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The Federal Moratorium On Residential Evictions Faces Constitutional Challenge

A&B ABstract: Landlords in Tennessee have challenged the order of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) that imposed a nationwide moratorium on certain residential evictions. If sustained, the challenge could have a major impact on the scope of federal power during the pandemic.

Background of the Eviction Moratorium

The CARES Act imposed a 120-day moratorium on certain residential evictions that elapsed on August 25, 2020.  With this date impending, on August 8, President Trump directed executive agencies to “take all lawful measures to prevent residential evictions and foreclosures resulting from financial hardships caused by COVID-19.” He also ordered the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to consider whether any measures “temporarily halting residential evictions” are “reasonably necessary to prevent further spread of COVID-19” between states.

The CDC Emergency Order

In response, on September 4, the CDC issued an emergency order imposing a nationwide moratorium on certain residential evictions through December 31, 2020 (“CDC Order”).  In doing so, the CDC coordinated with HHS and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). The CDC Order prevents the eviction of any tenant who certifies that he or she: (1) is “using best efforts to obtain all governmental assistance for housing”; (2) earns no more than $99,000 per year in income; (3) cannot pay rent in full due to a substantial loss in income or extraordinary medical expenses; (4) is “using best efforts to make timely partial payments”; and (5) would likely become homeless, or be forced to live in a shared living setting, if evicted.

Significantly, the CDC Order does not provide any compensation for landlords or property owners who are prevented from evicting non-paying tenants, nor does it establish any hearing process for challenges to a tenant’s Declaration.  Conversely, the Order also does not exempt tenants from their legal obligation to pay outstanding rent they accumulate.  It further provides that the moratorium can also be extended beyond December 31.

The Constitutional Challenge

On September 16, a group of seven landlords – which together own and manage over 5,000 residential rental units in western Tennessee – filed a lawsuit in federal court that challenges the constitutionality of the CDC Order.

In Tiger Lily LLC et al. v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Devel. et al., No. 2:20-2692 (W.D. Tenn.), the plaintiffs assert seven causes of action – spanning the Takings clause, to due process, to the improper displacement of state law – that all rest on the contention that the CDC Order was not authorized by law and exceeds federal authority.  Plaintiffs seek an injunction against enforcement of the CDC Order, but not monetary damages.

The Claims

Plaintiffs’ key substantive contention is that the CDC Order is not authorized by the statute or regulations upon which it relies, rendering it unconstitutional.  The Complaint’s specific claims in this respect appear questionable.  For example, the Order is rooted in Section 361 of the Public Health Services Act, which Plaintiffs say gives the Surgeon General only limited authority to issue orders addressing specific incidents of contamination.  But Section 361 empowers the Surgeon General to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.”  42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (emphasis added). After listing several categories, Section 361 then repeats that the Surgeon General may enact “other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.”  Id. 

The Complaint makes a similar argument about a federal CDC regulation the Order relies on, but it too vests the CDC Director with power to “take such measures to prevent [disease spread] as he/she deems reasonably necessary.”  42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs also cite a “savings” clause in the Public Health Services Act, which provides that it cannot supersede state law.  But there is an exception for state laws that “conflict” with an exercise of federal authority under the Act.  42 U.S.C. § 264(e).  Such a conflict appears to be present here.  In addition, “regulatory” Takings of the sort asserted by Plaintiffs are notoriously difficult to establish.  A New York federal judge recently rejected such a claim made against that state’s eviction moratorium.  Elmsford Apartment Assocs. LLC et al. v. Andrew Cuomo, No. 1:20-cv-04062 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020).

The Deeper Roots of the Challenge

Given these issues, the constitutional challenge may instead turn on the general question of whether the scope of the CDC Order is consistent with past practice and the intent underlying Section 361.  The CDC’s broad interpretation of its power would arguably give the Executive the power to restrict almost any type of activity, as applied to any “communicable” disease.

Further, the eviction moratorium is very different than exemplary public health measures listed in the statute, perhaps exceeding its intended scope. The moratorium also applies to purely intrastate evictions, which may not threaten interstate spread of COVID-19, as required for federal action.  Further, if the court were to conclude that the broad CDC Order is not “necessary” (42 U.S.C. § 264(a)) or “reasonably necessary” (42 C.F.R. § 70.2) to prevent the interstate spread of COVID-19, the Order could be invalidated.  This appears to be a matter of first impression, although statewide moratoriums have a long history and have been upheld by courts.  E.g., Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Minnesota foreclosure moratorium).

Takeaways

The Tiger Lily case may be significant regardless of its outcome.  As a procedural matter, it could spawn future lawsuits challenging the CDC Order in other courts, and potentially in the form of a nationwide class action.  Litigation over the CDC Order could eventually rival the onslaught of lawsuits involving the CARES Act, such as the Paycheck Protection Program “agent fee” litigation.

Further, if successful, Tiger Lily would also result not just in restoration the ability for the plaintiff landlords to evict non-paying tenants, but it could yield important clarifications and limits on the regulatory power of the federal government in connection with the pandemic.  Particularly if it is appealed to the Sixth Circuit (if not the U.S. Supreme Court), the Tiger Lily case could have meaningful ramifications for all future federal regulations related to COVID-19.

Moreover, if the CDC Order is struck down, this could spur Congress to consider addressing residential evictions directly again.  For example, Congress could enact its own broad moratorium by statute or provide more stimulus payments to struggling renters, enabling them to pay rent on time – which, in turn, would help landlords, albeit at taxpayer expense.  For these reasons, Tiger Lily and any subsequent related cases will be worth watching as they move through the courts.

New Jersey Releases Application Procedures for Student Loan Servicers

A&B ABstract: As we have previously discussed, effective November 27, 2019, Senate Bill 1149 (2019 N.J. Laws 200) (the “Act”), creates New Jersey’s “Student Loan Bill of Rights” and prohibits any person from “act[ing] as a student loan servicer, directly or indirectly, without first obtaining a license” from the Department of Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”).

Although the Act became effective in 2019, the DOBI did not provide an application or an application mechanism to apply for a New Jersey student loan servicer license in 2019. The DOBI recently released guidance on the application process and operational requirements for those wishing to service student loans in New Jersey.

Background:

On September 1, 2020, the DOBI released Bulletin No. 20-31 (the “Bulletin”), which provides application procedures to apply for a license. The DOBI will begin to accept license submissions from all persons on September 15, 2020. The application must be submitted through the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System (“NMLS”).

Persons that are currently acting as student loan servicers in the state that submit license forms prior to the close of business on December 31, 2020 may continue to operate as student loan servicers, pending DOBI’s approval of the license forms. All student loan servicers that are not exempt from licensure must submit all requirements for a license by December 31, 2020.

License Types

The Act creates two separate license types. The New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license is required for persons servicing student loans other than Federal Contract Student Loans (“FCSLs”). A Federal Contract Student Loan license is required for persons servicing student loans pursuant to a contract awarded by the United States Secretary of Education under 20 U.S.C.S. 1087f.

Persons servicing FCSLs will be automatically issued a limited, irrevocable license, upon adequately demonstrating their eligibility. Those servicing FCLSs and student loans other than FCLSs are required to obtain a both a Federal Contract Student Loan license and a New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license, and must comply with all requirements applicable to both license types.

Exemptions

As we previously noted, the Act’s licensure requirement does not apply to: (1) any state or federally chartered bank, savings bank, savings and loan association or credit union; (2) any wholly owned subsidiary of any bank or credit union; and (3) any operating subsidiary where each owner of the operating subsidiary is wholly owned by the same bank or credit union.

New Jersey Student Loan Servicer Application

Persons seeking to obtain a New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license must complete a license application through the NMLS. Amongst other application requirements, applicants must submit:

  • A nonrefundable license fee of $5,000;
  • A nonrefundable investigation fee of $500;
  • A surety bond in the amount of $30,000 plus an additional $30,000 per branch;
  • A financial statement demonstrating net worth of $250,000 prepared by a CPA or public account dated within 90 days of the applicant’s fiscal year end;
  • A business plan; and
  • An ownership chart.

Beginning in 2021, all student loan servicer licenses will expire at the close of business on December 31 each year. Renewals will be processed through the NMLS.

Federal Contract Student Loan Servicer License Application

As noted, applicants that service FCSLs must apply for a license to engage in student loan servicing pursuant to a contract awarded by the Secretary of Education. Applicants must complete a license form and submit the form through the NMLS. Applicants must submit:

  • A nonrefundable license fee of $5,000;
  • A certification indicating that the person is servicing student loans pursuant to a contract awarded by the Secretary of Education. The certification must be signed and sworn to under oath before a notary public;
  • For those solely servicing federal contract student loans, a surety bond in the amount of $30,000, plus an additional $30,000 for each branch office. Those servicing both federal contract student loans and student loans of any other type seeking both license types, is only required to obtain one surety bond in the amount of $30,000.

Operational Requirements and Penalties

The Bulletin discusses operational requirements for all student loan servicers. Among other operational requirements, all student loan servicers (regardless of license status) must: (1) maintain records; (2) file a report with the DOBI annually, setting forth information concerning business conducted in the previous calendar year; and (3) comply with all DOBI investigations and examinations.

The Bulletin notes that the Commissioner of the DOBI may suspend, revoke, or refuse to review the license of licensees who violate the Act.  Further, the Commissioner is empowered to bring a civil action against any person who violates the Act, and may seek a monetary penalty of note more than $10,000 for the first violation, and $20,000 for the second and each subsequent offense.

The Act also created a private right of action for borrowers who suffer ascertainable loss of money as a result of the use or employment by a student loan servicer of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under the Act. Borrowers are eligible for terrible damages as well as attorney’s fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit.

Takeaway:

Those currently servicing student loans in New Jersey should be prepared to submit a license application when the license application becomes active on September 15, 2020. All those currently engaged in student loan servicing in New Jersey must apply by December 31, 2020, or risk engaging in unlicensed activity after that date. Applicants should ensure that if they are servicing FCSLs that they apply for both license types.

NYDFS Issues Guidance to Mortgage Servicers Regarding Assessment of Registration Fees

A&B ABstract:

On September 1, 2020, the Deputy Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), issued guidance (the “Guidance”) to New York State regulated mortgage lenders and servicers (collectively referred to as “Servicers”) regarding fees paid to register mortgages in default. The Guidance reminds Servicers of the restrictions on fees and charges set forth under Part 419 of the Superintendent of Financial Services Regulations (“Part 419”) and directs Servicers to reverse and/or refund and credit registration fees impermissibly charged to New York borrowers and to create a log of all borrowers who were either charged, or paid any registration fee to a Servicer.

Part 419 Fee Restrictions

In December 2019, the NYDFS finalized amendments to Part 419, nearly 10 years after its initial adoption. Part 419, which sets forth business conduct requirements for mortgage loan servicers operating in the state, was amended to include expansive obligations that, in certain instances, exceed obligations under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules.

Under Section 419.5 of the amended regulations, servicers may only collect certain specified types of fees from a borrower, subject to certain conditions.  Such fees include attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, and property valuation fees.  In addition, a servicer may collect a fee if it is for a service that is actually rendered to the borrower, reasonably related to the cost of rendering that service, and is: (1) expressly authorized and clearly and conspicuously disclosed by the loan instruments and not prohibited by law; (2) expressly permitted by law and not prohibited by the loan instruments; or (3) not prohibited by law or the loan instruments and is for a specific service requested by the borrower that is assessed only after disclosure of the fee is provided and the borrower expressly consents to pay the fee in exchange for the service.

NYDFS Guidance

The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS has become aware that “certain counties, cities and other municipalities in New York State, by ordinance or otherwise, are requiring mortgage lenders and servicers…to register mortgages declared to be in default…with the county, city or other municipality in which the real property is situated” and that some Servicers have charged borrowers, or collected from their account, the fee for such registrations.

The Guidance reminds Servicers that Section 419.5 of Part 419 “only permits [a servicer] to collect certain specified types of fees from a [borrower], consisting of attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, property valuation fees, and fees for services actually rendered to a mortgagor when such fees are reasonably related to the cost of rendering the service to the borrower.” Because a “[r]egistration [f]ee is neither an attorney fee, late or delinquency fee, property valuation fee, or fee for a service rendered to a [borrower],” Servicers are prohibited from charging or collecting such a fee from a borrower under Part 419.

Servicers subject to the requirements of Part 419 who, at any time, collected any registration fees from a borrower, are directed to refund and credit the full amount of such registration fees to the account of the borrower. If the registration fee was charged to a borrower’s account, but was not collected, the Servicer must remove and reverse any and all registration fees charged to the borrower’s account.

Finally, Servicers are directed to create a log of all borrowers that were either charged, or paid any registration fee to the servicer “at any time.” The log must contain details of the full amounts of the registration fees, whether such fees were collected or charged, and the date(s) the full amounts of collected registration fees were refunded and credited to or, in instances where the fee was charged but not collected, removed and reversed from borrowers’ accounts.  The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS plans to inspect the log during its next examination of Servicers.

 Takeaway

The Guidance is a reminder to Servicers to ensure compliance with the fee restrictions under the amended Part 419 regulations.  Servicers should review their portfolio of New York loans to ensure borrowers who paid, or were charged, a registration fee are provided appropriate remediation, as the NYDFS has already flagged this as an issue that will be scrutinized in upcoming servicing examinations.

Colorado “True Lender” Matters Settle

A&B ABstract:

As we have previously reported, the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been engaged in litigation against certain marketplace lending programs, alleging the marketplace lenders were the true lenders and could not enforce contracts in excess of Colorado’s statutory interest rate cap.

On August 18, 2020, the parties filed Stipulations to Dismiss the two matters – Martha Fulford, Administrator Uniform Consumer Credit Code v. Marlette, Wilmington Trust, NA, solely as trustee for certain trusts, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, and intervenor Cross River Bank, and Martha Fulford, Administrator Uniform Consumer Credit Code v. Avant of Colorado LLC d/b/a Avant, Avant Inc. n/k/a Avant, LLC, Wilmington Trust, N.A., not in its individual capacity, but solely as a trustee for certain trusts, Wilmington Saving Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee for certain trusts, and Avant PB SPV, LLC.  The Stipulation included a copy of the actual settlement agreement as an Exhibit.

Settlement Terms

The settlement is being hailed by the parties as a win for Colorado borrowers as well as all parties to the litigation.  Under the settlement, responsible lending programs can continue to offer Colorado borrowers liquidity while protecting them from higher cost credit programs, while preserving the State’s right to supervise such programs.  It also maintains the enforceability of those loans originated by the banks under these programs, whether retained by the banks or transferred to a non-bank purchaser.  And it provides access to innovative products designed to meet the needs of underserved consumers.

Safe Harbor

In resolving the litigation, the settlement provides a safe harbor for loans originated to Colorado borrowers under the programs, and at least some other similar programs, if certain conditions are met.  Those terms include that:

  • The maximum APR not exceed 36%;
  • The non-bank platforms obtain or maintain a Colorado license and file regular reports;
  • All aspects of the program be subject to active supervision by the banks consistent with applicable banking guidelines;
  • The bank will fund all loans at origination; and
  • Certain limitations on the platforms’ ability to commit to purchase certain loans originated by the banks in advance.
Loan Deferral

In addition, the platforms have agreed to make available to Colorado borrowers with loans having interest rates above 21% a loan deferral program that allows them to defer installments for up to 60-days.  This first of its kind settlement may provide a framework for similar programs throughout the United States, allowing underserved consumers to obtain responsible credit on terms that give them the financial freedom to meet their needs from lenders who provide a transparent and cost effective means of accessing those credit markets.

Alston & Bird represented the Avant and Wilmington defendants in the Avant matter, led by John Redding, a partner in the firm’s Los Angeles office.

A&B Attorneys Address “The Impact of COVID-19 on Mortgage Servicing Rights and Servicing Advances”

On August 11, a multidisciplinary group of Alston & Bird lawyers hosted the webinar “The Impact of COVID-19 on Mortgage Servicing Rights and Servicing Advances.”  Participants were Karen Gelernt and Katrina Llanes, Finance practice partners; Matthew Mamak, Corporate Transactions and Securities practice partner; and Nanci Weissgold, Financial Services & Products practice partner.

The webinar addressed the impact of COVID-19 on servicers generally, focusing on servicing rights, servicing advances, implications of the CARES Act, and forbearance moratoriums. Additional topics included: (1) the approaches of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to financing servicing advances, and servicing rights; (2)  industry consolidation; and (3) how M&A transactions in this sector will need to address additional concerns arising from changes brought about by COVID-19 and the government responses to the pandemic and resulting economic stressors.

Please click here to listen to the playback and here to view the presentation.