Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

State Law

District Courts Split on Convenience Fees Under Debt Collection Laws

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A&B ABstract:

In a number of recent decisions, district courts have split on the issue of whether a mortgage servicer violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and related state debt collection statutes by charging a borrower a convenience fee for making a mortgage payment over the phone, interactive voice recording system (“IVR”).

FDCPA Sections 1692(f) and 1692a

Section 1692(f) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using unfair or unconscionable means to collect any debt, and enumerates specific examples of prohibited conduct.  Such conduct includes the “[c]ollection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement created the debt or permitted by law.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6).  Among other things, the term “debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person” or “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person….”  Id.

Overview of Convenience Fees

In addition to offering consumers several no-cost options to make a timely monthly mortgage payment, many servicers also offer borrowers a means to make an immediate payment on their mortgage by phone, IVR, or the Internet.  Servicers who make such services available to their customers may charge a fee, often referred to as a “convenience fee,” in connection with this service.  In a wave of recent cases, borrowers who have elected to use such payment methods and consequently incurred convenience fees have sued their mortgage servicers, alleging that the convenience fees violated the FDCPA.  Frequently, these borrowers also allege that the convenience fees violated other state consumer protection statutes, breached the express terms of their mortgage agreements, and ran afoul of common law.

Recent Decisions

This year, numerous courts across the country have ruled on loan servicers’ motions to dismiss convenience claims asserted by borrowers.  A clear split has now emerged regarding the viability of plaintiffs’ legal theories.

Some Courts Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA Claims, Finding Plaintiffs’ Allegations Concerning Convenience Insufficient to State a Violation of the FDCPA

Many courts, largely in district courts in Florida, have dismissed borrowers’ claims for failure to state a claim under the FDCPA and related state acts.  According to these courts, a convenience fee is neither a “debt,” nor is it properly characterized as “incidental” to the mortgage debt itself.  Moreover, these courts have also rejected the argument that the servicer is “debt collector” under the FDCPA unless the loan was in default when the borrower became obligated to pay the convenience fee.

One of the key decisions in this recent line of cases in Turner v. PHH Mortgage Corp. No. No. 8:20-cv-00137-T-30SPF (Feb. 24, 2020 M.D. Fla.).  There, PHH charged Turner for making mortgage payments via telephone or online.  Turner alleged those convenience fees violated the FDCPA, and its Florida counterpart, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”).  PHH responded by moving to dismiss those claims.  The court agreed with PHH, concluding that the convenience fees were not debts owed another as contemplated by the acts.  Further, the court found that even if the fees were debts, PHH’s optional payment services had separate convenience fees that originated with PHH—not with Turner’s mortgage.

Additionally, the court relied on the fact that when Turner became obligated to pay the convenience fees, she was not in default in her obligation to pay it.  Thus, according the court’s analysis, PHH was not acting as a debt collector under the acts because (1) the debt was not in default and (2) the debt originated with PHH.  A number of other courts have since dismissed the borrowers’ claims under similar reasoning, often citing Turner’s analysis as persuasive.  See, e.g. Estate of Derrick Campbel. V. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 20-CV-80057-AHS, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020); Reid v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 20-CV-80130-AHS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79378 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2020); Bardak v. Ocwen Loan Serv., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158874 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2020).

Some Courts Find that Borrowers’ Allegations Concerning Convenience Fees Are Sufficient to State a Claim Under the FDCPA

A number of other courts across the country, from California to Florida to Texas, have concluded that a borrower does state a claim for violation of the FDCPA (or an equivalent state statute) by alleging that the borrower was charged a convenience fee in connection with a mortgage payment made over the phone, IVR, or Internet.

In contrast to the decisions discussed above, these courts find that the convenience fee is “incidental” to the mortgage debt under FDCPA section 1692f(1).  These courts have rejected the servicers’ arguments that convenience fees are not incidental to the mortgage because they arise from separate services and obligations voluntarily undertaken by the borrower.  They have found instead that, regardless of the fact that the payment method is optional, it is still incidental to the mortgage debt because the servicers only collect convenience fees when borrowers make debt payments.  See, e.g., Glover v. Owen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38701 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2020).

Similarly, the court in Glover further found that the convenience fees were not permitted by Florida law because the court could not identify any statute or law expressly permitting such fees, nor were they explicitly allowed by the mortgage agreement.  A number of other courts have employed similar reasoning and refused to dismiss borrowers’ convenience fee claims under the FDCPA or corollary state statutes.  See, e.g., Torliatt v. Ocwen Loan Serv., No. 19-cv-04303-WHO, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141261 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 2020) (refusing to dismiss claims under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—California’s equivalent of the FDCPA—and California’s Unfair Competition Law); Caldwell v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 3:19-cv-02193-N (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2020) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the Texas Debt Collection Act).

Takeaway

There is a growing split among district courts regarding whether a borrower who is charged a convenience fee has a viable claim under the FDCPA.  This division is particularly acute within the Eleventh Circuit, and is one unlikely to be resolved in the Court of Appeals any time soon.  So, for the foreseeable future, we expect to see more lawsuits where borrowers seek to take advantage of the current state of legal uncertainty around convenience fees.

New Jersey Releases Application Procedures for Student Loan Servicers

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A&B ABstract: As we have previously discussed, effective November 27, 2019, Senate Bill 1149 (2019 N.J. Laws 200) (the “Act”), creates New Jersey’s “Student Loan Bill of Rights” and prohibits any person from “act[ing] as a student loan servicer, directly or indirectly, without first obtaining a license” from the Department of Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”).

Although the Act became effective in 2019, the DOBI did not provide an application or an application mechanism to apply for a New Jersey student loan servicer license in 2019. The DOBI recently released guidance on the application process and operational requirements for those wishing to service student loans in New Jersey.

Background:

On September 1, 2020, the DOBI released Bulletin No. 20-31 (the “Bulletin”), which provides application procedures to apply for a license. The DOBI will begin to accept license submissions from all persons on September 15, 2020. The application must be submitted through the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System (“NMLS”).

Persons that are currently acting as student loan servicers in the state that submit license forms prior to the close of business on December 31, 2020 may continue to operate as student loan servicers, pending DOBI’s approval of the license forms. All student loan servicers that are not exempt from licensure must submit all requirements for a license by December 31, 2020.

License Types

The Act creates two separate license types. The New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license is required for persons servicing student loans other than Federal Contract Student Loans (“FCSLs”). A Federal Contract Student Loan license is required for persons servicing student loans pursuant to a contract awarded by the United States Secretary of Education under 20 U.S.C.S. 1087f.

Persons servicing FCSLs will be automatically issued a limited, irrevocable license, upon adequately demonstrating their eligibility. Those servicing FCLSs and student loans other than FCLSs are required to obtain a both a Federal Contract Student Loan license and a New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license, and must comply with all requirements applicable to both license types.

Exemptions

As we previously noted, the Act’s licensure requirement does not apply to: (1) any state or federally chartered bank, savings bank, savings and loan association or credit union; (2) any wholly owned subsidiary of any bank or credit union; and (3) any operating subsidiary where each owner of the operating subsidiary is wholly owned by the same bank or credit union.

New Jersey Student Loan Servicer Application

Persons seeking to obtain a New Jersey Student Loan Servicer license must complete a license application through the NMLS. Amongst other application requirements, applicants must submit:

  • A nonrefundable license fee of $5,000;
  • A nonrefundable investigation fee of $500;
  • A surety bond in the amount of $30,000 plus an additional $30,000 per branch;
  • A financial statement demonstrating net worth of $250,000 prepared by a CPA or public account dated within 90 days of the applicant’s fiscal year end;
  • A business plan; and
  • An ownership chart.

Beginning in 2021, all student loan servicer licenses will expire at the close of business on December 31 each year. Renewals will be processed through the NMLS.

Federal Contract Student Loan Servicer License Application

As noted, applicants that service FCSLs must apply for a license to engage in student loan servicing pursuant to a contract awarded by the Secretary of Education. Applicants must complete a license form and submit the form through the NMLS. Applicants must submit:

  • A nonrefundable license fee of $5,000;
  • A certification indicating that the person is servicing student loans pursuant to a contract awarded by the Secretary of Education. The certification must be signed and sworn to under oath before a notary public;
  • For those solely servicing federal contract student loans, a surety bond in the amount of $30,000, plus an additional $30,000 for each branch office. Those servicing both federal contract student loans and student loans of any other type seeking both license types, is only required to obtain one surety bond in the amount of $30,000.

Operational Requirements and Penalties

The Bulletin discusses operational requirements for all student loan servicers. Among other operational requirements, all student loan servicers (regardless of license status) must: (1) maintain records; (2) file a report with the DOBI annually, setting forth information concerning business conducted in the previous calendar year; and (3) comply with all DOBI investigations and examinations.

The Bulletin notes that the Commissioner of the DOBI may suspend, revoke, or refuse to review the license of licensees who violate the Act.  Further, the Commissioner is empowered to bring a civil action against any person who violates the Act, and may seek a monetary penalty of note more than $10,000 for the first violation, and $20,000 for the second and each subsequent offense.

The Act also created a private right of action for borrowers who suffer ascertainable loss of money as a result of the use or employment by a student loan servicer of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under the Act. Borrowers are eligible for terrible damages as well as attorney’s fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit.

Takeaway:

Those currently servicing student loans in New Jersey should be prepared to submit a license application when the license application becomes active on September 15, 2020. All those currently engaged in student loan servicing in New Jersey must apply by December 31, 2020, or risk engaging in unlicensed activity after that date. Applicants should ensure that if they are servicing FCSLs that they apply for both license types.

NYDFS Issues Guidance to Mortgage Servicers Regarding Assessment of Registration Fees

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A&B ABstract:

On September 1, 2020, the Deputy Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), issued guidance (the “Guidance”) to New York State regulated mortgage lenders and servicers (collectively referred to as “Servicers”) regarding fees paid to register mortgages in default. The Guidance reminds Servicers of the restrictions on fees and charges set forth under Part 419 of the Superintendent of Financial Services Regulations (“Part 419”) and directs Servicers to reverse and/or refund and credit registration fees impermissibly charged to New York borrowers and to create a log of all borrowers who were either charged, or paid any registration fee to a Servicer.

Part 419 Fee Restrictions

In December 2019, the NYDFS finalized amendments to Part 419, nearly 10 years after its initial adoption. Part 419, which sets forth business conduct requirements for mortgage loan servicers operating in the state, was amended to include expansive obligations that, in certain instances, exceed obligations under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules.

Under Section 419.5 of the amended regulations, servicers may only collect certain specified types of fees from a borrower, subject to certain conditions.  Such fees include attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, and property valuation fees.  In addition, a servicer may collect a fee if it is for a service that is actually rendered to the borrower, reasonably related to the cost of rendering that service, and is: (1) expressly authorized and clearly and conspicuously disclosed by the loan instruments and not prohibited by law; (2) expressly permitted by law and not prohibited by the loan instruments; or (3) not prohibited by law or the loan instruments and is for a specific service requested by the borrower that is assessed only after disclosure of the fee is provided and the borrower expressly consents to pay the fee in exchange for the service.

NYDFS Guidance

The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS has become aware that “certain counties, cities and other municipalities in New York State, by ordinance or otherwise, are requiring mortgage lenders and servicers…to register mortgages declared to be in default…with the county, city or other municipality in which the real property is situated” and that some Servicers have charged borrowers, or collected from their account, the fee for such registrations.

The Guidance reminds Servicers that Section 419.5 of Part 419 “only permits [a servicer] to collect certain specified types of fees from a [borrower], consisting of attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, property valuation fees, and fees for services actually rendered to a mortgagor when such fees are reasonably related to the cost of rendering the service to the borrower.” Because a “[r]egistration [f]ee is neither an attorney fee, late or delinquency fee, property valuation fee, or fee for a service rendered to a [borrower],” Servicers are prohibited from charging or collecting such a fee from a borrower under Part 419.

Servicers subject to the requirements of Part 419 who, at any time, collected any registration fees from a borrower, are directed to refund and credit the full amount of such registration fees to the account of the borrower. If the registration fee was charged to a borrower’s account, but was not collected, the Servicer must remove and reverse any and all registration fees charged to the borrower’s account.

Finally, Servicers are directed to create a log of all borrowers that were either charged, or paid any registration fee to the servicer “at any time.” The log must contain details of the full amounts of the registration fees, whether such fees were collected or charged, and the date(s) the full amounts of collected registration fees were refunded and credited to or, in instances where the fee was charged but not collected, removed and reversed from borrowers’ accounts.  The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS plans to inspect the log during its next examination of Servicers.

 Takeaway

The Guidance is a reminder to Servicers to ensure compliance with the fee restrictions under the amended Part 419 regulations.  Servicers should review their portfolio of New York loans to ensure borrowers who paid, or were charged, a registration fee are provided appropriate remediation, as the NYDFS has already flagged this as an issue that will be scrutinized in upcoming servicing examinations.

Colorado “True Lender” Matters Settle

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A&B ABstract:

As we have previously reported, the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been engaged in litigation against certain marketplace lending programs, alleging the marketplace lenders were the true lenders and could not enforce contracts in excess of Colorado’s statutory interest rate cap.

On August 18, 2020, the parties filed Stipulations to Dismiss the two matters – Martha Fulford, Administrator Uniform Consumer Credit Code v. Marlette, Wilmington Trust, NA, solely as trustee for certain trusts, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, and intervenor Cross River Bank, and Martha Fulford, Administrator Uniform Consumer Credit Code v. Avant of Colorado LLC d/b/a Avant, Avant Inc. n/k/a Avant, LLC, Wilmington Trust, N.A., not in its individual capacity, but solely as a trustee for certain trusts, Wilmington Saving Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee for certain trusts, and Avant PB SPV, LLC.  The Stipulation included a copy of the actual settlement agreement as an Exhibit.

Settlement Terms

The settlement is being hailed by the parties as a win for Colorado borrowers as well as all parties to the litigation.  Under the settlement, responsible lending programs can continue to offer Colorado borrowers liquidity while protecting them from higher cost credit programs, while preserving the State’s right to supervise such programs.  It also maintains the enforceability of those loans originated by the banks under these programs, whether retained by the banks or transferred to a non-bank purchaser.  And it provides access to innovative products designed to meet the needs of underserved consumers.

Safe Harbor

In resolving the litigation, the settlement provides a safe harbor for loans originated to Colorado borrowers under the programs, and at least some other similar programs, if certain conditions are met.  Those terms include that:

  • The maximum APR not exceed 36%;
  • The non-bank platforms obtain or maintain a Colorado license and file regular reports;
  • All aspects of the program be subject to active supervision by the banks consistent with applicable banking guidelines;
  • The bank will fund all loans at origination; and
  • Certain limitations on the platforms’ ability to commit to purchase certain loans originated by the banks in advance.
Loan Deferral

In addition, the platforms have agreed to make available to Colorado borrowers with loans having interest rates above 21% a loan deferral program that allows them to defer installments for up to 60-days.  This first of its kind settlement may provide a framework for similar programs throughout the United States, allowing underserved consumers to obtain responsible credit on terms that give them the financial freedom to meet their needs from lenders who provide a transparent and cost effective means of accessing those credit markets.

Alston & Bird represented the Avant and Wilmington defendants in the Avant matter, led by John Redding, a partner in the firm’s Los Angeles office.

Delaware Governor Issues Order Modifying Restrictions on Residential Foreclosures and Evictions

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A&B Abstract:

On June 30, 2020, Delaware Governor, John Carney, issued a Twenty-Third Modification (the “Order”) to the Declaration of a State of Emergency (the “State of Emergency”), initially issued on March 12, 2020. The Order became fully effective July 1, 2020. The Order addresses a number of issues that impact residential mortgage loan servicers, including restrictions on residential foreclosure and evictions and certain fees or charges, which modifies guidance issued under the Sixth Modification of the State of Emergency (the “Sixth Modification”), which we previously discussed.

Restrictions on Late Fees and Excess Interest for Missed Payments

Under the Sixth Modification, with respect to any missed payment on a residential mortgage occurring during the State of Emergency, no late fee or excess interest could be charged or accrued on the account for such residential mortgage during the State of Emergency. Under the Order, these provisions have been removed in their entirety.

Foreclosure Restrictions

The Order continues to impose restrictions on a mortgage servicer’s ability to initiate or complete a foreclosure action or sale, however, the Order replaces Paragraph C of the Sixth Modification and makes certain other significant changes thereto.

Notably, the Order lifts the stay of deadlines in any action pursuant to paragraphs C.2, C.3, and C.4 of the Sixth Modification.  Paragraph C.2 of the Sixth Modification had extended all deadlines in residential mortgage foreclosure actions, including those related to the Automatic Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program established pursuant to § 5062C of Title 10 of the Delaware Code.  Paragraph C.3 prohibited residential properties subject to a residential mortgage foreclosure action, for which a judgment of foreclosure was issued prior to the State of Emergency, from proceeding to a sheriff’s sale until 31 days after the State of Emergency.  Paragraph C.4 prohibited any residential property that was the subject of a residential mortgage foreclosure action, and which was sold at sheriff’s sale, from being subject to an action of ejectment or write of possession until 31 days following the termination of the State of Emergency. The Order lifts these restrictions, unless a court determines that a longer period is needed in the interest of justice.

With the lift of the stay of deadlines, the Order allows a party to act to remove individuals from residential properties, subject to a residential mortgage foreclosure action, where a judgment of foreclosure was issued prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency. However, individuals still cannot act to, and sheriffs, constables, and their agents, cannot remove individuals from their homes unless a judgment of foreclosure was obtained before March 13, 2020. All other provisions of Chapter 49 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code remain in effect in accordance with their terms.

Restrictions on Evictions

Similarly, with respect to evictions, the Order replaces paragraph B of the Sixth Modification and makes significant additional changes thereto.

The Order now provides that actions for summary possession may be filed with respect to any residential unit located within Delaware, but must be stayed to permit the Justice of the Peace Court to determine whether the parties would benefit from court supervised dispute resolution. Previously, no party could bring an action for summary possession for any residential rental unit located in Delaware. Actions that were brought before the State of Emergency, for which no final judgment had been entered, are further stayed.

Sheriffs, constables, and their agents continue to be prohibited from removing individuals from residential properties during the time the Order is in effect, unless a court determines on its own motion, or upon the motion of the parties, that it is necessary in the interest of justice. Additionally, the Order continues to prohibit the charging late fees or interest with respect to any past due balance for any residential unit during the State of Emergency.

Takeaway

The Order makes significant changes to the Sixth Modification to the Declaration of the State of Emergency, which significantly impacts mortgage servicing in Delaware. Servicers should carefully review the Order to fully determine their rights and obligations with respect to Delaware borrowers.