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OCC Issues Super Intelligence Supervisory Framework: What Banks, Nonbank Partners, and Secondary Market Participants Need to Know

On November 4, 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued OCC Bulletin 2026-54, “Super Intelligence: Supervisory Framework,” along with a framework designed to support OCC examiners in evaluating banks’ use of “super intelligence” (SI) in normal-course business activities. The OCC uses SI to refer to the technologies previously encompassed by the term “artificial intelligence” as defined in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3), citing Executive Order 14434. The framework applies to activities including credit decisioning, payments, fraud detection, customer service, operations, risk management, and market activities.

What Happened?

The framework presents sixteen components grouped into six pillars: Purpose, Risk, Control, Oversight, Resilience, and Assurance. It also includes an illustrative risk-tiering methodology and a technical lexicon drawn largely from the AI Lexicon workstream of the Artificial Intelligence Executive Oversight Group. The OCC explains that model risk management principles in OCC Bulletin 2026-13 apply to non-generative and non-agentic SI models, so the new framework “is more applicable to generative and agentic SI.” The OCC also discloses that the framework was prepared with the assistance of SI and was reviewed, edited, and approved by a human.

The OCC is explicit about the framework’s status. The bulletin states that the framework “does not establish supervisory expectations for banks,” that banks “are not expected to use this document to assess their use of SI,” and that nothing in it is intended to “set forth enforceable standards or prescriptive requirements.” Examiners “should not treat SI as a separate and distinct risk category, and banks are not required to define a separate SI risk appetite.” The OCC calls the framework a living document and intends to update it as technology, use cases, and supervisory understanding mature.

Which Institutions Are Covered?

The framework applies to national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations. Examiners may apply the framework to community banks, but are instructed to tailor examinations to the bank’s size, complexity, and risk profile, proportionate to the nature, consequences, autonomy, and complexity of its SI use cases.

Nonbank lenders, servicers, and fintech partners are not directly covered. The framework states that accountability for managing the bank’s risk generally remains with the bank even when development or hosting is distributed across vendors. Nonbanks that provide SI-enabled services to, originate for, or service loans for national banks should therefore expect these considerations to arrive through their bank partners’ third-party oversight, due diligence, and contract negotiations.

What Does the Framework Cover?

The framework’s overarching principle is that a bank’s control intensity could increase in correlation with the potential consequences of an SI agent’s failure or misuse. Higher-consequence uses may warrant greater restrictions on autonomy, stronger controls, more direct human oversight, more independent validation, and more robust resilience measures. Risk classification may be based on potential consequences, transfer of agency, and the degree of human oversight rather than technical sophistication. As the OCC puts it, a simple rules-based agent authorized to initiate transactions could present greater risk than a sophisticated model limited to internal drafting assistance. Key components include:

  • Defined purpose and permitted use. Before deployment and after a material change, a bank may document what a system is and is not designed to do, who may invoke it, the data and systems it may access, the actions it could take, and when human review or suspension is required. Activity outside the approved purpose may be treated as a control failure even when the result appears reasonable.
  • Human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop controls. Human-in-the-loop means review and approval before an output or action is used; human-on-the-loop means active monitoring with authority and practical ability to intervene. Reviewers need competency and authority, review must be more than “a nominal click,” and banks may evaluate how many agents or alerts one person can credibly monitor. A misfire or hallucination may justify temporarily increasing human involvement.
  • Governance and accountability. The board and senior management may establish an SI risk appetite, identify accountable executives and use-case owners, and set approval authority across development, deployment, material change, suspension, and retirement. Board members, risk management, validation, and audit may need technical fluency proportionate to the bank’s use cases.
  • Model risk management extensions. Some SI does not fit traditional assumptions of model stability or reproducible outputs. The framework points to more frequent monitoring for drift and vendor updates, repeated testing and consistency thresholds for non-deterministic outputs, and alternatives to champion-challenger testing for generative outputs. It cautions that explainability tools “do not reveal the SI’s reasoning.”
  • Data governance and privacy. Banks may assess the lineage, licensing, and representativeness of training and production data, including data embedded in third-party foundation models, and subject synthetic data to quality and bias review. Privacy risks include model memorization, inference of sensitive characteristics, retention of prompts, outputs, and embeddings, vendor use of bank data to train models for other customers, and cross-border processing.
  • SI “does not change the bank’s underlying legal obligations.” The framework highlights Bank Secrecy Act and sanctions screening (where poor data or thresholds can increase false negatives or positives), consumer compliance in servicing, collections, disclosures, and marketing, and hallucinations about fees, rates, account status, or policies that could create legal or customer-harm exposure.
  • Third-party and vendor risk. Banks may define the authority, identity, permitted tool use, and escalation limits of provider agents; adopt an SI incident vocabulary with notification timelines covering hallucination, misfire, drift, or manipulation; consider how contracts allocate liability for model-related errors and customer harm; and require notice when vendors add SI features or change models.
  • Operational resilience. An agentic system “could remain available while taking inappropriate or harmful actions.” The framework cites monitoring, circuit breakers, rate limits, least-privilege permissions, and kill switches; fail-over to trained staff or narrower agents; a separate customer remediation workstream; and controls for external customer, fintech, or agentic-commerce agents interacting through bank channels.
  • Attack surfaces include prompt injection and jailbreaking, data and model poisoning, model extraction and data leakage, and excessive agency through broad credentials. Agent identities may be governed in a manner comparable to privileged users.
  • Testing, documentation, and audit. Testing methods include adversarial testing, red teaming, expert subjective review, LLM-as-a-judge, and hallucination measurement. Documentation should support reconstruction of material outputs through inputs, retrieved sources, tool calls, approvals, overrides, and version history. Internal audit coverage may scale to autonomy and rate of change, with access to underlying evidence rather than only management summaries, and findings reported to the audit committee or board.

How Does the Illustrative Risk Tiering Work?

The framework describes a graduated control model: “light-touch for low-risk, low-autonomy use, materially heavier for anything approaching customer-impacting, irreversible, or highly autonomous action.” Each use case may be scored on seven factors, regardless of business line: decision consequence, reversibility, customer and financial impact, autonomy level, data sensitivity, explainability (including adverse action notice obligations), and provenance (in-house, fine-tuned third-party, or fully external). The factors combine into four illustrative composite tiers:

  • Tier 1: Critical. Direct action, low or no reversibility, high financial or customer impact, autonomous or partially autonomous. Examples: autonomous payment agents, real-time credit decisioning, fraud-hold release, market access.
  • Tier 2: High. Direct action or high-weight decision support with human-on-the-loop oversight. Examples: SI-assisted underwriting, agent-initiated customer communications, AML alert disposition, code assistance for internal code or data access changes.
  • Tier 3: Moderate. Decision support with mandatory human-in-the-loop review, limited data sensitivity, reversible. Examples: internal summarization for credit memos, agent-assisted research.
  • Tier 4: Low. No customer or financial data exposure, no direct action, fully human-controlled. Examples: internal productivity tools, code assistance, general employee Q&A.

A fully autonomous, customer-facing payment agent sits at Tier 1 “regardless of how well it performs in testing.”

Why Does It Matter?

Although the framework creates no new requirements, it shows what OCC examiners will ask about generative and agentic SI, the area to which the OCC says the framework is most applicable. For banks, the framework provides a detailed benchmark for purpose statements, human oversight, containment, and evidence. For nonbank lenders and servicers, bank partners are likely to carry these expectations into diligence questionnaires and contracts, particularly on provider agents, incident definitions, model change notice, and liability. For structured finance and secondary market participants, SI used in underwriting, servicing, and collections is becoming a diligence item, and the ability to reconstruct SI-supported loan-level decisions may bear on representations, warranties, and repurchase exposure.

What Do I Need to Do?

Banks and their partners should use the framework to inform or enhance existing governance, model risk, compliance, and third-party programs account for SI. This should include the following steps:

  • Document purpose and permissions. Record each use case’s permitted actions, data and system access, decision boundaries, and escalation triggers in terms that can be tested.
  • Tier use cases by consequence. Score use cases on the seven factors and confirm that control intensity, validation, and audit coverage track the resulting tier.
  • Make human oversight real. Define reviewer authority and expertise, review standards, span of control, and override logging, and watch for alert fatigue and bulk approvals.
  • Build containment and remediation. For Tier 1 and Tier 2 uses, test kill switches, circuit breakers, fail-over processes, and customer remediation workflows.
  • Revisit vendor contracts. Address provider agent permissions, SI incident definitions and timelines, model change notice, restrictions on training with bank data, liability allocation, and exit rights.
  • Address compliance and privacy. Test for hallucinations in customer-facing representations, recalibrate BSA and sanctions tools, and set retention and access controls for prompts, outputs, and logs.
  • Expand testing and evidence. Adopt adversarial, red-team, and hallucination testing, and retain the inputs, tool calls, approvals, and version history needed to reconstruct material decisions.
  • Prepare for partner and investor diligence. Nonbanks and secondary market participants should expect, and be ready to provide or request, inventory, tiering, testing, and incident evidence.

Alston & Bird’s team is available to assist banks, nonbank lenders and servicers, and structured finance participants in assessing their SI governance programs against the OCC framework and in preparing for examinations and partner diligence.

Federal Bank Regulators Announce Rescission of Climate-Related Risk Management Principles

What Happened?

On October 16, 2025, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) (collectively, the “bank regulators”) announced that they intend to rescind the interagency Principles for Climate-Related Financial Risk Management for Large Financial Institutions (“Climate Principles”).

Why Does it Matter?

The Climate Principles, initially issued in 2023, require large financial institutions with consolidated assets over $100 billion to consider climate-related financial risk management in line with regulator risk expectations (including for governance, compliance management, strategic planning, and risk management). The banking regulators’ move to rescind the Climate Principles follows the OCC’s withdrawal from them on March 31.

This recission signals the bank regulators’ shifting view of how climate change considerations should impact individual bank policy, which is consistent with President Trump’s rescission of the Biden Administration’s executive order on climate-related financial risk. The FRB staff noted in a memo to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors that they believe the Climate Principles “are not necessary and may be distracting large financial institutions from the management of material financial risks.” (Previously, FRB Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman argued in 2023, when the Climate Principles were initially issued, that they “increased compliance cost and burden without a commensurate improvement to the safety and soundness of financial institutions.” She also expressed concerns that examiners would be pressured to apply the Climate Principles’ expectations on smaller banks.)

What Do You Need to Do?

Guidance from the bank regulators emphasize that banks must continue to assess all material risks and should be resilient to a range of risks. This does not completely rule out that a bank may need to prepare for climate-related risks, but it removes the spotlight from these risks if they are not deemed “material,” such as those that are present, in the words of FRB Vice Chair Bowman, over an “indefinite time horizon.” The rescission of the Climate Principles will take effect immediately upon publication of a formal notice in the Federal Register (currently pending); the bank regulators issued a draft notice in advance of that publication.

The banking regulators’ withdrawal of the Climate Principles does not impact parallel state action to address risks associates with climate change. Shortly after the Climate Principles were issued in 2023, the New York Department of Financial Services issued its own guidance for financial institutions regarding climate change risks. This guidance remains in effect for all New York state regulated mortgage lenders and servicers, banking organizations, licensed branches, and agencies of foreign banking organizations. Thus, even when the Climate Principles are rescinded, regulated financial institutions may have cause to remain attuned to related risks.

OCC Issues Guidance on “Buy Now, Pay Later” Lending

A&B Abstract:

On December 6, 2023, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a bulletin aimed at providing guidance to national banks and federal savings associations (“Financial Institutions”) involved in “buy now, pay later” (BNPL) lending. The advisory emphasizes the need for these Financial Institutions to carefully manage risks associated with BNPL, focusing on aspects such as underwriting, repayment terms, pricing, and safeguards to protect customers. Additionally, the OCC stresses the importance of clear and prominent marketing materials and disclosures.

The Bulletin

While BNPL products may vary, the bulletin focuses on BNPL loans which involve four or fewer installments without finance charges, and that are commonly offered at the point of sale. Such BNPL products are distinguished from more traditional installment loans with payment terms greater than four installments or that charge interest or carry other finance charges. These loans have become increasingly popular, especially among younger individuals and those with limited credit history.

The OCC identifies various risks related to BNPL loans for both lenders and consumers, including credit, compliance, operational, strategic, and reputational risks. Specific concerns include potential borrower overextension, limited applicant credit history, unclear disclosure language, challenges with merchandise returns and merchant disputes, operational and compliance risks related to third-party relationships, and increased operational risk due to the highly automated nature of BNPL lending.

Further details on risks include the potential for elevated first payment default risk, additional fees for borrowers due to overextension, and the possibility that credit reporting agencies may lack visibility into BNPL activity.

The OCC’s guidance advises Financial Institutions engaged in BNPL lending to establish robust risk management systems, including prudent lending policies for risk identification, measurement, monitoring, and control. Regarding credit risk, the bulletin emphasizes the importance of sound charge-off practices, allowances for credit losses, and timely reporting of comprehensive information to credit bureaus under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The guidance also provides recommendations for operational risk management. It encourages Financial Institutions to assess and mitigate fraud risks, subject BNPL lending process models to sound model risk management and integrate BNPL lending into broader compliance management systems. Additionally, it highlights the need for Financial Institutions engaging third parties in BNPL lending to incorporate such relationships into their third-party risk management protocols.

Takeaway:

Given the OCC’s focus on the risks associated with BNPL products, now is a good time for Financial Institutions engaged in BNPL Lending to ensure that their compliance management programs are robust enough to ensure compliance with the OCC’s guidance.

OCC Rule Affirms Valid-When-Made Doctrine

A&B ABstract:

On May 15, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  (“OCC”) issued a final rule, effective August 3, 2020, addressing the “valid-when-made” doctrine.  The rule clarifies that the interest rate on a loan originated by a national bank or federal savings association, if permissible at the time of origination, will continue to be a permissible and enforceable term of the loan following a sale, transfer, or assignment of the loan, regardless of whether the third party debt buyer is a federally chartered bank.

Discussion

In November, 2019 the OCC issued a proposed rule to address the ambiguity created by the Second Circuit in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC. The Madden court held that a purchaser of a loan (unsecured credit card debt) originated by a national bank could not charge interest at the rate permissible for the bank if that rate would not be permissible under the applicable state usury cap. Madden did not address the valid-when-made doctrine, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case in 2016.

Final Rule

The OCC’s final rule, effective August 3, 2020, effectively codifies the valid-when-made doctrine.  Specifically, the rule provides that interest on a loan that is permissible pursuant to section 85 (applicable to national banks) and section 1463(g) (applicable to federally chartered thrifts) of the National Bank Act “shall not be affected by the sale, assignment or other transfer of the loan.” The OCC emphasized that “that sections 85 and 1463(g) incorporate, rather than eliminate, these state caps.”  A bank must comply with the interest rate limit established under the law of the state where it is located. The OCC recognized that disparities between interest rates between banks arise as a result of the state laws that impose such caps.

In affirming the valid-when-made doctrine, the OCC indicated that “to effectively assign a loan contract and allow the assignee to step into the shoes of the national bank assignor, a permissible interest term must remain permissible and enforceable notwithstanding the assignment”.  Further, the OCC, in rebutting comments made during the rulemaking that a third party non-bank debt buyer should not step into the shoes of the national bank originator, observed that “the enforceability of an assigned interest term should [not] depend on the licensing status of the assignor or assignee.”  Simply put, the OCC affirmed that when a bank transfers a loan, interest permissible before the transfer continues to be permissible after the transfer.

The rule does not address which entity is the true lender when a bank transfers a loan to a third party. The OCC’s rule applies to “interest,” as that term is defined in 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4001(a) and 160.110(a).

Takeaways

The rule is welcome news, ensuring that uncertainty concerning the effects of the Madden decision does not erode the liquidity of the secondary market for loans originated by national banks and federally chartered thrifts.  It effectively levels the playing field by allowing purchasers of these loans to collect the same agreed upon interest rate and contractual loan terms as the original. Such uniformity is critical for the secondary market.  Hopefully, the FDIC will similarly finalize its proposed rule.

Nevertheless, we note that the OCC rulemaking does not reverse Madden, and while the pronouncement should be influential in circuits aside from the Second Circuit, it is expected to face court challenges, not to mention criticism from congressional Democrats.   The saga will likely continue.