Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)

CFPB Seeks Permanent Enforcement – Will this Further its Repeat Offender Agenda?

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What Happened?

On May 31, 2024, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) sued student loan servicer Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) for illegally collecting on student loans that have been discharged in bankruptcy and sending false information about consumers to credit reporting companies, in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. As a result of PHEAA’s alleged practices, borrowers are forced to either pay debt they do not owe or risk being hit with negative information on their credit reports and default due to the purported non-payment. The CFPB’s lawsuit asks the court to order PHEAA to stop its illegal conduct, provide redress to borrowers it has harmed, and pay a civil penalty.

Notably, this lawsuit follows a prior complaint and proposed stipulated judgments filed by the CFPB against PHEAA and National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (the Trusts) just 25 days earlier. The stipulated judgments filed by the CFPB on May 6, 2024, if approved (briefing to continue until at least June 28, 2024), would require the PHEAA and the Trusts to pay more than $5 million for student loan servicing failures, including failing to provide accurate information to borrowers and incorrectly denying forbearance requests. In addition to certain affirmative obligations, the Trusts are prohibited from directly or indirectly violating sections 1031 (prohibiting unfair, deceptive, abusive acts and practices) and 1036 (prohibiting violating a federal consumer financial law) of the CFPA with respect to certain borrower requests.

Why Is It Important?

The proposed stipulated judgments conspicuously lack one important feature – they do not provide for a termination date. While certain administrative provisions contain time limits (such as 5-year notification and recordkeeping requirements), the stipulated judgments effectively act as a permanent injunction against PHEAA and the Trusts. In other words, if, at any point in the future, PHEAA were to violate the Consumer Financial Protection Act, then PHEAA would be liable for violating the stipulated judgment – and, subsequently, at risk of being branded a “repeat offender” by the CFPB. Conveniently, just last week, the CFPB finalized a rule to establish a registry to detect and deter corporate offenders that have broken consumer laws and are subject to federal, state, or local government or court orders.

What Do I Need to Do?

Institutions within the CFPB’s jurisdiction should be aware of the CFPB’s actions and present any applicable legal defenses as to why an indefinite contract may be deemed unenforceable in court. Further, institutions should enhance their compliance management systems to mitigate risk and ensure they do not end up on the CFPB’s repeat offender list.

FSOC Issues Report on Nonbank Mortgage Servicing Highlighting Strengths, Vulnerabilities and Recommendations

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What Happened?

In May 2024, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or Council) issued a Report on Nonbank Mortgage Servicing (the Report). The Report recognizes the strengths of nonbank mortgage companies (NMCs) and the important role they serve. However, the Council warns that the vulnerabilities of NMCs are more acute due, in part, to the mortgage market shift from banks to NMCs, the increasing federal government exposure to NMCs, financial strain of nonbank originators following the end of the refinance boom, and considerable liquidity risk from NMCs funding sources. The Council warns that it will continue to monitor such risks and take or recommend additional actions in accordance with its Analytic Framework (the 2023 Analytic Framework) and Nonbank Designation Guidance (the 2023 Nonbank Designation Guidance), which we discussed in a prior blog post. The Council also makes several recommendations, including asking Congress to establish a fund financed by the nonbank mortgage sector and administered by an existing federal agency to ensure there are no taxpayer-funded bailouts should a nonbank mortgage servicer fail.

Why Does it Matter?

Background

The Dodd-Frank Act empowers FSOC to designate a nonbank financial company subject to enhanced prudential standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors by a two-thirds vote of the Council. The Council is comprised of 10 voting members consisting of the U.S. prudential regulators, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an independent member having insurance expertise, and five non-voting members with the Secretary of the Treasury serving as Chairperson of the Council.

This designation can be made upon the Council’s finding that:

  • Material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States; or
  • The nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability in the United States.

The Council’s 2023 Analytic Framework provides a non-exhaustive list of eight potential risk factors and the indicators that FSOC intends to monitor that include: (i) leverage, (ii) liquidity risks and maturity mismatches, (iii) interconnections, (iv) operational risk, (v) complexity of opacity, (vi) inadequate risk management, (vii) concentration, and (viii) destabilizing activities. Additionally, FSOC will assess the transmission of those risks by evaluating: (i) exposure, (ii) asset liquidation, (iii) critical function or service, and (iv) contagion. The 2023 Nonbank Designation Guidance, procedural in nature, defines a two-stage process the Council will use to make a firm-specific “nonbank financial company determination” pursuant to FSOC’s Analytic Framework. The Council also has the authority to make recommendations to regulators and Congress and engage in interagency coordination.

The 2024 Report on Nonbank Mortgage Servicing

At the outset, the Council recognizes that the NMC market share has increased significantly. Based on HMDA data, NMCs originate around two-thirds of mortgages in the United States and owned the servicing rights on 54 percent of mortgage balances in 2022 as compared to 2008 when NMCs originated only 39 percent of mortgages and owned the servicing rights on only four percent of mortgage balances. Moreover, in the 10-year period between 2014 and 2024, the share of Agency (i.e., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) servicing handled by NMCs increased from 35 percent 66 percent.

In 2023, NMCs serviced around $6 trillion for the Agencies and approximately 70 percent of the total Agency market.

FSOC recognizes that NMCs filled a void following the 2007-2009 crisis when banks exited the market due to several factors (such as the revised capital rules on banks, making MSRs less attractive, as well as perceived increased costs of default servicing resulting from the National Mortgage Settlement, the Independent Foreclosure Review, prosecutions under the False Claims Act, and private litigation.) According to FSOC, NMCs developed substantial operational capacity and embraced technology. The Council also recognizes NMCs’ strength in servicing historically underserved borrowers. In 2022, NMCs originated greater than 70 percent of mortgages extended to Black and Hispanic borrowers and more than 60 percent of low- and moderate-income borrowers.

While recognizing the strengths of NMCs, the Report also highlights several vulnerabilities. Of the eight risk factors identified in the 2023 Analytic Framework, FSOC focuses its concerns on the following four vulnerabilities:

  • Liquidity Risks & Maturity Mismatches: As provided in the 2023 Analytic Framework, a shortfall of sufficient liquidity to cover short-term needs, or reliance on short-term liabilities to finance longer-term assets, can lead to rollover or refinance risk. FSOC may measure this risk by looking at the ratios of short-term debt to unencumbered liquid assets and the amount of additional funding available to meet unexpected reductions in available short-term funds. FSOC reports “considerable” liquidity concerns from NMCs’ funding sources and servicing contracts. First, NMCs’ reliance on warehouse lines of credit can result in (i) margin calls, (ii) repricing or restructuring lines by raising interest rates, changing the types of acceptable collateral, or canceling lines, (iii) exercising cross default provisions, and (iv) the risk of multiple warehouse lenders enforcing covenants or imposing higher margin requirements at the same time. Second, NMCs face liquidity risk from margin calls on the hedges in place to protect interest rate movements while mortgages are on a warehouse line. Third, NMCs face liquidity risks from their lines of credit that are collateralized by mortgage servicing rights (MSRs), that can also result in margin calls. Finally, requirements to advance funds on behalf of the investor (particularly Ginnie Mae) or repurchase mortgages from securitization pools may result in liquidity strains.
  • Leverage: As provided in the 2023 Analytic Framework, leverage is assessed by levels of debt and other off-balance sheet obligations that may create instability in the face of sudden liquidity restraints, within a market or at a limited number of firms in a market. To assess leverage, the Council may look at quantitative metrics such as ratios of assets, risk-weighted assets, debts, derivatives liabilities or exposures, and off-balance sheet obligations to equity. The Report cites to data from Moody’s Ratings which requires an NMC to have a ratio of secured debt to gross tangible assets of less than 30 percent for its long-term debt rating to be investment grade. In the third quarter of 2023, 37% of NMCs met this standard and 35% of NMCs had ratios in excess of 60 percent which is considered a high credit risk. According to FSOC, equity funding by NMCs add to leverage vulnerability.
  • Operational Risk: As provided in the 2023 Analytic Framework, operational risk arises for the “impairment or failure of financial market infrastructures, processes or systems, including due to cybersecurity vulnerabilities.” The Report highlights that for NMCs operational risks include continuity of operations, threats from cyber events, third-party risk management, quality control, governance, compliance, and processes for servicing delinquent loans.
  • Interconnections: As provided in 2023 Analytic Framework, direct or indirect financial interconnections include exposures of creditors, counterparties, investors, and borrowers that can increase the potential negative effect measured by the extent of exposure to certain derivatives, potential requirement to post margin or collateral, and overall health of the balance sheet. Through warehouse lenders, other financing sources, servicing and subservicing relationships, NMCs are connected to each other. Because of such linkages, the Council is concerned that financial difficulties at one core lender could affect many NMCs.

Because of these NMC vulnerabilities, FSOC is concerned that NMCs could transmit the negative effects of such shocks to the mortgage market and broader financial system through the following channels discussed in the 2023 Analytic Framework:

  • Critical Functions and Services: As provided in 2023 Analytic Framework, a risk to financial stability can arise if there could be a disruption of critical functions or services that are relied upon by market participants for which there is no substitute. FSOC is concerned that if an NMC is under financial strain, it would not have the resources to carry out its core responsibilities, which could result in bankruptcy, borrower harm, operational harm, or servicing transfers mandated by state regulators.
  • Exposures: This refers to the level of direct and indirect exposure of creditors, investors, counterparties, and others to particular instruments or asset classes. Again, if an NMC faced financial strain that impacted the ability of the NMS to execute its functions, other counterparties could be harmed, including investors and credit guarantors. The Agencies could also experience high costs and credit losses and may have challenges in transferring servicing to a more stable servicer. The Report notes that “servicing assumption risk may be slightly less acute (though not less costly) for the enterprises, which have more preemptive tools available to them to assist a servicer in distress than Ginnie Mae does.”
  • Contagion and Asset Liquidation: While these are two separate risks, the Council grouped them together. As defined in the 2023 Analytic Framework, contagion is the potential for financial contagion arising from public perceptions of vulnerability and loss of confidence in widely held financial instruments. Asset liquidation is rapid asset liquidation and the snowball effect of a widespread asset selloff across sectors. The Council is concerned that because MSRs are a large share of NMCs’ assets, “changes in macroeconomic conditions or funder risk appetite” could depress MSR valuations resulting in rapid liquidation and have a material impact on NMC solvency and access to credit.

Because of the federal government’s financial support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the direct responsibility for Ginnie Mae’s guarantee to bond investors, the federal government has an interest in addressing servicing risks. FSOC does not believe such risks, as identified above, are sufficiently addressed by the states or existing federal authority. First, “[n]o federal regulator has direct prudential authorities over nonbank mortgage servicers.” Second, the state regulators have prudential authority, however, only nine states (as of April 2024) have adopted prudential financial and corporate governance standards. To that end, the Council recommends:

  • State regulators adopt enhanced prudential requirements, further coordinate supervision of nonbank mortgage servicers, and require recovery and resolution planning for large nonbank mortgage servicers.
  • Federal and state regulators should continue to monitor the nonbank mortgage sector and develop tabletop exercises to prepare for the failure of nonbank mortgage servicers.
  • Congress should provide the Federal Housing Finance Agency and Ginnie Mae with additional authority to establish safety and soundness standards and directly examine nonbank mortgage servicer counterparties for compliance with such standards. Congress should also authorize Ginnie Mae and encourage state regulators to share information with each other and Council members.
  • Congress should consider legislation to provide more protections for borrowers to keep their homes.
  • Congress should consider providing Ginnie Mae with authority to expand its Pass-Through Assistance Program (PTAP) to include tax and insurance payments, foreclosure costs and or advances during periods of severe market stress.
  • Congress should through legislation establish a fund (financed by the nonbank mortgage servicing sector) to facilitate operational continuity of servicing for servicers in bankruptcy or failure to ensure the servicing obligations can be transferred, or the company is recapitalized or sold. The Council recommends that Congress provide “sufficient authority to an existing federal agency to implement and maintain the fund, assess appropriate fees, set criteria for making disbursements, and mitigate risks associated with the implementation of the fund.”

What Do I Need to Do?

Well, shortly after the Report was issued, CFPB Director Chopra issued a statement, indicating that: “The Report is silent on what, if any, tools the FSOC itself should use to address these risks. That must be the next phase of our work. In line with the 2023 Analytic Framework and Nonbank Designation Guidance, we should carefully consider whether any large nonbank mortgage companies meet the statutory threshold for enhanced supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve Board.”

Given that warning, NMCs should pay careful attention to the statutory threshold for enhanced supervision and work on mitigating their liquidity and other risks. The Report points out that the CSBS enhanced prudential standards are enforceable by the states that have adopted such standards “including through multistate examinations that include at least one state that has adopted the standards or through referrals to states that have adopted these standards.” Thus, servicers should anticipate more state or multistate probes concerning liquidity and corporate governance. And, while stating the obvious, now is the time to double down on managing operational risks, including but not limited to continuity of operations, threats from cyber events, third-party risk management, quality control, governance, compliance, and processes for servicing delinquent loans.

Appraisal Bias Settlement: Potential Roadmap

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What Happened?

The lender and consumers reached a settlement in an appraisal bias case, Nathan Connolly and Shani Mott v. Shane Lanham, 20/20 Valuations, LLC, and loanDepot.com, LLC, filed in Maryland District Court, that gained the attention of the CFPB and DOJ. While some of the terms in the settlement are already industry standard, there appear to be some newer obligations that could be a template for other lenders to follow.

Why it Matters?

The settlement is important – both for what it does and what it doesn’t do. Unfortunately, the settlement does not address the question of whether a lender is responsible for the actions of an appraiser who is neither an employee nor an agent of the lender.

By way of background, in response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act established new rules to ensure appraisal independence and address issues of inflated appraisals or overvaluation. More recently, however, partially due to changes in the market, consumers have lodged complaints of undervaluation, alleging that discrimination resulted in the appraisal coming in too low.

Given this increase in complaints and the Administration’s focus on racial equity, regulators have been grappling with how best to address and eliminate appraisal bias. Prior to the settlement, the CFPB and DOJ jointly made arguments in a statement of interest that would hold lenders liable for the actions of an appraiser who is neither an employee nor an agent of the lender.

In response, the MBA issued an amicus brief requesting that the Court recognize that there is no existing legal authority to hold a lender liable for the alleged actions of an independent appraiser. The resulting settlement is silent on this point.

The settlement does, however, impose several obligations on the lender and its and appraisal management companies (AMCs), providing insight into what the mortgage industry could do to combat appraisal bias.

In particular, the settlement requires mortgage loan applications be provided with information on how to raise concerns with a valuation sufficiently early in the valuation process so that issues or errors can be resolved before a final decision on the application is made, including:

  • The right to request a reconsideration of value (ROV) as soon as possible;
  • A description of the process to obtain an ROV (which may not create unreasonable barriers or discourage applicants from making ROV requests) and a description of the lender’s evaluation process;
  • If the ROV is denied or the value is unchanged, a written explanation of the lender’s evaluation of the submitted material;
  • The standards that trigger a second appraisal; and
  • The applicant’s right to file a complaint with the CFPB or HUD, as part of the ROV process.

Further, the settlement requires the lender to:

  • Conduct statistical analysis tracking appraisal outcomes by protected class and neighborhood demographics including whether the loan was denied, whether a second appraisal was ordered, and whether there was a change in the valuation as a result of the ROV process. Such analysis must track individual appraisers including appraisal outcomes, ROV requests, and bias complaints.
  • Not utilize appraisers who, according to the statistical analysis, received multiple complaints from minority applicants in minority neighborhoods alleging appraisal bias, or who have a pattern of undervaluing homes owned by minority applicants or homes in minority neighborhoods, or who have been found to have discriminated in an appraisal.
  • Clearly outline internal stakeholder roles and responsibilities for processing an ROV request.
  • Ensure that ROV requests of valuation bias or discrimination complaints across all relevant business channels are escalated to the appropriate channel for research or a response.
  • Adhere to ROV timelines for certain milestones.
  • Review appraiser response to ROV requests for completeness, accuracy, and indicia of bias and discrimination.
  • Establish standards for offering a second appraisal which at a minimum must include when the first appraisal has indicia of bias or discrimination is otherwise defective.
  • Ensure that the applicant’s interest rate will remain locked during the ROV process.
  • Ensure that ensure applicants are not charged for the cost of an ROV or second appraisal.
  • Include on its website educational information on how to understand an appraisal report and contact information for questions on the appraisal report.
  • Update its fair and responsible lending policy to explicitly prohibit discrimination in violation of state and federal fair lending laws on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, disability, marital status, or age.
  • Provide training annually and for new employees on discrimination in residential mortgage lending and appraisals, and on all policies related to the ROV process, appraisal reviews, and the use of value adjustments.
  • Not utilize appraisers who previously were found by a regulatory body or court of law to have discriminated in an appraisal.

Finally, the settlement requires that AMCs and appraisers doing business with the lender contractually agree to:

  • Represent that appraisers will receive fair lending training; and
  • Certify that appraisers have not been subject to any adverse finding related to appraisal bias or discrimination, or list or describe any findings.

What to do now?

Lenders should carefully review the settlement and compare it to existing policies and procedures. While the settlement is only binding on the parties to the agreement, others should take interest. Historically, lenders conduct fair lending statistical testing for underwriting, pricing, and redlining risk. It might be time to consider adding appraisal risk.

CFPB Issues Credit Card Penalty Fee Final Rule, Reduces Late Fees to $8

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What Happened?

On March 5, 2024, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued the Credit Card Penalty Fees Final Rule (“Final Rule”), which reduces the safe harbor for the maximum late fee that large credit card issuers may charge to $8. This rule is effective on May 14, 2024.

Why Is It Important?

Background

The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 provided that any penalty fee imposed on a consumer in connection to an omission or violation of a cardholder agreement under an open-end consumer credit plan must be “reasonable and proportional” to the omission and violation.[1] To implement this provision, Regulation Z provided that card issuers may not impose a fee for violating the terms of a credit card account under an open-end consumer credit plan (“Penalty Fee”) unless the issuer (1) undergoes a cost analysis and determines that the fee is reasonably proportional to the total costs incurred by the issuer for such violation, or (2) complies with the safe harbor provisions, which provide set amounts for Penalty Fees that card issuers may charge.[2]

Previously, the safe harbor for Penalty Fees were $30 for an initial violation and $41 for each subsequent violation of the same type that occurs during the same billing cycle or in one of the next six billing cycles. These thresholds were adjusted annually to reflect changes to the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”).[3]

Final Rule

Under the Final Rule, the safe harbor threshold for late fees is limited to $8 and the annual adjustments to reflect changes in the CPI no longer apply to the $8 threshold. This new threshold only applies to “Large Card Issuers,” which are card issuers that have one million or more open credit card accounts.

The new late fee safe harbor threshold does not apply to Smaller Card Issuers. To qualify as a “Smaller Card Issuer,” the issuer, together with its affiliates, must have fewer than one million “open credit card accounts” from January through December of the preceding year.[4] If an issuer has one million or more open credit card accounts at any point in the current calendar year, it loses its status as a Smaller Card Issuer.[5] If the card issuer chooses to use the Regulation Z safe harbor provisions, the late fee safe harbor threshold of $8 is applicable to the issuer starting the 60th day after it meets or exceeds the threshold.[6] It will not qualify as a Smaller Card Issuer again until it has fewer than one million open credit card accounts in an entire preceding calendar year.

For other violations, the safe harbor amounts, adjusted to reflect changes to the CPI, are now $32 for an initial violation and $43 for subsequent violations of the same type that occurs during the same billing cycle or in one of the next six billing cycles.[7] Large Card Issuers may charge Penalty Fees pursuant to these safe harbors for other violations of the terms or requirements of an account.[8]  Smaller Card Issuers may continue to charge fees, including late fees, under the current safe harbor provisions.

Alternatively, if not relying on the safe harbor provisions, a card issuer may impose penalties on consumers for violations of their credit card account if the issuer undergoes a cost analysis and determines that the fee is reasonably proportional to the total costs incurred by the issuer for such violation. However, the Final Rule provides that when determining penalty fees, card issuers may not include any collection costs incurred after an account is charged-off in accordance with loan loss provisions.[9]  These restrictions and challenges in demonstrating that the fee is reasonably proportional to the total costs incurred by the issuer for violations make it difficult for card issuers to deviate from the safe harbors.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (the “USCC”) indicated that it would sue “immediately” to prevent the Final Rule from going into effect, arguing that the Final Rule will result in fewer card offerings and limit access to affordable credit for many consumers.[10] On March 7, 2024, two days after the CFPB issued its Final Rule, the USCC filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas seeking an injunction to stop the CFPB from implementing the Final Rule.[11] Most recently, in an order on March 18, 2024, the U.S. District Judge Mark Pittman expressed concern over the choice of venue and has ordered briefing regarding the choice to determine whether the case should be transferred to another venue.[12]

What Do I Need to Do?

Large Card Issuers should ensure that their policies, procedures, and controls are updated to ensure compliance with the Final Rule by May 14th, pending the outcome of any litigation against the CFPB challenging the Final Rule. Smaller Card Issuers should monitor the number of open accounts that they and their affiliates have to ensure that they still qualify as Smaller Card Issuers and that they are charging the correct late fee penalties depending on their status.

[1] 15 USC § 1665d(a).

[2] 12 CFR § 1026.52(b)(1).

[3] 12 CFR §1026.52(b)(1)(ii)(D).

[4] 12 CFR § 1026.52(b)(3). “Affiliate” means any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another company, as set forth in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq.). Id. “Open credit card accounts” are credit card accounts under an open end (not home secured) consumer credit plan where either (1) the cardholder can obtain extensions of credit on the account or (2) there is an outstanding balance on the account that has not been charged off. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.52(b)(6). An account that has been suspended temporarily is considered an open credit card account. Id.

[5] 12 CFR § 1026.52(b)(3).

[6] Id.

[7] 12 CFR §1026.52(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B).

[8] 12 CFR §1026.52(b)(1)(ii).

[9] 12 CFR §1026.52(b)(1)(i), Comment 2.i

[10] U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Opposes New CFPB Credit Card Late Fees Rule That Limits Access to Affordable Consumer Credit (March 5, 2024), https://www.uschamber.com/finance/u-s-chamber-opposes-new-cfpb-credit-card-late-fees-rule-that-limits-access-to-affordable-consumer-credit.

[11] U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Files Lawsuit Against Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Protect Credit Card Users (March 7, 2024), https://www.uschamber.com/finance/u-s-chamber-files-lawsuit-against-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-protect-credit-card-users.

[12] Order, Doc. 45 at 1, Mar. 18, 2024, No. 4:24-cv-00213-P, https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/dwvkeqowrvm/03192024cfpb_venue.pdf.

CFPB’s War on Mortgage Fees Continues

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What Happened?

Immediately following President Biden’s State of the Union Address announcing plans to lower homebuyer and refinancing costs, the CFPB issued a blog post seeking public input on how mortgage closing costs impact consumers. The CFPB also announced that it will work to monitor closing costs and, “as necessary, issue rules and guidance to improve competition, choice and affordability.” Significantly, the CFPB also signaled that it will continue to use its supervision and enforcement tools for companies that fail to comply with the law.

Why Is It Important?

The CFPB is putting companies on notice that the Bureau will be taking a close look at the total loans costs for originating a residential mortgage loan, including origination fees, appraisal fees, credit report fees, title insurance, discount points, and other fees. In particular, the CFPB is paying “significant attention to the recent rise in discount points,” and seems concerned with the lack of competition in connection with certain fees, such as lender’s title insurance and credit reports. The CFPB also has expressed concerns with how companies may charge lender credits and fees that are financed into the loan amount (through higher interest rates or mortgage insurance payments).

While the CFPB’s blog post does not identify any specific laws, it does provide some clues. First, the Bureau is concerned that some closing costs are high and increasing due to lack of competition. According to the Bureau, “[b]orrowers are required to pay for many of the costs associated with closing a home loan but cannot pick the provider and do not benefit from the service.” Taking unreasonable advantage of the inability of a consumer to protect their interests in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service could be construed as abusive under the Dodd-Frank Act’s UDAAP statute.

Because certain fees are fixed and don’t fluctuate with the loan size or interest rate, the Bureau is concerned that such fees could disproportionately impact borrowers with smaller loans, such as low-income borrowers, first-time borrowers, or Black or Hispanic borrowers.  This could present a fair lending problem under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Indeed, the CFPB already has announced that, pursuant to its authority to prevent unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices (“UDAAPs”), the Bureau will begin examining institutions for alleged discriminatory conduct that the Bureau deems to be unfair.

Of course, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act to address many of the above concerns, and the TRID Rule already attempts to ensure that consumers are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the residential real estate settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges.

What Do I Need to Do?

The CFPB is sending a strong message to the industry that closing fees will be receiving scrutiny from the CFPB.  And knowing that the CFPB has been on a hiring spree in its enforcement division, now is a good time to take a close look at the fees being charged from both a UDAAP and fair lending perspective.  The team at Alston & Bird has deep knowledge on mortgage fees and is happy to assist with such a review.