Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Banking Regulatory Agencies

New York DFS to Impose Climate Change Safety and Soundness Expectations on Mortgage Lenders, Servicers, and other Regulated Organizations

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What Happened?

On December 21, 2023, the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) published an 18-page guidance document (the “Guidance”) on managing material, financial and operational risks due to climate change. The NYDFS issued the Guidance after considering feedback it received on proposed guidance it issued in December 2022 on the same topic. The Guidance applies to New York State regulated mortgage lenders and servicers, as well as New York State regulated banking organizations, licensed branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations (collectively, “Regulated Organizations”).

Why Is It Important?

The NYDFS has set forth its expectations, replete with examples, for Regulated Organizations to strategically manage climate change-related financial and operational risks and identify necessary actions proportionate to their size, business activities and risk profile.  Such expectations include:

  • Corporate Governance: An organization’s board of directors should establish a risk management framework, including its overall business strategy and risk appetite, which include climate related financial and operational risks, and holding management accountable for implementation. Such framework should be integrated within an organization’s three lines of defense – quality assurance, quality control and internal audit. Recognizing that low and moderate income (“LMI”) communities may be adversely impacted from climate change, the NYDFS expects an organization’s board of directors to direct management to “minimize and affirmatively mitigate disproportionate impacts” which could violate fair lending and other consumer finance laws. On that note, the NYDFS reminds organizations to consider opportunities to mitigate financial risk through financing or investment opportunities which enhance climate resiliency and are eligible for credit under the New York Community Reinvestment Act.
  • Internal Control and Risk Management: Regulated Organizations should also consider and incorporate climate related financial risks when identifying and mitigating all types of risks, including credit, liability, market, legal/compliance risk, and operational and strategic risk. The NYDFS defines financial risks from climate change to include physical risks from more intense weather events as well as transition risks, resulting from “economic and behavior changes driven by policy and regulation, new technology, consumer and investor preferences and changing liability risks.” The NYDFS recognizes that insurance is an important mitigant to climate change risk but cautions that the availability of such insurance in the future is not guaranteed.
  • Data Aggregation and Reporting: Regulated Organizations should establish systems to aggregate data and internally report its efforts to monitor climate related financial risk to facilitate board and senior management decision making. Such organizations also should consider developing and implementing climate scenario analyses.

What Do You Need to Do?

The NYDFS stresses that organizations should not let “uncertainty and data gaps justify inaction.” Although the NYDFS has not issued a timeline for implementation of the Guidance or begun incorporating such expectations into examinations (which will be coordinated with the prudential regulators to align with joint supervisory processes), now is the time to begin integrating climate-related financial and operational risks into your company’s organizational structure, business strategies and risk management operations.  This will help you prepare for when your organization is required to respond to the request for information which the NYDFS anticipates sending out later this year.  It is anticipated that the NYDFS will ask for information on the steps your organization has taken or will take within a specified period to manage financial and operational climate-related risks, including government structure, business strategy, risk management, operational resiliency measures, and metrics to measure risks.

OCC Issues Guidance on “Buy Now, Pay Later” Lending

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A&B Abstract:

On December 6, 2023, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a bulletin aimed at providing guidance to national banks and federal savings associations (“Financial Institutions”) involved in “buy now, pay later” (BNPL) lending. The advisory emphasizes the need for these Financial Institutions to carefully manage risks associated with BNPL, focusing on aspects such as underwriting, repayment terms, pricing, and safeguards to protect customers. Additionally, the OCC stresses the importance of clear and prominent marketing materials and disclosures.

The Bulletin

While BNPL products may vary, the bulletin focuses on BNPL loans which involve four or fewer installments without finance charges, and that are commonly offered at the point of sale. Such BNPL products are distinguished from more traditional installment loans with payment terms greater than four installments or that charge interest or carry other finance charges. These loans have become increasingly popular, especially among younger individuals and those with limited credit history.

The OCC identifies various risks related to BNPL loans for both lenders and consumers, including credit, compliance, operational, strategic, and reputational risks. Specific concerns include potential borrower overextension, limited applicant credit history, unclear disclosure language, challenges with merchandise returns and merchant disputes, operational and compliance risks related to third-party relationships, and increased operational risk due to the highly automated nature of BNPL lending.

Further details on risks include the potential for elevated first payment default risk, additional fees for borrowers due to overextension, and the possibility that credit reporting agencies may lack visibility into BNPL activity.

The OCC’s guidance advises Financial Institutions engaged in BNPL lending to establish robust risk management systems, including prudent lending policies for risk identification, measurement, monitoring, and control. Regarding credit risk, the bulletin emphasizes the importance of sound charge-off practices, allowances for credit losses, and timely reporting of comprehensive information to credit bureaus under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The guidance also provides recommendations for operational risk management. It encourages Financial Institutions to assess and mitigate fraud risks, subject BNPL lending process models to sound model risk management and integrate BNPL lending into broader compliance management systems. Additionally, it highlights the need for Financial Institutions engaging third parties in BNPL lending to incorporate such relationships into their third-party risk management protocols.

Takeaway:

Given the OCC’s focus on the risks associated with BNPL products, now is a good time for Financial Institutions engaged in BNPL Lending to ensure that their compliance management programs are robust enough to ensure compliance with the OCC’s guidance.

FSOC Approves Analytic Framework for Financial Stability Risks and Guidance on Nonbank Financial Company Designations

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A&B Abstract:

On November 3, 2023 the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter “FSOC” or “Council”) unanimously approved final versions of: (1) the new Analytic Framework for Financial Stability Risk Identification, Assessment, and Response (“Analytic Framework”); and (2) the updated Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company Determinations (“Nonbank Designations Guidance”). The Analytic Framework was published today in the Federal Register and is effective immediately, and the Nonbank Designations Guidance will be effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

Given the recent bank failures, it should come as no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on financial risks to U.S. stability across various sectors, including nonbank mortgage lenders and servicers.

Background

Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act created FSOC, an interagency panel of top U.S. financial regulators, to monitor excessive risks to U.S. financial stability and facilitate intergovernmental cooperation to effectively address those risks. Chaired by the Treasury Secretary and consisting of 10 voting members (comprised of the U.S. prudential regulators including, among others, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)) and 5 nonvoting members, one of the Council’s statutory purposes is to specifically oversee large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies that pose potential risks to U.S. financial stability and, given the broad statutory mandate, the Council’s monitoring may cover an expansive range of asset classes, institutions, and activities, such as:

  • Markets for debt, loans, and other institutional and consumer financial products and services;
  • Central counterparties and payment, clearing, and settlement activities;
  • Financial entities, including banking organizations, broker-dealers, mortgage originators and services;
  • New or evolving financial products and practices; and
  • Developments affecting the resiliency of the financial system, such as cybersecurity and climate-related financial risks.

The Dodd-Frank Act empowers the Council to designate a nonbank financial company subject to certain prudential standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. The Dodd-Frank Act lists 10 factors that Council must consider before making such designation.  To date, the Council has used this authority sparingly.  According to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the Council’s updated Nonbank Designations Guidance will make it easier to use its nonbank designation authority, eliminating “several prerequisites to designation … that were not contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act and that are based on a flawed view of how financial risks develop and spread” that exist under the previous guidance issued in 2019.

As the country experienced a regional bank crisis earlier this year, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Council may use its authorities less sparingly than in the past. The Council’s annual reports specifically address the potential risks of nonbank companies, support the updated requirements issued by the Federal Housing Finance Authority, Ginnie Mae and the CSBS Model State Regulatory Prudential Standards for Nonbank Mortgage Servicers, and recommend that relevant federal and state regulators continue to enhance or establish information sharing in responding to distress at a mortgage servicer.  Indeed, in June 2022, FSOC restarted its Nonbank Mortgage Servicing Task Force, an interagency group to facilitate coordination and additional market monitoring of nonbank servicers.

The Finalized Analytic Framework

The finalized Analytic Framework, which is not a formal rule, broadly describes the approach FSOC expects to take in “identifying, assessing, and responding to certain potential risks to U.S. financial stability,” and interprets “financial stability” to mean the “financial system being resilient to events or conditions that could impair its ability to support economic activity, such as by intermediating financial transactions, facilitating payments, allocating resources, and managing risks.”  The Council’s statutory mandate includes the duty to monitor a wide class of assets, such as new or evolving financial products and practices, and nonbank financial companies, such as mortgage originators and servicers, at several key pressure points.

Following consideration of public comments on the proposed Analytic Framework, which we previously discussed, the finalized Analytic Framework reflects several key changes from the proposed Analytic Framework, which include:

  • A description of the term “threat to financial stability” that builds on the proposed interpretation, specifically, to mean events or conditions that could “substantially impair” the financial system’s ability to support economic activity;
  • Additional examples of the types of quantitative metrics FSOC will consider to assess vulnerabilities that contribute to risks to financial stability;
  • Clarification on the relationship between the vulnerabilities and the four transmission channels (discussed below) by highlighting vulnerabilities that may be particularly relevant to a channel; and
  • An emphasis on the importance of FSOC’s engagement with state and federal financial regulatory agencies as it assesses potential risks and the extent to which existing regulation may mitigate those risks.

Under the finalized Analytic Framework, a non-exhaustive list of potential risk factors and the indicators that FSOC intends to monitor includes:

  • Leverage, assessed by levels of debt and other off-balance sheet obligations that may create instability in the face of sudden liquidity restraints.
  • Liquidity Risks & Maturity Mismatches, measured by the ratios of short-term debt to unencumbered liquid assets and the amount of additional funding available to meet unexpected reductions in available short-term funds.
  • Interconnections, measured by the extent of exposure to certain derivatives, potential requirements to post margin or collateral, and overall health of the balance sheet.
  • Operational Risks, measured by the failure to implement proper controls related to financial market infrastructures and the vulnerability of cybersecurity incidents.
  • Complexity or Opacity, such as the extent to which transactions occur outside of regulated sectors, in a grey area of overlapping or indefinite jurisdiction, or are structured in such a way that cannot be readily observed due to complexity or lack of disclosure.
  • Inadequate Risk Management, such as the failure to maintain adequate controls and policies or the absence of existing regulatory oversight.
  • Concentration, measured by the market share for the provision of important services within segments of applicable financial markets and the risk associated with high concentration in a small number of firms.
  • Destabilizing Activities, such as trading practices that substantially increase volatility in a particular market, especially when a moral hazard is present.

Just as FSOC will consider all the factors listed above as sources of potential financial risk contagion, it will also assess the transmission of those risks to broader market sectors and other specific entities based on certain metrics. This non-exhaustive list of transmission risk factors includes:

  • Exposures: The level of direct and indirect exposure of creditors, investors, counterparties, and others to particular instruments or asset classes.
  • Asset liquidation: Rapid asset liquidation and the snowball effect of a widespread asset sell off across sectors.
  • Critical function or service: The potential consequences of interruption to critical functions or services that are relied upon by market participants for which there is no substitute.
  • Contagion: The potential for financial contagion arising from public perceptions of vulnerability and loss of confidence in widely held financial instruments.

Despite receiving comments recommending that the Analytic Framework specifically address climate-related risk, FSOC declined to do so, explaining that it believes potential risks related to climate change may be assessed under other factors such as through the “interconnections” vulnerability factor and the “exposures” transmission channel.  Similarly, FSOC declined to specifically discuss risks to the financial needs of underserved families and communities because it expects that such risks would be considered under the “critical function or service” transmission channel.

Once a financial risk has been identified, FSOC may use various tools to mitigate such risk depending on the circumstances.  For instance, FSOC may work with the relevant federal or state regulator to seek to address the risk. Where a regulator can sufficiently address such risk in a timely manner, FSOC will encourage regulators to do so.  Through formal channels, the Council can make a public recommendation to Congress or regulatory agencies to apply new standards or heightened scrutiny to a known risk within their jurisdiction. Where no clear-cut regulatory oversight exists, the Council may make legislative recommendations to Congress to address the risk. These formal recommendations to agencies or Congress, made pursuant to section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act, are also subject public notice and comment.

In addition to making nonbinding recommendations for action to the appropriate financial regulatory authorities, FSOC is empowered to make a “nonbank financial company determination,” by a two-thirds vote, that a specific company shall be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and subject to enhanced prudential standards. This designation can be made upon FSOC’s finding that:

  • Material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States; or
  • The nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability in the United States.

Nonbank Financial Company Designation Final Interpretative Guidance

The finalized Nonbank Designations Guidance is procedural in nature relating to nonbank financial company designation.  It defines a two-stage process FSOC will use to make a firm-specific “nonbank financial company determination” discussed in FSOC’s Analytic Framework. In the proposed interpretive guidance issued for public comment in April 2023, the Council recognized that in the past, it “has used this authority sparingly, but to mitigate the risks of future financial crises, the Council must be able to use each of its statutory authorities as appropriate to address potential threats to U.S. financial stability.”  The Nonbank Designations Guidance will change the 2019 guidance in the following three ways:

  • First, under the current guidance, FSOC is committed to relying on federal and state regulators to address problematic nonbank financial company activity before considering whether a designation is appropriate. The new guidance removes this prioritization and allows FSOC to consider an entity for a designation proactively, without first relying on regulators to act before FSOC begins deliberating.
  • Second, FSOC has finalized the Analytic Framework discussed above to revise its process for monitoring risks to U.S. financial stability. This comprehensive new framework replaces that found in Section III of the 2019 interpretive guidance. Because the new guidance is focused on the procedural process for making nonbank financial company designations, the substantive analytic factors applied by FSOC in its assessments will be contained in the separate Analytic Framework document.
  • Third, FSOC has reversed course and is eliminating its current practice of conducting a cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the likelihood of material financial distress prior to making its determination. FSOC has concluded that these processes are not required by Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. FSOC defines “material financial distress” as a nonbank financial company “being in imminent danger of insolvency or defaulting on its financial obligations.” In eliminating the “likelihood” assessment required by the 2019 guidance, the Council will now presuppose a company’s material financial distress and then evaluate what consequences could follow for U.S. financial stability.

With respect to the formal process for nonbank financial company determinations, the finalized Nonbank Designations Guidance describes a two-stage process that FSOC will use once they decide to review a company for a potential designation.

Stage One:  FSOC will conduct a preliminary analysis of a company that has been identified for review based on quantitative and qualitative information available publicly and regulatory sources. FSOC will notify the company no later than 60 days before a vote is held to evaluate the company for Stage Two.  A company under review may submit information for FSOC’s review and may request to meet with FSOC staff and members agencies responsible for the analysis.  When evaluating a company in Stage One, the Council’s Nonbank Designations Committee may decide whether to analyze the risk profile of the company as a whole or to consider the risk posed by its subsidiaries as separate entities, depending on which entity the Council believes poses a threat to financial stability. At Stage One, FSOC is statutorily obligated to collect information from any relevant, existing regulators that oversee the company’s activities concerning the specific risks the Council has identified.

Stage Two: Any nonbank financial company selected for additional review will receive notice that the company is being considered for supervision by the Federal Reserve and enhanced prudential standards. The Nonbank Designations Guidance says that “[t]he review will focus on whether material financial distress at the nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the company, could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.” At this point, if a company is under consideration for a Proposed Determination it will receive a formal Notice of Consideration from the Council.

The Council will begin its Stage Two review by consulting with the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) and relevant financial regulators to ascertain the risk profile of the company. This information would remain confidential throughout the process, and, once interagency coordination has produced all available information, the company will be invited to submit any relevant information to the Council. These submissions may include “details regarding the company’s financial activities, legal structure, liabilities, counterparty exposures, resolvability, and existing regulatory oversight. . . . Information relevant to the Council’s analysis may include confidential business information such as detailed information regarding financial assets, terms of funding arrangements, counterparty exposure or position data, strategic plans, and interaffiliate transactions.” Council staff from the FSOC Deputies Committee will be available to meet with representatives of the company and will disclose the specific focus of the Council’s analysis, although the areas of analytic focus may change based on the ongoing analysis.

Finally, if FSOC preliminarily designates the company for supervision by the Federal Reserve and subjects it to enhanced prudential standards, the company will be able to request a nonpublic hearing after which FSOC may vote to make a final designation. FSOC will conduct an annual review for any company designated by the Council to determine whether continued Federal Reserve supervision and enhanced prudential standards are still appropriate. This annual review period will afford the company the opportunity to meet with Council representatives and present information or make a written submission to the Council about its efforts to mitigate risk. If the Council decides to sustain the designation, it will present the company with a written explanation for its decision.

Takeaway

Given the 2023 regional banking crisis, it is no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on potential risks to financial stability.  In FSOC’s 2021 and 2022 annual reports, nonbank mortgage companies have been identified as a potential risk.  The Federal Housing Finance Agency and Ginnie Mae have both updated their minimum financial eligibility requirements for seller/servicers and issuers with such requirements taking effect with varying effective dates later in 2023 and 2024.  States also have started to adopt prudential regulatory standards for nonbank mortgage servicers.  By voting through the Analytic Framework and Nonbank Designations Guidance, the Council signals that it remains vigilant to weaknesses in the financial system and will utilize a variety of tools and approaches to strengthen its supervision over companies if existing protections do not adequately mitigate financial stability risks.  Indeed, CFPB Director and voting member of the Council, Rohit Chopra, has expressed strong support for the actions taken and points out that the Council currently has “a total of zero shadow banks” designated as systemically important and that could pose a threat to financial stability which, according to Director Chopra, will most likely change once the Council implements the new guidance and conducts evaluations to identify shadow banks that meet the statutory threshold for enhanced oversight.

FSOC Issues Proposed Update to Interpretative Guidance on Nonbank Financial Company Designations

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A&B Abstract:

On April 21, 2023 the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter “FSOC” or “Council”) issued for public comment (1) a proposed analytic framework setting forth FSOC’s approach to identifying, evaluating, and addressing potential risks to financial stability (“Proposed Analytic Framework”), and (2) proposed revisions to FSOC’s existing 2019 interpretive guidance that FSOC would use when deciding whether to designate a nonbank financial company for enhanced prudential standards and Federal Reserve supervision (“Proposed Interpretive Guidance”). Comments concerning the new proposed framework are due by June 27, 2023. Given the recent bank failures, it should come as no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on financial risks to U.S. stability across various sectors, including nonbank mortgage lenders and servicers.

Background

Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act created FSOC, an interagency panel of top U.S. financial regulators, to monitor excessive risks to U.S. financial stability and facilitate intergovernmental cooperation to effectively address those risks. The Dodd-Frank Act empowers the Council to designate a nonbank financial company subject to certain prudential standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. The Dodd-Frank Act lists 10 factors that Council must consider before making such designation.  To date, the Council has used this authority sparingly.  According to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the Council’s revisions will make it easier to use its nonbank designation authority, eliminating “inappropriate hurdles as part of the designation process” that exist under the current guidance issued in 2019.

As the country is in the midst of a regional bank crisis, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Council may use its authorities less sparingly than in the past. The Council’s annual reports specifically address the potential risks of nonbank companies, supports the updated requirements issued by the Federal Housing Finance Authority, Ginnie Mae and the CSBS Model State Regulatory Prudential Standards for Nonbank Mortgage Servicers, and recommends that relevant federal and state regulators continue to enhance or establish information sharing in responding to distress at a mortgage servicer.  Indeed, in June 2022, FSOC restarted its Nonbank Mortgage Servicing Task Force, an interagency group to facilitate coordination and additional market monitoring of nonbank servicers.

The Proposed Analytic Framework

The Proposed Analytical Framework, which is not a formal rule, broadly describes how FSOC “identifies, evaluates, and responds to potential risks to U.S. financial stability, whether they come from activities, individual firms, or otherwise.”  The Council’s statutory mandate includes the duty to monitor a wide class of assets, such as new or evolving financial products and practices, and nonbank financial companies, such as mortgage originators and servicers, at several key pressure points. A non-exhaustive list of these potential risk factors and the indicators that FSOC intends to monitor includes:

  • Leverage, assessed by levels of debt and other off-balance sheet obligations that may create instability in the face of sudden liquidity restraints.
  • Liquidity Risks & Maturity Mismatches, measured by the ratios of short-term debt to unencumbered liquid assets and the amount of additional funding available to meet unexpected reductions in available short-term funds.
  • Interconnections, measured by the extent of exposure to certain derivatives, potential requirements to post margin or collateral, and overall health of the balance sheet.
  • Operational Risks, measured by the failure to implement proper controls related to financial market infrastructures and the vulnerability of cybersecurity incidents.
  • Complexity & Opacity, such as the extent to which transactions occur outside of regulated sectors, in a grey area of overlapping or indefinite jurisdiction, or are structured in such a way that cannot be readily observed due to complexity or lack of disclosure.
  • Inadequate Risk Management, such as the failure to maintain adequate controls and policies or the absence of existing regulatory oversight.
  • Concentration, measured by the market share for the provision of important services within segments of applicable financial markets and the risk associated with high concentration in a small number of firms.
  • Destabilizing Activities, such as trading practices that substantially increase volatility in a particular market, especially when a moral hazard is present.

Just as FSOC will consider all the factors listed above as sources of potential financial risk contagion, it will also assess the transmission of those risks to broader market sectors and other specific entities based on certain metrics. This non-exhaustive list of transmission risk factors includes:

  • The level of direct and indirect exposure of creditors, investors, counterparties, and others to particular instruments or asset classes.
  • Rapid asset liquidation and the snowball effect of a widespread asset sell off across sectors.
  • The potential consequences of interruption to critical functions or services that are relied upon by market participants for which there is no substitute.
  • The potential for financial contagion arising from public perceptions of vulnerability and loss of confidence in widely held financial instruments.

Once a financial risk has been identified, FSOC may use various tools to mitigate such risk depending on the circumstances.  For instance, FSOC may work with the relevant federal or state regulator to seek to address the risk. Where a regulator can sufficiently address such risk in a timely manner, FSOC will encourage regulators to do so.  Through formal channels, the Council can make a public recommendation to Congress or regulatory agencies to apply new standards or heightened scrutiny to a known risk within their jurisdiction. Where no clear-cut regulatory oversight exists, the Council may make legislative recommendations to Congress to address the risk. These formal recommendations to agencies or Congress, made pursuant to section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act, are also subject public notice and comment.

In addition to nonbinding recommendations for action to the appropriate financial regulatory authorities, FSOC is empowered to make a “nonbank financial company determination,” by a two-thirds vote, that a specific company shall be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and subject to enhanced prudential standards. This designation can be made upon FSOC’s finding that:

  • Material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States; or
  • The nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to financial stability in the United States.

Nonbank Financial Company Designation Interpretative Guidance

The Proposed Interpretive Guidance is procedural in nature relating to nonbank financial company designation.  It would define a two-stage process FSOC will use to make a firm-specific “nonbank financial company determination” discussed in FSOC’s Proposed Analytic Framework. The Council recognized that in the past, it “has used this authority sparingly, but to mitigate the risks of future financial crises, the Council must be able to use each of its statutory authorities as appropriate to address potential threats to U.S. financial stability.”  The Proposed Interpretive Guidance, if adopted, would change the 2019 guidance in the following three ways:

  • First, under the current guidance, FSOC is committed to relying on federal and state regulators to address problematic nonbank financial company activity before considering whether a designation is appropriate. The new guidance removes this prioritization and allows FSOC to consider an entity for a designation proactively, without first relying on regulators to act before FSOC begins deliberating.
  • Second, FSOC has issued the Proposed Analytic Framework discussed above to revise its process for monitoring risks to U.S. financial stability. This comprehensive new framework replaces that found in Section III of the 2019 interpretive guidance.
  • Third, FSOC has reversed course and is eliminating its current practice of conducting a cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the likelihood of material financial distress prior to making its determination. FSOC has concluded that these processes are not required by Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. FSOC defines “material financial distress” as a nonbank financial company “being in imminent danger of insolvency or defaulting on its financial obligations.” In eliminating the “likelihood” assessment required by the 2019 guidance, the Council would now presuppose a company’s material financial distress and then evaluate what consequences could follow for U.S. financial stability.

With respect to the formal process for nonbank financial company determinations, the Proposed Interpretive Guidance contemplates a two-stage process that FSOC would use once they decide to review a company for a potential designation.

Stage One:  FSOC would conduct preliminary analysis of a company that has been identified for review based on quantitative and qualitative information available publicly and regulatory sources. FSOC would notify the company no later than 60 days before a vote is held to evaluate the company for Stage Two.  A company under review may submit information for FSOC’s review and may request to meet with FSOC staff and members agencies responsible for the analysis.  When evaluating a company in Stage One, the Council’s Nonbank Designations Committee may decide whether to analyze the risk profile of the company as a whole or to consider the risk posed by its subsidiaries as separate entities, depending on which entity the Council believes poses a threat to financial stability. At Stage One, FSOC is statutorily obligated to collect information from any relevant, existing regulators that oversee the company’s activities concerning the specific risks the Council has identified.

Stage Two: Any nonbank financial company selected for additional review would receive notice that the company is being considered for supervision by the Federal Reserve and enhanced prudential standards. The Proposed Interpretive Guidance says that “[t]he review will focus on whether material financial distress at the nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the company, could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.” At this point, if a company is under consideration for a Proposed Determination it would receive a formal Notice of Consideration from the Council.

The Council would begin its Stage Two review by consulting with the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) and relevant financial regulators to ascertain the risk profile of the company. This information would remain confidential throughout the process, and, once interagency coordination has produced all available information, the company would be invited to submit any relevant information to the Council. These submissions “may include details regarding the company’s financial activities, legal structure, liabilities, counterparty exposures, resolvability, and existing regulatory oversight. . . . Information relevant to the Council’s analysis may include confidential business information such as detailed information regarding financial assets, terms of funding arrangements, counterparty exposure or position data, strategic plans, and interaffiliate transactions.” Council staff from the FSOC Deputies Committee would be available to meet with representatives of the company and would disclose the specific focus of the Council’s analysis.

Finally, if FSOC preliminarily designates the company for supervision by the Federal Reserve and subjects it to enhanced prudential standards, the company would be able to request a nonpublic hearing after which FSOC may vote to make a final designation. FSOC would conduct an annual review for any company designated by the Council to determine whether continued Federal Reserve supervision and enhanced prudential standards are still appropriate. This annual review period would afford the company the opportunity to meet with Council representatives and present information or make a written submission to the Council about its efforts to mitigate risk. If the Council decides to sustain the designation, it would present the company with a written explanation for its decision.

Takeaway

Given the current 2023 regional banking crisis, it is no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on potential risks to financial stability.  In FSOC’s 2021 and 2022 annual reports, nonbank mortgage companies have been identified as a potential risk.  The Federal Housing Finance Agency and Ginnie Mae have both updated their minimum financial eligibility requirements for seller/servicers and issuers with such requirements taking effect with varying effective dates later in 2023 and 2024.  States also have started to adopt prudential regulatory standards for nonbank mortgage servicers.  The Council appears to be signaling that additional supervision could occur if existing protections do not adequately mitigate risks.

*We would like to thank Summer Associate, Noah LeGrand, for their contribution to this blog post.

Is the DOJ (De Facto) Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act?

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A&B Abstract:

Furthering the Justice Department’s Combating Redlining Initiative, the Department of Justice has announced another redlining settlement.  But this settlement is different – this one involves a bank that has received top marks by its prudential regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for its compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a statute enacted to reduce redlining, for the same years that the DOJ alleged the bank engaged in redlining.

The DOJ’s Allegations

Lakeland Bank is a northern New Jersey-based, state chartered bank with more than $10 billion in assets.  The DOJ alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)/Regulation B, and specifically “that Lakeland engaged in illegal redlining by avoiding providing home loans and other mortgage services, and engaged in discrimination and conduct that would discourage mortgage applications from prospective applicants who are residents of or seeking credit in majority Black and Hispanic census tracts” located in its northern New Jersey assessment area.  In entering the more than $13 million settlement, the Bank did not admit to any of the DOJ’s allegations.  It agreed to various requirements to strengthen its fair lending compliance program, including investing in a loan subsidy fund, opening additional branches, and expanding its CRA assessment area.

The FDIC’s Findings

What is curious, however, is that in its latest CRA performance evaluation, the FDIC determined that Lakeland “exhibits a good record of serving the credit needs of the most economically disadvantaged areas of its assessment area, low-income individuals, and/or very small businesses, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.”  It determined that there is in fact strong competition for lending in the area, but that the bank nonetheless showed good penetration to borrowers of low- and moderate-income levels and in low- and moderate-income areas.  Further, the FDIC determined that the bank “makes extensive use of innovative and/or flexible lending practices in order to serve assessment area credit needs,” noting that the bank’s programs provide lower down payments, lower interest rates, down payment assistance, first-time homebuyer programs, and unsecured small dollar loan programs, for lower-income individuals and small businesses.  The FDIC also called Lakeland “a leader in making community development loans.”  In fact, Lakeland received a rating of “Outstanding,” the highest rating which only a small number of banks achieve, in each of its CRA exams for more than a decade.

CRA versus Fair Lending Laws

The rub is that the CRA is not a fair lending statute, as it focuses on income disparity and not racial disparity, though it often goes hand in glove with the fair lending laws.  For example, a failure to comply with fair lending laws (e.g., the Fair Housing Act, ECOA/Regulation B) can result in a downgrade of a bank’s CRA rating, despite its satisfactory or better performance in its CRA evaluation.  The CRA is enforced by the OCC, FDIC, and Federal Reserve Board.  The fair lending laws are typically enforced by the OCC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, CFPB, NCUA, FTC, and HUD (along with state regulators).  The threshold for an agency’s referral to DOJ for enforcement proceedings is low, requiring reason to believe there is a pattern or practice of discrimination.

Takeaway

In practice, the Lakeland settlement shows how a bank can be susceptible to fair lending risk with respect to redlining, and yet still pass its (anti-redlining) CRA examination with flying colors.  Maybe that is a reason to revise the CRA regulations (spoiler alert: that’s already in the works).  Or maybe it is a reminder to banks to mind the forest and the trees.  Focusing on CRA is necessary but not sufficient, and a bank needs to ensure it is regularly monitoring its lending activity for potential redlining.