Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Consumer Finance

California Attorney General Targets Location Data in New Investigative Sweep

This week California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced a new investigative sweep under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). We have anticipated this sweep for some time based on the focus and the direction of a number of inquiries, investigations, and enforcement proceedings initiated by Attorney General Bonta’s office over the past 12-24 months.

The Notices of Violation issued by the Attorney General’s office will give rise to meaningful risks for many of the receiving businesses. We anticipate the Attorney General’s team will focus on granular technical details of data collection via mobile apps including through the third-party SDKs[1] that are ubiquitous across digital mobile products. How these and other digital analytics tools collect and transfer data, including precise location data, is often not well understood even by the internal digital marketing, data analytics, and product development teams that deploy and use the tools. This blind spot has created a zone of risk for many businesses that would not consider themselves a part of the “location data industry” referenced in the Attorney General’s announcement.

The interactions with the Attorney General’s office in these investigations and in enforcement proceedings can also change focus when the Attorney General’s staff suspects compliance gaps in other sensitive areas, such as use of mobile apps by children or in connection with healthcare or other sensitive activities. Careful and detailed internal legal/technical data flow analyses are therefore critical to quickly identifying the full scope of potential risk and framing the strategy for engaging with the Attorney General. For those businesses that have not received notices, this is another opportunity to close the gap between digital advertising, data analytics, and mobile app development and these emerging and increasingly clear legal privacy standards relating to precise location data and use of third-party SDKs in mobile apps.

Alston & Bird’s Privacy, Cyber & Data Strategy Team has extensive experience advising and defending clients who receive inquiries and violation notices from California’s privacy regulators.  We will continue to monitor developments in privacy regulatory enforcement in California and other states.

[1] “SDK” refers to a software development kit. These tools, many of which are free, are commonly used by mobile app teams to shorten app development timelines and quickly add features and functions to mobile apps.

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Originally published March 12, 2025 on Alston & Bird’s Privacy, Cyber & Data Strategy Blog.

Consumer Finance State Roundup

The latest edition of the Consumer Finance State Roundup highlights recently enacted measures of potential interest from two states:

California:

Effective January 1, California Assembly Bill 3108 addresses mortgage fraud.  Previously, California law defined “mortgage fraud” to include, in connection with a mortgage loan transaction, filing with the county recorder any document that the person knows to contain a deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission, and with the intent to defraud.

Taking this a step further, the measure prohibits the filing of any document with the recorder of any county that a person knows to contain a material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission. Further, the measure expressly provides that a mortgage broker or person who originates a loan commits mortgage fraud if, with the intent to defraud, the person takes specified actions relating to instructing or deliberately causing a borrower to sign documents reflecting certain loan terms with knowledge that the borrower intends to use the loan proceeds for other uses. For prosecution purposes, the alleged fraud value must be $950 or more (the threshold for grand theft).

A mortgage lender could unintentionally find itself guilty of mortgage fraud if it simply allows a borrower to use a business purpose loan for consumer purposes or makes a bridge loan that it knows will not be used for a dwelling. California’s Penal Code § 532f(b) makes it mortgage fraud for a mortgage broker or lender to allow mortgage-related documents to be formed and filed when the broker or lender has reason to know that the borrower intends on using the loan for purposes other than for what the loan is intended.

Although intent to defraud is an element to this crime, that element can only be determined through rigorous and time-consuming investigation. If a borrower, for example, uses a business loan for consumer purposes or does not apply the funds from a bridge loan towards a dwelling, the lender will be subject to additional scrutiny unless it can prove that all efforts were made to understand the borrower’s plans for the funds.

The measure also prohibits a person who originates a covered loan from avoiding, or attempting to avoid, the application of the law regulating the provision of covered loans by committing mortgage fraud. A “covered loan” means a consumer loan in which the original principal balance of the loan does not exceed the most current Fannie Mae conforming loan limit for a single-family first mortgage loan.

The measure also amends Section 4973 of the Financial Code, which imposes certain requirements ad restrictions (e.g., the inclusion of a prepayment fee or penalty after the first 36 months) in connection with covered loans and amends Section 532f of the Penal Code (as discussed above) in connection with the prohibition on committing mortgage fraud.

New York:

  • Effective June 11, Assembly Bill 424 amends Section 35 of the Banking Law, which relates to an information pamphlet that residential mortgage lenders must provide to applicants. In place of making a physical pamphlet available to lenders, the amended section requires the Department of Financial Services to notify mortgage bankers of the posting a digital version of the pamphlet on the Department’s website (and when it makes any changes thereto). The measure also amends the pamphlet contents to reflect that a lender may provide an applicant with a good faith estimate (instead of a loan estimate), depending on the type of loan for which the applicant is applying.
  • Effective May 15, Assembly Bill 2056 amends Section 283 of the Real Property Law, which limits the amount of flood insurance that a mortgagee may require a mortgagor to maintain. Under current law, that section provides that the maximum amount of coverage a mortgagee may require is the mortgage’s outstanding principal amount as of January 1 of the year the policy will be in effect. As amended, that section makes the maximum permitted amount of coverage the lesser of the outstanding principal amount or the residential property’s replacement. Additionally, AB2056 slightly alters the printed notice about flood insurance that a mortgagee must deliver to mortgagors, removing language referring to the fact that required coverage would only protect the interest of the lender or creditor in the property.
  • Effective March 21, New York Senate Bill 804 amends data breach notification requirements. Section 899-aa of the General Business Law requires a person or business to notify New York residents whose data is part of a breach, as well as to provide notice to certain governmental entities (including the Department of Financial Services). As amended, that section will require notification to the Department of Financial Services (in the form mandated by N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.17) only by “covered entities.” A “covered entity” is any person who requires any type of authorization to operate under the Banking Law, Insurance Law, or Financial Services Law, and thus includes a mortgage banker or mortgage servicer.

DEI in Lending: Are Special Purpose Credit Programs About to DIE?

For the last several years, federal agencies, including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), have been strongly encouraging financial institutions to implement and offer targeted credit assistance to historically underserved communities as one way to remedy the effects of redlining. Not surprisingly, in accordance with the prior Administration’s Combatting Redlining Initiative, every one of the 16 settlements by the CFPB and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) against both bank and non-bank lenders have mandated that these lenders offer targeted credit assistance based on the race or ethnicity of the borrowers or the predominant race or ethnicity of their neighborhoods. To satisfy the terms of these settlements, the lenders often work with state and local agencies to help market and administer their targeted loan subsidies to eligible borrowers based on protected characteristics. And still more redlining cases, brought by fair housing organizations that receive funding through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) Private Enforcement Initiative (“PEI”), have been resolved via partnerships with federal- and state-funded entities to provide preferential treatment to Black and Hispanic borrowers and neighborhoods. However, given the current Administration’s stated goal of abolishing preferential treatment in favor of “colorblind equality,” it seems that preferential treatment in lending – even where beneficial to underserved and historically redlined communities – is on the chopping block.

DEI in the Current Political Climate

Only a couple of weeks into the new Administration, the message is clear: diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) initiatives are out. On January 22, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order terminating DEI initiatives in the federal workforce and in federal contracting and spending. Specifically, the Executive Order directs all departments and agencies to take strong action to end private sector “DEI discrimination,” including civil compliance investigations, and requires the Attorney General and the Secretary of Education to issue joint guidance regarding the measures and practices required to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2023 decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard. As a reminder, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harvard effectively ended race-conscious admission programs at colleges and universities across the country.

Shortly after the President’s Executive Order, on January 31, 2025, Texas governor Greg Abbott issued his own Executive Order directing all Texas state agencies to eliminate any forms of DEI policies and to treat all people equally regardless of race. In particular, the Executive Oder requires all state agencies to comply with a “color-blind guarantee,” including by ensuring that “all agency rules, policies, employment practices, communications, curricula, use of state funds, awarding of government benefits, and all other official actions treat people equally, regardless of race.” Similarly, West Virginia governor Patrick Morrisey issued his own Executive Order prohibiting DEI efforts by any entity receiving state resources, and there are likely more of such state executive actions to come.

Are SPCPs a form of DEI?

The above federal and state executive actions cast significant doubt on the current legality and permissibility of special purpose credit programs (“SPCPs”), which have been recognized for years as an exception to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) prohibition on differential treatment in lending. SPCPs, by definition, provide credit assistance to borrowers via some preferential treatment, often on the basis of borrower race or ethnicity or the predominant race or ethnicity of the residents in the neighborhood. While there may be no agreed-upon definition of DEI, it is safe to say that a SPCP that provides credit assistance, or more favorable credit terms, to borrowers based on race or ethnicity is a form of DEI.

To that end, where the requirement for a lender to implement a SPCP is baked into the terms of a settlement with a federal government agency, and such agency conducts ongoing monitoring of the lender’s activities to ensure the SPCP is being properly carried out, one could argue that the government is effectively mandating differential treatment based on race or ethnicity – in violation of the new DEI prohibition. The same could be said where state agencies and non-profit organizations that receive federal and state funds assist lenders in marketing and administering their SPCPs. Even the HUD-funded Fair Housing Initiatives Program, which includes the PEI program, could be problematic from a White House perspective, given that federal and/or state funds are currently being spent on furthering alleged redlining remediation through differential treatment.

It is even possible that SPCPs offered voluntarily and proactively by lenders may be scrutinized, particularly if the lender receives any government funding or grants. Currently, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer SPCPs where borrowers receive down payment or closing cost assistance grants from both the government-sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) and the lender. It is unclear whether such GSE programs would fall within the scope of the President’s Executive Order.

Other Uses of DEI in Lending

Setting aside SPCPs, which are often imposed on lenders by the government as a way to remediate alleged redlining, federal and state agencies essentially expect lenders to engage in race-based action and differential treatment in an effort to manage fair lending risk. Indeed, when assessing whether a lender may have engaged in redlining against a particular racial or ethnic group, the CFPB and DOJ, as a matter of course, employ quota-based metrics to evaluate the “rates” or “percentages” of a lender’s activity in majority-minority geographic areas. These federal agencies also consider a lender’s failure to specifically target neighborhoods based on race or ethnicity to be evidence of potential redlining. In other words, the government’s approach to date has not been “colorblind.” It will be interesting to see whether the agencies’ approach to redlining cases will change as a result of this shift away from DEI.

Takeaways for Lenders

Lenders that offer their own SPCPs or participate in GSE SPCPs should ensure that their written plans continue to meet the requirements of Regulation B, which implements ECOA. As always, the justifications for lending decisions that could disproportionately affect consumers based on their race, ethnicity, or other protected characteristic should be well documented and justified by legitimate business needs.

More importantly, lenders that are worried about their fair lending compliance or are subject to a government inquiry for potential redlining should consult with counsel regarding the best approach for presenting evidence of their minority-area lending. These lenders also should strongly consider whether a government-mandated SPCP is the best way forward. While an SPCP, such as loan subsidies or other pricing or underwriting flexibilities may benefit underserved communities and likely expedite settlement of an enforcement matter, the risk of running afoul of DEI prohibitions is not immaterial.

Financial Services Advisory | The (Bay) State of the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act

Executive Summary
7 Minute Read

Massachusetts has joined the growing list of states that have at least partially adopted the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act. Our Financial Services Group examines the model act, how the Bay State has adopted it, and the implications for money transmitters.

  • The Massachusetts act applies to any entity that transfers money within the United States
  • The act only applies to consumer transactions, a major difference from the national model
  • Requirements of the act take effect January 1, 2026

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Massachusetts is the first state of 2025 to sign its version of the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act into law. The model act is a set of nationwide standards for the supervision and regulation of money transmitters created by state and industry experts and approved by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) in 2021. Since then, 25 states have enacted legislation to adopt, in whole or in part, a version of the model act.

Both the governor and state commissioner of banks emphasized the need to protect consumers and pointed to the widespread use of peer-to-peer payment applications as an important reason for adopting the new law. While regulation of businesses offering peer-to-peer payment services may have been a goal, the new law is far more comprehensive than the current framework, which addresses cross-border money transmissions and the sale of checks or money orders.

Scope of the New Massachusetts Act

Historically, Massachusetts has only required entities engaging in the business of selling, issuing, or registering checks or engaging in foreign money transmission activities, such as facilitating cross-border transactions, to obtain licenses. The new law repeals the prior law and replaces it with a statutory framework influenced by the model act. The new law applies to any entity that provides transfers of money between individuals or entities within the United States if it does not otherwise qualify for an exemption.

Specifically, the new law regulates the following activities as “money transmission”: (1) the sale or issuance of payment instruments to a person in Massachusetts; (2) the sale or issuance of stored value to a person in Massachusetts; or (3) the receipt of money for transmission from a person in Massachusetts.

In addition to expanding the scope, the new law incorporates key provisions from the model act, including express exemptions for operators of payment systems providing processing, clearing, or settlement services and for entities acting as agents of payees in accordance with statutory requirements.

Comparison to Model Act

While closely modeled on the model act, the new law does differ from the model act in a few notable ways.

Expressly for consumer purposes only

The definition of “money transmission” in the new law refers to the provision of such services to individuals and corporate entities. At the same time, the definition is expressly limited to “transactions engaged in by a person for personal, family or household purposes.” This addition limits the scope of the new law to consumer purposes. In contrast, the model act does not specify the purpose of the transactions, implying that it applies to both consumer and commercial transactions.

Silent on payroll processing services

The new law did not adopt the model act’s explicit inclusion of “payroll processing services” in its definition of money transmission. However, it did not expressly exempt payroll services, as is the case in other states, such as California.

The Division of Banks has posted select opinions interpreting the current law, including one as recently as November 2024, providing guidance on the licensing requirements for payroll and employee benefit services. The division concluded the services provided by the payroll service provider were not licensable under the state’s laws on cross-border money transmissions because none of the services involved the “transfer of money to foreign countries,” although certain other check services were licensable under the state’s laws on the sale of checks or money orders.

In reaching this conclusion, the deputy commissioner of banks and general counsel cautioned that “legislation has been filed that would overhaul the licensing and regulation of money transmission and would include domestic money transmission within the licensure requirement.”

Although Massachusetts may interpret payroll processing services as falling under the category of commercial services exempted by the limitations on money transmission set forth in the new law, recent guidance has focused on the presence of foreign transmission activity as the determining factor in resolving the question of whether licensure is required.

Does not adopt virtual currency provisions

The new law did not adopt the virtual currency provisions of the model act. Opinions posted on the division’s website clarify that entities involved in virtual currency transactions, such as exchanges or kiosks, may not require a foreign transmittal agency license if their activities do not involve transmitting funds to foreign countries.

The division often concluded that these entities’ activities did not involve transmitting funds to foreign countries, which was the primary driver for requiring such a license. The division’s conclusions are based on the specific facts presented in each case, and different facts may lead to different outcomes. As Massachusetts begins regulating domestic transactions, it remains unclear whether the new law will be interpreted to apply to virtual currency transactions.

Impact on Current Licensees

Licenses obtained under the current law will remain in effect, but renewals for the year 2026 and after will need to be filed in accordance with the new law.

Existing licensees will need to comply with the requirements in the new law, including maintaining a surety bond, permissible investments, and meeting the tangible net worth requirements.

Effective Date

New laws take effect in Massachusetts 90 days after the governor signs the law, unless the new law is an emergency law or pertains to certain matters excluded under the Massachusetts Constitution, making the effective date of the new law April 1, 2025. The new law states that the majority of its requirements will take effect January 1, 2026. Persons engaged in money transmission in Massachusetts that are required under the new law to obtain licensure must file an application for licensure by June 1, 2026 and may continue their activities while their application is pending until the application has been approved, withdrawn, or denied.

Model Act Adoption Landscape

Many states have adopted the model act either wholly or in part since the CSBS approved the model act in 2021. These states include:

  • Arizona
  • Arkansas
  • California
  • Connecticut
  • Georgia
  • Hawaii
  • Illinois
  • Indiana
  • Iowa
  • Kansas
  • Maine
  • Maryland
  • Massachusetts
  • Minnesota
  • Missouri
  • Nevada
  • New Hampshire
  • North Dakota
  • South Carolina
  • South Dakota
  • Tennessee
  • Texas
  • Vermont
  • West Virginia
  • Wisconsin

States’ Partial Adoptions of the Model Act

The model act regulates money transmission by establishing licensing, financial security, and reporting requirements and includes exemptions for certain entity types. While the goal of the model act was harmonization in the money transmission industry, states have not uniformly adopted the model act, with some choosing to adopt only certain provisions and others choosing to exempt activities the model act defines as licensable.

One exemption that has seen inconsistent adoption is that of payroll processing services, with some states expressly exempting payroll processors, other states choosing to be silent on whether payroll processing services constitute money transmission, and a third approach, such as that taken in Iowa, where the state adopted an “agent of the payor” exemption that applies to payroll processing.

Additionally, the model act provides an option for states to impose uniform licensing and disclosure requirements on virtual currency business activity. Only a few states, including Maine and Minnesota, have opted to include the model act’s virtual currency provisions. Other states are continuing to regulate virtual currency activity either through new licensing regimes or through regulatory interpretations of their money transmission laws.

Despite improved alignment between the states, companies engaging or seeking to engage in money transmission activities must continue managing compliance individually for each state.

2025 Adoptions of the Model Act

Massachusetts is the latest state to regulate domestic money transmission. Nearly half the states that have adopted at least part of the model act did so in 2024. We anticipate momentum in adoption of the model act will continue this year. Some states, including Alaska, Idaho, and Virginia, have pending legislation to address whether the state will also adopt a form of the model act later in the year.

We further note that while states are continuing to consider adopting the model act, Kansas, South Carolina, and Wisconsin each have new money transmission laws based on the model act that went into effect January 1, 2025.


Originally published January 22, 2025.

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Maryland Secondary Market Imperiled by Sweeping Regulatory Change Requiring Licensure for All Assignees of Mortgage Loans

What Happened?

A development with far-reaching consequences for the secondary market, on January 10, 2025, the Maryland Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”) issued guidance that requires mortgage trusts and their assignees to be licensed in Maryland. The OFR based its guidance on its interpretation of the case, Estate of Brown v. Ward, 261 Md. App 385 (2024). The case involved a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) that was made subject to Maryland’s credit grantor provisions. The court would not consider existing Maryland case law that provides that a securitization trust with a national bank trustee is not subject to licensing because those cases did not involve the credit grantor provisions. The OFR took the opposite approach and reached the conclusion that all assignees, including passive trusts of residential mortgage loans are subject to licensing. OFR issued regulations to accompany the guidance, which are effective immediately, but enforcement will be delayed until April 10, 2025.

The OFR’s unduly expansive interpretation of Estate of Brown and its mandate that all assignees of residential mortgage loans be licensed under the Mortgage Lender Law (“MLL”) or Installment Loan Law (“ILL”) is a radical departure of how Maryland regulates secondary market assignees of residential mortgage loans. Prior to this change, the licensing requirements of both the ILL and the MLL applied exclusively to original creditors and primary market participants, such as brokers and servicers, not their assignees. Up to now, the OFR did not require secondary market purchasers of loans, trusts, and other securitization vehicles to obtain licenses in Maryland. However, the guidance would appear to require licensing for all subsequent assignees, including whole loan purchasers, trusts and other special purpose entities, absent an exemption. This licensing requirement will create a logistical nightmare for the secondary market, especially securitization trusts, and unless Estate of Brown is reversed by the Maryland Supreme Court and the OFR’s regulation and guidance is withdrawn, it could adversely impact the availability of credit to Maryland consumers. While the OFI has suspended enforcement of the regulations until April, the regulations apply to impacted entities as of January 10, 2025. Therefore, these entities should not foreclose on Maryland residential loans without first obtaining an MLL license.

The Maryland Appellate Court Decides Trusts and Other Assignees of Certain Loans Must Be Licensed

In Estate of Brown, a Delaware statutory trust acquired a HELOC on residential real property located in Maryland and sought to foreclose. The personal representative to the borrower’s estate raised several challenges to foreclosure, including that the trust was not properly licensed as the assignee of the HELOC. On appeal from dismissal of those challenges, the appellate court of Maryland reversed and held that the licensing requirements under the Credit Grantor Revolving Credit Provisions (“OPEC”) apply not only to original credit grantors but also to assignees of revolving credit plans. The OPEC subtitle provides that “[a] credit grantor making a loan or extension of credit under this subtitle is subject to [] licensing ….”

The underlying HELOC included an election stating that “[t]his loan is made under Subtitle 9, Credit Grantor Revolving Credit Provisions of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.” The court held that persons, including the Delaware statutory trust, that acquire revolving credit plans made under OPEC are subject to the licensing requirements of that subtitle.

The Maryland appellate court reasoned that OPEC defines a “credit grantor” to include any person who acquires or obtains the assignment of a revolving credit plan made under OPEC. The Court opined that an assignee inherits the rights and obligations of the original lender, including the duty to be licensed.

Maryland Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”) Seeks to Expand the Maryland Appellate Decision

Although Estate of Brown dealt solely with OPEC, there is also a companion statute for Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (“CLEC”) found at Md. Code, CL § 12-1001, et seq. Like OPEC, under CLEC, a license is required under ILL and/or MLL, unless exempt, for a credit grantor making a closed-end loan or extension of credit under CLEC. In both instances, the licensing requirement is only triggered if the loan is expressly made under OPEC or CLEC. In order for a loan to be subject to OPEC or CLEC, the lender ordinarily makes a written election to do so in the agreement, note, or other evidence of the extension of credit. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 12-913; 12-1013.

In industry guidance issued by OFR, noting the identical licensing obligations under the two statutes, OFR concluded that a license is required for an assignee of both an OPEC and a CLEC loan. However, OFR also took the extraordinary step of stating that a license is required for ANY assignee of a mortgage loan, even if no OPEC or CLEC election is made. OFR concluded as much despite the Estate of Brown case relying on the licensing requirement applicable to credit grantors, as that term is defined by OPEC and CLEC. The court in Estate of Brown expressly stated that it did not matter that MLL does not impose an independent licensing obligation on an assignee because the “licensing argument is founded entirely on the Credit Grantor Revolving Credit Provisions subtitle. Specifically, [the argument] relies on CL § 12-915 as the source of the licensing obligation.” While OPEC and CLEC define credit grantors to include assignees, the definition of lender for both ILL and MLL is limited to the person making a loan. For example, MLL only requires a license for a “mortgage lender” which is defined as any person who: (1) is a mortgage broker; (2) makes a mortgage loan to any person; or (3) is a mortgage servicer. Md. Code, FI § 11- 501(k)(1). Clearly, an assignee of a loan is not included in the definition of a mortgage lender.

The Guidance and Emergency Regulations

OFR states that persons that acquire or obtain assignments of any mortgage loan, including but not limited to mortgages made under OPEC or CLEC, are subject to licensing, absent an exemption under the ILL and MLL. However, an entity licensed under the MLL and engaged solely in mortgage lending business does not also need an ILL.

In addition to guidance, OFR promulgated emergency regulations applicable to MLL licensing. The regulations define “passive trusts” to include mortgage trusts that acquire, but do not originate, broker, or service, mortgage loans and allow a passive trust to designate the trustee, or a principal officer of the trustee if the trustee is not a natural person, as the passive trust’s qualifying individual. The regulations also allow a passive trust to satisfy the statutory net worth requirement by providing evidence of assets, such as securitized mortgage pools, that will be held within 90 days of licensure.

Why Does it Matter?

The guidance is troubling for several reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the law. Across the nation, secondary market participants recognize that a license is only required if the licensing statute specifically applies to assignees, but the OFR has upended this long held convention by boldly proclaiming that all assignees must carry the same licenses that are required of originators. As a result, based on regulations from OFR, it now appears that all assignees of mortgage loans must obtain a Mortgage Lender License, unless exempt.

Second, its rationale is not limited to mortgages. Although the guidance focuses on mortgage loans, and the regulations only address the MLL, the interpretation suggests that assignees of installment loans must also obtain an Installment Lender License. While the guidance suggests that a license under the ILL will be needed at least for an entity obtaining installment loans, unlike the MLL, there are no corresponding regulatory amendments signaling how a trust may comply with the licensing provisions of the ILL.

Third, it is not clear if an assignee of a mortgage loan could need another license. The OFR’s guidance indicates that an entity licensed under the MLL, and solely engaged in mortgage lending, does not need an ILL license. While it appears that OFR intends for an assignee of mortgage loans to only obtain an MLL license, “mortgage lending” is defined narrowly. A passive holder of mortgage loans would not be engaged in lending, brokering, or servicing as those terms are defined by the MLL. Accordingly, an assignee who is not making, brokering, or servicing mortgage loans is arguably not engaged in mortgage lending, leaving open the possibility that secondary market participants could need to obtain both licenses rather than just the MLL license.

Overall, the licensing process is onerous. Trusts will need to designate a principal officer who meets qualifications such as having three years of experience in mortgage lending. The officer will also be subject to a credit report check, a criminal background check (including fingerprinting), and must submit a resume. Additionally, trusts must obtain a surety bond, register as a foreign entity in Maryland, and provide a business volume statement for the past 12 months. These requirements may impose significant costs and administrative burdens, particularly if bank trustees must become involved. Additionally, licensees are subject to the substantive requirements set forth in the applicable law and regulations.

The OFR’s actions are part of a growing assertiveness by state and federal governments to regulate the secondary market and trusts in particular. For example, the CFPB has successfully asserted the power to investigate and bring enforcement actions directly against securitization vehicles and on October 1, 2024 settled a long standing action against National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“NCSL Trusts”), as well as the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (“PHEAA”), the primary student loan servicer for active student loans held by the NCSL Trusts, arising in connection with the NCSL Trusts’ and PHEAA’s alleged improper servicing practices.

What Do I Need to Do?

 Trusts and any entity that acquires Maryland loans should review their portfolios to determine if a license is required under the MLL and/or ILL. Notably, the licensing requirement is effective as of January 10, 2025, although enforcement is paused through April 10, 2025. During this period, entities should become familiar with what it means to be a licensee and gain familiarity with the mortgage lender application requirements that require, among other things, the appointment of a “qualifying individual” who has three years’ experience in mortgage lending.

Industry participants and trade groups should work together closely to advocate against these startling changes, provide comments to the OFR’s regulations, and provide additional pushback against this attempted regulatory overreach.

Alston & Bird’s Consumer Financial Services Team is actively engaged and monitoring these developments and is able to assist with any compliance concerns regarding these sweeping changes to Maryland law.