct rules prohibit a mortgage servicer from requiring a homeowner to waive legal claims and defenses as a condition of a loan modification, reinstatement, forbearance or repayment plan. It is unclear whether Part 419 would be interpreted to prohibit servicers from seeking a waiver of the limitations period pursuant to Section 17-105, especially with respect to loans where the limitations period has already run. To further complicate matters, the New York legislature is currently considering a bill that would (1) create an express private right of action for violations of Part 419; (2) make compliance with Part 419’s requirements a condition precedent to commencing a foreclosure action; and (3) render failure to materially comply with Part 419 to be a defense to a foreclosure action or an action on the note, even if servicing of the loan has been transferred to a different servicer when a foreclosure action or action on the note is commenced.

Rules:

The Act amends and adds several provisions of the Rules relating to the application of the statute of limitations in actions relating to mortgage debt.

First, the Act adds Section 203(h) to the Rules, which terminates the ability of a lender or servicer to extend the statute of limitations on a foreclosure action by any form of unilateral action. No voluntary discontinuation of an action to enforce a mortgage may “in form or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period to commence an action and to interpose a claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute.” In other words, the amended section appears to prohibit a mortgagee from “de-accruing” a cause of action or otherwise effectuating a unilateral extension of the limitations period by suspending a foreclosure action – and providing loss mitigation opportunities to the borrower – once the six-year statute of limitations has begun to run after the loan is accelerated. The methods by which the statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action can be waived or extended are exclusively set forth in Article 17 of the GOL (see GOL 17-105 (express written agreement to extend, waive or not plead as a defense the statute of limitations); 17-107 (unqualified payment on account of mortgage indebtedness effective to revive statute of limitations)). Accordingly, a bare stipulation of discontinuance or a lender’s unilateral decision to revoke its demand for full payment is no longer a permissible method for waiving, extending, or modifying the statute of limitations.

Second, the Act adds Section 205-a to the Rules, limiting reliance on the savings statute for time-barred claims. After termination of an action, the new section permits the original named plaintiff to commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions only if: (a) the plaintiff brings the new action within six months of the termination; and (b) the termination of the prior action occurred in any manner other than a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, dismissal for any form of neglect, for violation of any court rules or individual part rules, failure to comply with any court scheduling orders, failure to appear for a conference or at a calendar call, failure to timely submit any order or judgment, or a final judgment upon the merits. Further, only one six-month extension will be available to the plaintiff.

Under new Section 205-a, a successor-in-interest or an assignee of the original plaintiff can only commence a new action if such party pleads and proves that the assignee is acting on behalf of the original plaintiff. Further, if the defendant has served an answer and the action has been terminated, in a new action based on the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions (whether brought by the original plaintiff or a successor-in-interest or assignee thereof) any cause of action or defense that the defendant asserts will be considered timely “if such cause of action or defense was timely asserted in the prior action.” Section 205-a also provides that, where applicable, the original plaintiff (or a successor-in-interest acting on behalf of the original plaintiff) may only receive one six-month extension and no court shall allow the original plaintiff to receive more than one six-month extension.

Third, the Act amends Section 213(4) of the Rules to clarify that in any action where the statute of limitations is raised as a defense – and if that defense is based on a claim that the indebtedness was accelerated prior to or through commencement of a prior action – a plaintiff will be estopped from asserting that a mortgage instrument was not validly accelerated prior to or by way of commencement of a prior action. An exception exists if the prior action “was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.”

Further, in any quiet title action seeking cancellation and discharge of record of a mortgage instrument, a defendant will be estopped from asserting that the applicable statute of limitations period for commencement of an action has not expired because instrument was not validly accelerated prior to or by way of commencement of a prior action, “unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.”

Finally, the Act amends Section 3217 of the Rules, by adding a new Subsection (e), which clarifies that if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense in an action, and if the defense rests on a claim that the instrument was accelerated prior to or by virtue of the commencement of a prior action, the plaintiff cannot stop the tolling of the statute of limitations by asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated unless the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination regarding invalid acceleration.

Takeaway

In light of the Act’s curtailment of a servicer’s or investor’s ability to unilaterally suspend a foreclosure action, we recommend that mortgagees carefully review their pending mortgage foreclosure actions in New York state. At a minimum, the Act removes the ability of a holder or servicer in New York state to voluntarily discontinue a foreclosure action after acceleration of the indebtedness triggers the running of the statute of limitations.

Whether this will interfere with servicers’ contractual rights and ability – and obligations under the CFPB rules and New York Part 419 – to offer meaningful loss mitigation opportunities to borrowers remains to be seen. At least one judge thinks so. In a recent Order to Show Cause, a New York Supreme Court judge concluded that the Act violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution and included an invitation for the New York Attorney General to weigh in.

CFPB Proposes Nonbank Registry to Focus on Compliance “Recidivism”

A&B ABstract:

On December 12, 2022, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced a proposed rule to require certain non-banks to register with the agency when they become subject to a public written order or judgment imposing obligations based on violations of certain consumer protection laws. The CFPB also proposes to maintain a public online registry of those nonbanks subject to agency or court orders, to “limit the harms from repeat offenders.” We provide below a description of the CFPB’s proposed rule, along with the potential implications for the financial services industry.

Background on Proposed Rule

Earlier this year, CFPB Director Rohit Chopra presented remarks at the University of Pennsylvania, where he asserted that “[c]orporate recidivism has become normalized and calculated as the cost of doing business; the result is a rinse-repeat cycle that dilutes legal standards and undermines the promise of the financial sector and the entire market system.” To address this problem, Director Chopra suggested establishing “dedicated units in our supervision and enforcement divisions to enhance the detection of repeat offenses and corporate recidivists and to better hold them accountable.” With respect to accountability for “serial offenders of federal law,” Director Chopra warned that the CFPB would be focusing on “remedies that are more structural in nature,” including “limits on the activities or functions” of the entity.

Subsequently, in November 2022, and leading up to the proposed rule, the CFPB announced, as part of its Supervisory Highlights, that it would be establishing a Repeat Offender Unit as part of its supervision program. The Repeat Offender Unit would be focused on: reviewing and monitoring the activities of “repeat offenders;” identifying the root cause of recurring violations; pursuing and recommending solutions and remedies that hold entities accountable for failing to consistently comply with Federal consumer financial law; and designing a model for order review and monitoring that reduces the occurrences of repeat offenders. The Bureau asserts that its authority for these efforts, along with any proposed rulemaking, is derived from the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s mandate that the Bureau “monitor for risks to consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services” and “gather information from time to time regarding the organization, business conduct, markets, and activities of covered persons and service providers.” See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1), (4).

Proposed Requirements

The CFPB’s proposed rule would require certain nonbanks covered person entities (with exclusions for insured depository institutions, insured credit unions, related persons, States, certain other entities, and natural persons) to register with the Bureau upon becoming subject to a public written order or judgment imposing obligations based on violations of certain consumer protections laws. Such entities would be required to register in a system established by the Bureau, provide basic identifying information about the company and the order (including a copy of the order), and periodically update the registry for accuracy and completeness. For purposes of the proposed rule, “covered person” would have the same meaning as in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6). Further, “service providers” would be deemed covered persons to the extent that they engage in the offering or provision of their own consumer financial product or services or where they act as service providers to covered person affiliates.

In addition, certain larger participant nonbanks subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority would be required to designate a senior executive, who is responsible for and knowledgeable of the nonbank’s efforts to comply with the orders identified in the registry, to attest regarding compliance with covered orders and submit an annual written statement attesting to the steps taken to oversee the activities subject to the applicable order for the preceding calendar year, and whether the executive knows of any violations of, or other instances of noncompliance with, the covered order.

Further, the CFPB is considering whether to release, via its publicly available website, the above registry information for non-banks.

Implications for Non-Banks

While the CFPB’s proposed enforcement order registry would provide greater transparency about a lender’s regulatory track record to the various federal and state regulators and the general public, it remains to be seen how the information maintained in this registry might be used against lenders. At a minimum, however, the proposed rule raises the following significant implications for non-banks:

  • Supervision and examination considerations. The CFPB intends to use the information in the registry to coordinate its “risk-based supervisory prioritization,” for those non-bank markets covered by the Bureau’s supervision and examination authority under CFPA section 1024(a). Thus, entities with a local, state, or federal prior enforcement order may be subject to more targeted supervision.
  • Investigation and enforcement presumptions. The CFPB intends to use the information in the registry in connection with its investigation and potential enforcement activities, which presents various risks, including:
    • Increased civil money penalties. Specifically, the CFPB believes that the information contained in the proposed registry can assist the agency in determining the civil penalties that may be assessed for a future violation of federal consumer financial law, given that federal law permits the CFPB to consider the entity’s “history of previous violations.” Indeed, it is possible that the CFPB may use evidence of prior enforcement against an entity, brought by itself or another agency, to establish that the entity acted knowingly or recklessly in violating federal consumer financial law, perhaps even where the prior enforcement order involved a different consumer-related issue.
    • Presumption of consumer harm. Further, the CFPB believes there is a “heightened likelihood” that entities that are subject to public orders relating to consumer financial products and services may pose risks to consumers in the markets for those products and services, since entities that have previously been subject to enforcement actions “present an increased risk of committing violations of laws.” Thus, there may be a presumption of consumer harm against an entity where a prior enforcement order exists. Yet this approach by the CFPB likely will overstate the actual harm to consumers, as most consent orders do not contain an admission by the entity of any liability or wrongdoing.
  • Increased reputational risk. Given that the CFPB maintains Memoranda of Understanding with federal parties (such as the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice), as well as with at least 20 state attorneys general offices, it appears that the information reported to the registry already would be available to such agencies. However, the registry will permit all agencies, as well as the general public, a readily accessible, one-stop shop to an entity’s entire enforcement track record, which may present significant reputational risk to that entity, as well as a potentially increased risk of class action lawsuits and other consumer claims.
  • Facilitating of private enforcement. The CFPB believes that the proposed registry may “facilitate private enforcement of the Federal consumer financial laws by consumers, to the extent those laws provide private rights of action, where consumers have been harmed by a registered nonbank.” In other words, the “information that would be published under the proposal might be useful in helping consumers understand the identity of a company that has offered or provided a particular consumer financial product or service, and in determining whether to file suit or otherwise make choices regarding how to assert their legal rights.”

Takeaway:

Given the significant implications raised by the CFPB’s proposed rule, non-bank financial institutions should consider submitting comments, which are due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. In particular, the CFPB seeks comment on “its preliminary conclusion that collecting and registering public agency and court orders imposing obligations based upon violations of consumer law would assist with monitoring for risks to consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial products and services.” The CFPB also seeks comment on “whether the types of orders described in the proposal, and the types of information that would be collected about those orders and covered nonbanks under the proposal, would provide useful information to the Bureau,” as well as “any other risks that might be identified through collecting the information described in the proposal.” Finally, the Bureau seeks comment on whether it should consider collecting any other information in order to identify risks to consumers associated with orders.

Assumptions on the Rise: Are You Ready for Mortgage Assumptions?

A&B ABstract:

Mortgage assumptions – where a buyer assumes the existing mortgage loan of a seller – have fluctuated in popularity since the 1980s. However, inflation and the high interest rate environment, coupled with an observable shift to a buyer’s market, are raising the prospect that assumable mortgages – especially those with historically low interest rates – are likely to become a selling point for potential sellers. Statements by the real estate broker industry, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and former Ginnie Mae officials, to name a few, corroborate this hunch. Ultimately, given these rumblings, it appears that lenders, and more so mortgage servicers, will need to prepare for a potential increase in mortgage assumption volume. Below are several key considerations with respect to mortgage assumptions.

Servicer Capabilities

Servicers generally will need to diligently evaluate the assuming buyer’s creditworthiness. In certain cases, servicers may need to offer and service home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) and second liens to support the cost difference between the amount of the loan to be assumed and the cost of the property. Further, as servicers will likely have to evaluate the assuming consumer’s credit eligibility in connection with the processing of most mortgage assumptions, such activities may give rise to additional state mortgage lender and/or loan originator licensing obligations. While the federal SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act and its implementing Regulation G and H generally do not consider mortgage loan origination activity to encompass a servicer’s activities in connection with the processing of a loan modification, when the borrower is reasonably likely to default, there is no such exemption for mortgage assumptions. Moreover, states that license mortgage loan origination activities may vary as to whether a license is required to process an assumption.

 Investor Restrictions

Even if a buyer is deemed creditworthy to assume the seller’s mortgage payments, the agency or investor backing the seller’s mortgage loan must approve the assumption. Most government-backed mortgage loans, such as those guaranteed or insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (VA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are assumable, provided specific requirements are met.  On the other hand, conventional mortgages (i.e., loans meeting the requirements for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the “GSEs”)) may be more difficult to assume.

It is important to note that the requirements for processing and/or approving an assumption vary from agency to agency and among the GSEs. By way of example:

  • FHA loans are assumable if the buyer meets certain credit requirements, according to FHA guidelines. Buyers who assume FHA mortgages pay off the remaining balance at the current rate, and the lender releases the seller from the loan.
  • VA mortgage assumption guidelines are similar to FHA, with some notable differences. The VA or the VA-approved lender must evaluate the creditworthiness of the buyer, who generally must also pay a VA funding fee of 0.5% of the loan balance as of the transfer date. Unlike new loans, buyers can’t finance the funding fee when assuming a loan, it must be paid in cash at the time of transfer. Moreover, the only way the seller can have their VA entitlement restored would be to have the home assumed by a fellow eligible active-duty service member, reservist, veteran, or eligible surviving spouse.
  • USDA permits loan assumptions but operates differently from FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans. For example, according to USDA guidelines, when most buyers assume a USDA loan, the lender will generally issue new terms, which may include a new rate.
  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may permit an assumption under certain circumstances. For example, Fannie Mae may permit the assumption of certain first-lien adjustable-rate mortgage (ARMs) loans that have not been converted to a fixed-rate-mortgage loan.

Due-on-Sale Clauses

Many conventional mortgages today contain “due-on-sale” clauses that authorize a lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender’s security interest if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the loan is sold or transferred without the lender’s prior written consent. However, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act prohibits a lender from exercising its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause in connection with certain exempt transfers or dispositions, including, among others: (1) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety; (2) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower; (3) a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of the property; and (4) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner of the property. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j–3(d).

Fees

Whether an assumption fee can be charged, and the amount of such fee, will depend on many factors including application of the Garn-St. Germain Act, the CFPB mortgage servicing rules, investor and agency guidelines, and state laws. Further, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) may impact whether a servicer may assess and collect an assumption fee. While most states neither expressly permit nor prohibit assumption fees, several other states, such as Idaho and Michigan, explicitly recognize and permit assumption fees in limited cases (e.g., only where the fee is included in the purchase contract or other agreement). Other states may regulate the amount of an assumption fee. For example, Colorado law limits assumption fees to one-half of 1% of the outstanding principal mortgage amount.

General Federal Consumer Financial Compliance

Assumption transactions also raise compliance considerations under federal consumer financial laws. Under TILA and Regulation Z, an assumption occurs if the transaction meets the following elements: (1) includes the creditor’s express acceptance of the new consumer as a primary obligor; (2) includes the creditor’s express acceptance in a written agreement; and (3) is a “residential mortgage transaction” as to the new consumer. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.20(b). A “residential mortgage transaction” is a transaction: (a) in which a security interest is created or retained in the new consumer’s principal dwelling; and (b) which finances the acquisition or initial construction of the new consumer’s principal dwelling. 12 C.F.R. 1026.2(a)(24). If the transaction is an assumption under Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. § 1026.20(b)), then, as noted by the CFPB in its TILA-RESPA Factsheet, creditors must provide a Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure, unless the transaction is otherwise exempt. Moreover, the assumption transaction may also trigger requirements under Regulation Z’s loan originator compensation and ability-to-repay rules.

With respect to RESPA and Regulation X, however, assumptions are exempt unless the mortgage instruments require lender approval for the assumption and the lender approves the assumption. Specifically, Regulation X expressly exempts from its coverage any “assumption in which the lender does not have the right expressly to approve a subsequent person as the borrower on an existing federally related mortgage loan.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.5(b)(5). By way of example, the Fannie/Freddie Uniform Security Instrument provides that:

Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower’s obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower’s rights and obligations under this Security Instrument.  Borrower shall not be released from Borrower’s obligations and liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing.  The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit successors of Lender.

Finally, with respect to the CFPB’s Mortgage Servicing Rules, if a successor in interest assumes a mortgage loan obligation under state law or is otherwise liable on the mortgage loan obligation, the protections that the consumer enjoys under Regulation X go beyond the protections that apply to a confirmed successor in interest. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30(d).

Takeaway

The processing of mortgage assumptions involves many of the same regulatory considerations as originating a new loan. However, because of varying requirements under agency and investor guidelines, there are several unique aspects to processing assumptions, which may pose challenges for servicers that do not regularly engage in mortgage origination. The economic climate appears to be ripe for an uptick in mortgage loan assumption activity. Accordingly, servicers should ensure their compliance management systems are prepared to manage the associated compliance risks.