Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Loans

Correspondent Lending on the Rise: Increasing Gains Point to Increasing Risk

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A&B Abstract:

According to a recent edition of Inside Mortgage Finance, correspondent lending is the only lending channel that posted gains in Q3 2023. While it is always nice to see gains, it should also serve as a reminder to take a fresh look at your risk management program to ensure it is calibrated to address the unique risks of correspondent lending.

To level set, we define a correspondent lender as one who performs the activities necessary to originate a mortgage loan, i.e., takes and processes applications, provides required disclosures, and often, but not always, underwrites loans and makes the final credit decision. The correspondent lender closes loans in its name, funds the loans (often through a warehouse line of credit), and sells them to an investor by prior agreement.

The risk that correspondent misconduct poses to an investor falls broadly into three categories:  legal risk, reputational risk, and credit risk. Legal risk refers to the risk that the investor will be subject to legal claims based on the misconduct of the correspondent, or that the correspondent misconduct somehow will impair the investor’s rights under the loan agreements. Reputational risk refers to the risk of damage to the company’s reputation among investors, regulators, the public at large, counterparties, etc. Credit risk refers to the risk that correspondents will fail to conform to the investor’s underwriting guidelines or credit standards. We include fraud within this category.

In this post, we provide, in our assessment, an overview of the types of claims that pose the greatest legal risks, as well as best practices to mitigate such risks.

Theories of Liability on Assignees

The following laws and/or legal theories, in our assessment, pose the greatest risk of either vicarious liability or economic risk to assignees for the misconduct of correspondents:

  • Holder in Due Course:  Under the Uniform Commercial Code, if an assignee or “holder” of a mortgage loan rises to the level of a Holder in Due Course, it can enforce the borrower’s obligations notwithstanding certain defenses to repayment or claims in recoupment that the borrower may have against the original payee. If Holder in Due Course status is never attained or is lost, the purchaser of a mortgage loan will be subject to certain defenses to payment and claims in recoupment that the mortgagor may have against the original payee.
  • Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA): An assignee may be exposed to civil liability for a TILA violation that is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement.  In addition, for certain violations of TILA, a consumer may have an extended right to rescind a loan for up to three years from consummation. The consumer may exercise this right against an assignee. Moreover, amendments to TILA pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) expand the liability of assignees in connection with certain TILA violations, including violations relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure or TILA’s ability to repay, loan originator compensation, and anti-steering provisions.
  • Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) / Section 32 “High Cost” Loans: Subject to certain exceptions, an assignee of a HOEPA loan is subject to all claims and defenses with respect to the mortgage that the consumer could assert against the original creditor.
  • Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”): ECOA’s broad definition of “creditor” may place liability on assignees for the statute’s anti-discrimination and disclosure requirements where the assignee “regularly participates” in the credit decision.
  • State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: A number of states have passed anti-predatory lending laws that contain assignee liability provisions similar to those found in HOEPA with triggers that may differ from HOEPA. An assignee of a loan covered by such a state law will be subject to certain claims and defenses with respect to the mortgage that the consumer could assert against the original creditor.
  • Aiding and Abetting: Under the common law theory of aiding and abetting, loan purchasers and other parties can be held responsible for the acts of the lender that originated the loan, particularly if they (i) knew that the originating lender was engaged in “predatory” practices, and (ii) gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the originating lender. The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes aiding and abetting liability.
  • State and Federal Defenses to Foreclosure: Certain state laws expressly provide that a violation of the law may be asserted by a borrower as a defense against foreclosure, either as a bar to foreclosure or as a claim for recoupment or setoff. In addition, courts may invoke UDAP or UDAAP statutes or equitable remedies to prevent an originator or assignee from foreclosing on a loan that the court views as abusive or unfair.  Finally, as noted above, violations of TILA’s ability to repay, loan originator compensation, and anti-steering provisions may also be raised defensively to delay or prevent foreclosure.
  • State Licensing and Usury Laws: Certain state laws provide for the impairment of the mortgage loan if the originating lender was not properly licensed or the loan exceeded state usury limits.
  • Challenges to Ownership: Plaintiffs are increasingly raising concerns about investors’ or servicers’ authority to foreclose when the investor cannot produce original loan documents or otherwise verify ownership of the loan, although this risk is lessened when an investor acquires the loan directly from the original creditor.

The list above reflects the laws and legal theories that are most commonly used to impose liability on assignees and/or that we believe will be of increasing prominence going forward. There are other federal and state laws that might also expose assignees to liability, either expressly or by implication. There are also claims against an assignee based on the assignee’s own misconduct in connection with the origination of the loan. An example of a direct claim against an assignee related to loan origination would be a claim under fair lending laws that the underwriting criteria that the assignee established and provided to its correspondents violated fair lending laws. Of course, there are plenty of other risks that the assignee may need to manage, such as the risk of loss from fraud perpetrated against the assignee by borrowers or correspondents; the risk of correspondents’ non-compliance with the investor’s underwriting criteria; or the risk of liability from servicing violations.

Best Practices to Mitigate Correspondent Lending Risk

A financial institution should consider adopting the following best practices to mitigate against the legal, reputational, and credit risks presented by correspondent lending relationships, to the extent the institution has not done so already:

  • Ensure that its compliance management system reflects the legal and regulatory requirements relevant to correspondent lending activity and the risks presented by correspondent lending relationships, that the company has in place monitoring, testing, and audit processes commensurate with such risks, and that the company’s compliance training includes material relevant to the management of correspondent lending relationships and their associated risks.
  • Prepare written policies and procedures that explain comprehensively the steps the company takes to minimize the risk that it will be subjected to liability for violations by correspondents.
  • Conduct due diligence reviews to ensure that correspondents are properly licensed, particularly in those states in which the failure to be licensed could impair the enforceability of the loan.
  • Conduct company-level due diligence reviews of correspondents to assess whether the correspondent is willing and able to comply with applicable laws and avoid engaging in practices that might be considered predatory. This might involve reviewing the company’s policies and procedures, examination reports prepared by regulators (to the extent that such reports are not confidential), repurchase demands made against the correspondent, internal quality control reports, complaints received from consumers and regulators, and information about litigation in which the company is involved.
  • Interview correspondents regarding their policies and procedures designed to prevent predatory sales tactics and other predatory lending practices.
  • Question correspondents regarding the measures they use to oversee and monitor the brokers with whom they do business.
  • Perform loan-level reviews to ensure that loans (1) do not exceed HOEPA and state/local high cost loan law thresholds, (2) exceed state usury limits (particularly in states in which the failure to comply can impair the enforceability of the loan), (3) either are not covered by state or local anti-predatory lending laws or comply with the applicable restrictions under those laws, (4) comply with state usury restrictions, and (5) do not contain other illegal terms or predatory features.

Takeaway

With correspondent lending volume on the rise, now is a good time to review and possibly refresh your risk management approach to ensure it is commensurate with the risks presented by correspondent lending relationships.

FSOC Approves Analytic Framework for Financial Stability Risks and Guidance on Nonbank Financial Company Designations

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A&B Abstract:

On November 3, 2023 the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter “FSOC” or “Council”) unanimously approved final versions of: (1) the new Analytic Framework for Financial Stability Risk Identification, Assessment, and Response (“Analytic Framework”); and (2) the updated Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company Determinations (“Nonbank Designations Guidance”). The Analytic Framework was published today in the Federal Register and is effective immediately, and the Nonbank Designations Guidance will be effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

Given the recent bank failures, it should come as no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on financial risks to U.S. stability across various sectors, including nonbank mortgage lenders and servicers.

Background

Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act created FSOC, an interagency panel of top U.S. financial regulators, to monitor excessive risks to U.S. financial stability and facilitate intergovernmental cooperation to effectively address those risks. Chaired by the Treasury Secretary and consisting of 10 voting members (comprised of the U.S. prudential regulators including, among others, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)) and 5 nonvoting members, one of the Council’s statutory purposes is to specifically oversee large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies that pose potential risks to U.S. financial stability and, given the broad statutory mandate, the Council’s monitoring may cover an expansive range of asset classes, institutions, and activities, such as:

  • Markets for debt, loans, and other institutional and consumer financial products and services;
  • Central counterparties and payment, clearing, and settlement activities;
  • Financial entities, including banking organizations, broker-dealers, mortgage originators and services;
  • New or evolving financial products and practices; and
  • Developments affecting the resiliency of the financial system, such as cybersecurity and climate-related financial risks.

The Dodd-Frank Act empowers the Council to designate a nonbank financial company subject to certain prudential standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. The Dodd-Frank Act lists 10 factors that Council must consider before making such designation.  To date, the Council has used this authority sparingly.  According to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the Council’s updated Nonbank Designations Guidance will make it easier to use its nonbank designation authority, eliminating “several prerequisites to designation … that were not contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act and that are based on a flawed view of how financial risks develop and spread” that exist under the previous guidance issued in 2019.

As the country experienced a regional bank crisis earlier this year, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Council may use its authorities less sparingly than in the past. The Council’s annual reports specifically address the potential risks of nonbank companies, support the updated requirements issued by the Federal Housing Finance Authority, Ginnie Mae and the CSBS Model State Regulatory Prudential Standards for Nonbank Mortgage Servicers, and recommend that relevant federal and state regulators continue to enhance or establish information sharing in responding to distress at a mortgage servicer.  Indeed, in June 2022, FSOC restarted its Nonbank Mortgage Servicing Task Force, an interagency group to facilitate coordination and additional market monitoring of nonbank servicers.

The Finalized Analytic Framework

The finalized Analytic Framework, which is not a formal rule, broadly describes the approach FSOC expects to take in “identifying, assessing, and responding to certain potential risks to U.S. financial stability,” and interprets “financial stability” to mean the “financial system being resilient to events or conditions that could impair its ability to support economic activity, such as by intermediating financial transactions, facilitating payments, allocating resources, and managing risks.”  The Council’s statutory mandate includes the duty to monitor a wide class of assets, such as new or evolving financial products and practices, and nonbank financial companies, such as mortgage originators and servicers, at several key pressure points.

Following consideration of public comments on the proposed Analytic Framework, which we previously discussed, the finalized Analytic Framework reflects several key changes from the proposed Analytic Framework, which include:

  • A description of the term “threat to financial stability” that builds on the proposed interpretation, specifically, to mean events or conditions that could “substantially impair” the financial system’s ability to support economic activity;
  • Additional examples of the types of quantitative metrics FSOC will consider to assess vulnerabilities that contribute to risks to financial stability;
  • Clarification on the relationship between the vulnerabilities and the four transmission channels (discussed below) by highlighting vulnerabilities that may be particularly relevant to a channel; and
  • An emphasis on the importance of FSOC’s engagement with state and federal financial regulatory agencies as it assesses potential risks and the extent to which existing regulation may mitigate those risks.

Under the finalized Analytic Framework, a non-exhaustive list of potential risk factors and the indicators that FSOC intends to monitor includes:

  • Leverage, assessed by levels of debt and other off-balance sheet obligations that may create instability in the face of sudden liquidity restraints.
  • Liquidity Risks & Maturity Mismatches, measured by the ratios of short-term debt to unencumbered liquid assets and the amount of additional funding available to meet unexpected reductions in available short-term funds.
  • Interconnections, measured by the extent of exposure to certain derivatives, potential requirements to post margin or collateral, and overall health of the balance sheet.
  • Operational Risks, measured by the failure to implement proper controls related to financial market infrastructures and the vulnerability of cybersecurity incidents.
  • Complexity or Opacity, such as the extent to which transactions occur outside of regulated sectors, in a grey area of overlapping or indefinite jurisdiction, or are structured in such a way that cannot be readily observed due to complexity or lack of disclosure.
  • Inadequate Risk Management, such as the failure to maintain adequate controls and policies or the absence of existing regulatory oversight.
  • Concentration, measured by the market share for the provision of important services within segments of applicable financial markets and the risk associated with high concentration in a small number of firms.
  • Destabilizing Activities, such as trading practices that substantially increase volatility in a particular market, especially when a moral hazard is present.

Just as FSOC will consider all the factors listed above as sources of potential financial risk contagion, it will also assess the transmission of those risks to broader market sectors and other specific entities based on certain metrics. This non-exhaustive list of transmission risk factors includes:

  • Exposures: The level of direct and indirect exposure of creditors, investors, counterparties, and others to particular instruments or asset classes.
  • Asset liquidation: Rapid asset liquidation and the snowball effect of a widespread asset sell off across sectors.
  • Critical function or service: The potential consequences of interruption to critical functions or services that are relied upon by market participants for which there is no substitute.
  • Contagion: The potential for financial contagion arising from public perceptions of vulnerability and loss of confidence in widely held financial instruments.

Despite receiving comments recommending that the Analytic Framework specifically address climate-related risk, FSOC declined to do so, explaining that it believes potential risks related to climate change may be assessed under other factors such as through the “interconnections” vulnerability factor and the “exposures” transmission channel.  Similarly, FSOC declined to specifically discuss risks to the financial needs of underserved families and communities because it expects that such risks would be considered under the “critical function or service” transmission channel.

Once a financial risk has been identified, FSOC may use various tools to mitigate such risk depending on the circumstances.  For instance, FSOC may work with the relevant federal or state regulator to seek to address the risk. Where a regulator can sufficiently address such risk in a timely manner, FSOC will encourage regulators to do so.  Through formal channels, the Council can make a public recommendation to Congress or regulatory agencies to apply new standards or heightened scrutiny to a known risk within their jurisdiction. Where no clear-cut regulatory oversight exists, the Council may make legislative recommendations to Congress to address the risk. These formal recommendations to agencies or Congress, made pursuant to section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act, are also subject public notice and comment.

In addition to making nonbinding recommendations for action to the appropriate financial regulatory authorities, FSOC is empowered to make a “nonbank financial company determination,” by a two-thirds vote, that a specific company shall be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and subject to enhanced prudential standards. This designation can be made upon FSOC’s finding that:

  • Material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States; or
  • The nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability in the United States.

Nonbank Financial Company Designation Final Interpretative Guidance

The finalized Nonbank Designations Guidance is procedural in nature relating to nonbank financial company designation.  It defines a two-stage process FSOC will use to make a firm-specific “nonbank financial company determination” discussed in FSOC’s Analytic Framework. In the proposed interpretive guidance issued for public comment in April 2023, the Council recognized that in the past, it “has used this authority sparingly, but to mitigate the risks of future financial crises, the Council must be able to use each of its statutory authorities as appropriate to address potential threats to U.S. financial stability.”  The Nonbank Designations Guidance will change the 2019 guidance in the following three ways:

  • First, under the current guidance, FSOC is committed to relying on federal and state regulators to address problematic nonbank financial company activity before considering whether a designation is appropriate. The new guidance removes this prioritization and allows FSOC to consider an entity for a designation proactively, without first relying on regulators to act before FSOC begins deliberating.
  • Second, FSOC has finalized the Analytic Framework discussed above to revise its process for monitoring risks to U.S. financial stability. This comprehensive new framework replaces that found in Section III of the 2019 interpretive guidance. Because the new guidance is focused on the procedural process for making nonbank financial company designations, the substantive analytic factors applied by FSOC in its assessments will be contained in the separate Analytic Framework document.
  • Third, FSOC has reversed course and is eliminating its current practice of conducting a cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the likelihood of material financial distress prior to making its determination. FSOC has concluded that these processes are not required by Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. FSOC defines “material financial distress” as a nonbank financial company “being in imminent danger of insolvency or defaulting on its financial obligations.” In eliminating the “likelihood” assessment required by the 2019 guidance, the Council will now presuppose a company’s material financial distress and then evaluate what consequences could follow for U.S. financial stability.

With respect to the formal process for nonbank financial company determinations, the finalized Nonbank Designations Guidance describes a two-stage process that FSOC will use once they decide to review a company for a potential designation.

Stage One:  FSOC will conduct a preliminary analysis of a company that has been identified for review based on quantitative and qualitative information available publicly and regulatory sources. FSOC will notify the company no later than 60 days before a vote is held to evaluate the company for Stage Two.  A company under review may submit information for FSOC’s review and may request to meet with FSOC staff and members agencies responsible for the analysis.  When evaluating a company in Stage One, the Council’s Nonbank Designations Committee may decide whether to analyze the risk profile of the company as a whole or to consider the risk posed by its subsidiaries as separate entities, depending on which entity the Council believes poses a threat to financial stability. At Stage One, FSOC is statutorily obligated to collect information from any relevant, existing regulators that oversee the company’s activities concerning the specific risks the Council has identified.

Stage Two: Any nonbank financial company selected for additional review will receive notice that the company is being considered for supervision by the Federal Reserve and enhanced prudential standards. The Nonbank Designations Guidance says that “[t]he review will focus on whether material financial distress at the nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the company, could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.” At this point, if a company is under consideration for a Proposed Determination it will receive a formal Notice of Consideration from the Council.

The Council will begin its Stage Two review by consulting with the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) and relevant financial regulators to ascertain the risk profile of the company. This information would remain confidential throughout the process, and, once interagency coordination has produced all available information, the company will be invited to submit any relevant information to the Council. These submissions may include “details regarding the company’s financial activities, legal structure, liabilities, counterparty exposures, resolvability, and existing regulatory oversight. . . . Information relevant to the Council’s analysis may include confidential business information such as detailed information regarding financial assets, terms of funding arrangements, counterparty exposure or position data, strategic plans, and interaffiliate transactions.” Council staff from the FSOC Deputies Committee will be available to meet with representatives of the company and will disclose the specific focus of the Council’s analysis, although the areas of analytic focus may change based on the ongoing analysis.

Finally, if FSOC preliminarily designates the company for supervision by the Federal Reserve and subjects it to enhanced prudential standards, the company will be able to request a nonpublic hearing after which FSOC may vote to make a final designation. FSOC will conduct an annual review for any company designated by the Council to determine whether continued Federal Reserve supervision and enhanced prudential standards are still appropriate. This annual review period will afford the company the opportunity to meet with Council representatives and present information or make a written submission to the Council about its efforts to mitigate risk. If the Council decides to sustain the designation, it will present the company with a written explanation for its decision.

Takeaway

Given the 2023 regional banking crisis, it is no surprise that federal regulators are focusing on potential risks to financial stability.  In FSOC’s 2021 and 2022 annual reports, nonbank mortgage companies have been identified as a potential risk.  The Federal Housing Finance Agency and Ginnie Mae have both updated their minimum financial eligibility requirements for seller/servicers and issuers with such requirements taking effect with varying effective dates later in 2023 and 2024.  States also have started to adopt prudential regulatory standards for nonbank mortgage servicers.  By voting through the Analytic Framework and Nonbank Designations Guidance, the Council signals that it remains vigilant to weaknesses in the financial system and will utilize a variety of tools and approaches to strengthen its supervision over companies if existing protections do not adequately mitigate financial stability risks.  Indeed, CFPB Director and voting member of the Council, Rohit Chopra, has expressed strong support for the actions taken and points out that the Council currently has “a total of zero shadow banks” designated as systemically important and that could pose a threat to financial stability which, according to Director Chopra, will most likely change once the Council implements the new guidance and conducts evaluations to identify shadow banks that meet the statutory threshold for enhanced oversight.

HUD Seeks Comment on Proposed Notice to Change HECM for Purchase Program to Expand Funding Sources and Interested Party Contributions

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A&B Abstract:

On October 24, 2023, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) published, for public comment, a Federal Register Notice (“Proposed Notice”) to implement changes to the Federal housing Administration’s (“FHA”) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (“HECM”) for Purchase program. The Proposed Notice expands the list of acceptable funding sources and permits additional interested party contributions to satisfy the borrower’s monetary investment requirement. Under the Proposed Notice, the FHA would also remove existing restrictions that prohibit the borrower from accepting cash from a seller or another person or entity that financially benefits from the HECM for Purchase transaction. HUD is seeking comment from interested members of the public on the Proposed Notice. The period for public comment ends on November 24, 2023.

Background

The HECM for Purchase program allows mortgagees to originate HECM for Purchase transactions to purchase a 1-to-4 family dwelling unit, one unit of which will serve as the borrower’s principal residence. The program requires borrowers to contribute substantial liquid assets to meet the negotiated contract sales price for the property plus standard origination fees and charges.

In 2009, the FHA published Mortgage Letter 2009-11 (“ML 2009-11”) which prohibited certain funding sources for the investment:

  • sweat equity;
  • trade equity;
  • rent credit; and
  • cash or its equivalent, in whole or in part, received from the seller or any other person or entity that financially benefits from the HECM for Purchase transaction, or any third party or entity that is reimbursed, directly or indirectly, by the seller or any other person or entity that financially benefits from the HECM for Purchase transaction.

In addition, ML 2009-11 prohibited seller contributions (or “seller concessions”) in any HECM for Purchase transaction. “Seller concessions” are the use of “loan points, interest rate buy-downs, closing cost down payment assistance, builder incentives, gifts or personal property given by the seller, or any other party involved in the transaction.” These limits are meant to redirect expenses customarily paid by the seller or other interest parties to the borrower.

In 2017, the FHA codified the requirements for the HECM for Purchase program, and other program changes, and also codified three permitted funding sources for the borrower’s required money investment (the “Final Rule”):

  • Cash on hand;
  • Cash from the sale or liquidation of the borrower’s assets; and
  • HECM proceeds.

The Final Rule also changed the funding source restrictions to permit interested party contributions to pay for:

  • fees required to be paid by the seller under state or local law;
  • fees that are customarily paid by the seller in the locality of the subject property; and
  • purchase of the Home Warranty policy by the seller.

The Proposed Notice

The Proposed Notice would permit interested parties to contribute up to six percent of the sales price and expand the list of permitted interested party contributions.

Under the Proposed Notice, an “interested party contribution” would be defined to mean a payment by an interested party or combination of parties, toward the borrower’s origination fees, other closing costs including any items paid outside of closing, prepaid items, and discount points. “Interested Parties” refers to sellers, real estate agents, builders, developers, mortgagees, third-party originators, or other parties with an interest in the transaction.

Under the Proposed Notice, the six percent limit on interest party contributions may be applied towards but may not exceed the cost of:

  • origination fees;
  • other closing costs paid outside of closing (e.g., credit report and appraisal);
  • prepaid items;
  • discount points;
  • interested party payment for permanent and temporary interest rate buydowns; and
  • payment of the initial mortgage insurance premium.

Additionally, the Proposed Notice would also permit the following additional funding sources to satisfy the borrower’s monetary investment:

  • premium pricing;
  • gifts;
  • disaster relief grants; and
  • employer assistance.

This would be the first time that premium pricing is permitted for use in the HECM for Purchase program. Under the Proposed Notice, borrowers would be able to receive a credit from the mortgagee or third-party originator to reduce their closing costs in exchange for a certain initial mortgage interest rate.

Premium pricing credits from the mortgagee or third-party originator would be excluded from the six percent limit if the mortgagee or third-party originator is not the seller, real estate agent, builder, or developer. The interested party contributions for the various fees permitted under 24 C.F.R. § 206.44(c)(1) will also be excluded from the six percent interested party contribution limit. The FHA will also exclude the satisfaction of a Property Assessed Clean Energy (“PACE”) lien or obligation against the property by the property seller from the definition of an interested party contribution in the HECM for Purchase program.

Takeaway

The Proposed Notice is an effort by the FHA to more closely align the HECM for Purchase program with its forward mortgage programs. If implemented, the Proposed Notice would likely make it easier for borrowers to meet their monetary investment requirement by expanding the list of funding sources and permitting interested party contributions. Lenders participating in the HECM for Purchase program should review the Proposed Notice and consider submitting a comment.

Majority of States Now Permit Remote Work for MLOs and Mortgage Company Employees

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A&B Abstract:

On June 9, Illinois became the latest state in a growing trend to authorize remote work for mortgage loan originators and mortgage company employees. This makes five states joining the list of jurisdictions legislatively permitting MLOs to work remotely since Montana enacted similar legislation in March, with more states expected during the 2024 legislative sessions.

The Illinois amendments to The Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987, signed by Governor Pritzker on June 30, 2023, take effect on January 1, 2024 and specifies requirements that licensed MLOs must follow to allow employees to work from remote locations. These changes include:

  • Requiring the licensee to have written policies and procedures for supervising mortgage loan originators working from a remote location;
  • Restricting access to company platforms and customer information in accordance with the licensee’s comprehensive written information security plan;
  • Prohibiting in-person customer interactions at a mortgage originator’s residence unless the residence is a licensed location;
  • Prohibiting maintaining physical records at a remote location;
  • Requiring customer interactions and conversations about consumers to be in compliance with state and federal information security requirements.
  • Mandating mortgage loan originators working from a remote location to use a secure connection, either through a virtual private network (VPN) or other comparable system, to access the company’s system;
  • Ensuring the licensee maintains appropriate security updates, patches, or other alterations to devices used for remote work;
  • Requiring the licensee to be able to remotely lock, erase, or otherwise remotely limit access to company-related contents on any device; and
  • Designating the loan originator’s local licensed office as their principal place of business on the NMLS.

Nevada, Virginia, and Florida passed legislation resembling the Illinois law, mandating similar security, compliance, and surveillance requirements.

Temporary Guidance Ending

Remote work flexibility is now the majority stance for the industry. The four states mentioned above are the most recent since Montana passed similar legislation in March. Of the 53 U.S. jurisdictions tracked by the Mortgage Bankers Association (including Washington, D.C., Guam, and Puerto Rico), 30 have implemented permanent statutes or regulations allowing remote work, with 9 more jurisdictions still operating under temporary guidance permitting remote work.

Of the states still operating under temporary guidance, Oklahoma’s guidance expires December 31, 2023. The state government will need to take further action, whether legislative or regulatory, to continue to allow MLOs to work remotely. Louisiana issued temporary guidance in July 2020, which would stay active, “as long as there is a public health emergency relating to COVID-19, as declared by Governor Edwards of the State of Louisiana, or until rescinded or replaced.” Governor Edwards ended the emergency in March 2022 when he did not renew the expiring order. Remote work in Louisiana is now operating in a grey zone with regards to whether the temporary order is still in effect due to the, “until rescinded” language.

Different Methods, Similar Results

Although remote work is the new norm, states are taking different routes to allow MLOs to work remotely. Many statehouses passed legislative statutes, which allow for stable policies but can be difficult to revise through the legislative process. These statutes tend to follow similar structures and have similar requirements. Illinois, Virginia, Florida, and Nevada require MLOs to work from home so long as certain records are not maintained in remote locations, professionals do not meet with customers outside of licensed facilities, employees are properly supervised as required by the license, and the company maintains adequate cybersecurity measures to protect customer data.

Nebraska’s state legislature did not pass specific guidance regarding remote work for MLOs, but rather, passed authorization to allow the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance to promulgate regulations allowing remote work for MLOs. The Department has not yet issued permanent guidance for local MLOs regarding remote work requirements. Although using the regulatory system to implement rules may take longer to implement, it is also more flexible to changing circumstances and generally permits regulators to revise guidance faster than it takes a state legislature to convene, draft, and pass appropriate amendments to existing legislation.

Takeaway

The post-COVID workforce is clinging onto the last bit of convenience that the pandemic forced upon us. Surveys show that remote work flexibility is now the primary perk that would drive people to different employers. Since the technology needed to safely conduct business remotely is now proven, states are realizing that the easiest way to retain qualified mortgage professionals is to allow remote work flexibility. The American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) expressed concern over a lack of remote work options in 2022 before states started passing permanent legislation. State legislatures embraced AARMR’s concern that a lack of remote work options could cause professionals to leave the industry, further widening the access gap for already underserved communities. The remote work trend has touched other industries that were previously in-person only and is likely to grow in those other industries (e.g., remote notarization) as far as practically feasible.

* We would like to thank Associate, CJ Blaney, for their contributions to this blog post.

Affirmative Action in Lending: The Implications of the Harvard Decision on Financial Institutions

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Early this summer, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellow of Harvard College effectively ended race-conscious admission programs at colleges and universities across the country. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that decisions made “on the basis of race” do nothing more than further “stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.”

In particular, the Supreme Court reasoned that “when a university admits students ‘on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particular race, because of their race, think alike.’” Such stereotyping purportedly only causes “continued hurt and injury,” contrary as it is to the “core purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reminded us that “ameliorating societal discrimination does not constitute a compelling interest that justifies race-based state action.”

In the context of lending, federal regulatory agencies expect and encourage financial institutions to explicitly consider race in their lending activities. While the Community Reinvestment Act has required banks to affirmatively consider the needs of low-to-moderate-income neighborhoods, regulatory enforcement actions over the last few years have required both bank and nonbank mortgage lenders to explicitly consider an applicant’s protected characteristics such as race and ethnicity—conduct plainly prohibited by fair lending laws.

Could the impact of the Supreme Court holding extend beyond education to lending and housing? Will the Harvard decision serve to undercut federal regulators’ legal theories for demonstrating redlining and present a challenge for special purpose credit programs that explicitly consider race or other protected characteristics?

Fair Lending Laws Prohibit Consideration of Race

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits a creditor from discriminating against any applicant, in any aspect of a credit transaction, on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract). Similarly, the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against any person in making available a residential real-estate-related transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

In March 2022, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) went as far as to update its Examination Manual to provide that unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices (UDAAPs) “include discrimination” and signaled that the CFPB will examine whether companies are adequately “testing for” discrimination in their advertising, pricing, and other activities. When challenged by various trade organizations, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that the CFPB’s update exceeded the agency’s authority under the Dodd–Frank Act. This decision is limited, however, and enjoins the CFPB from pursuing its theory against those financial institutions that are members of the trade association plaintiffs. It is also unclear if the verdict will be appealed by the CFPB.

Despite federal prohibitions, regulators such as the CFPB and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) expect, and at times even require, lenders to affirmatively target their marketing and lending efforts to certain borrowers and communities based on race and/or ethnicity.

Race-Based Decisions Are Encouraged and Even Required by Regulators

CFPB examiners often ask lenders to describe their affirmative, specialized efforts to target their lending to minority communities. If there have been no such explicit efforts by the institution, the CFPB penalizes these lenders for not explicitly considering race in their marketing and lending decisions. For example, in the CFPB’s redlining complaint against Townstone Financial, the CFPB alleged that “Townstone made no effort to market directly to African-Americans during the relevant period,” and that “Townstone has not specifically targeted any marketing toward African-Americans.”

What’s more, if enforcement culminates in a consent order, the CFPB and DOJ effectively impose race- based action by requiring lenders to fund loan subsidies or discounts that will be offered exclusively to consumers based on the predominant race or ethnicity of their neighborhood. In the CFPB/DOJ settlement with nonbank Trident Mortgage, the lender was required to set aside over $18 million toward offering residents of majority-minority neighborhoods “home mortgage loans on a more affordable basis than otherwise available.”

And in the more recent DOJ settlement with Washington Trust, the consent order required the lender to subsidize only those mortgage loans made to “qualified applicants,” defined in the settlement as consumers who either reside, or apply for a mortgage for a residential property located, in a majority-Black and Hispanic census tract. Such subsidies are a common feature of recent redlining settlements, which have been occurring with increased frequency since the DOJ announced its Combating Redlining Initiative in October 2021.

Not only do the CFPB and DOJ encourage, and in certain cases, even require, race-based lending in potential contravention of fair lending laws, but federal regulators also expect some degree of race-based hiring by lenders. This expectation is based on the stereotypical assumption that lenders need racial and ethnic minorities in their consumer-facing workforce to attract racial and ethnic minority loan applicants. In the Townstone complaint, for example, the CFPB chastised the lender for failing to “employ an African-American loan officer during the relevant period, even though it was aware that hiring a loan officer from a particular racial or ethnic group could increase the number of applications from members of that racial or ethnic group.”

Ultimately, all the recent redlining consent orders announced by the CFPB and DOJ impose at least some race-based requirement, which would seem to run afoul of fair lending laws and Supreme Court precedent.

Racial Quota-Based Metrics Used by Regulators

Further, when assessing whether a lender may have engaged in redlining against a particular racial or ethnic group, the CFPB and DOJ, as a matter of course, employ quota-based metrics to evaluate the “rates” or “percentages” of a lender’s activity in majority-minority geographic areas, specifically majority-minority census tracts (MMCTs). Then the regulators compare such rates or percentages of the lender’s loan applications or originations in MMCTs to those of other lenders. For example, in its complaint against Lakeland Bank, the DOJ focused on the alleged “disparity between the rate of applications generated by Lakeland and the rate generated by its peer lenders from majority-Black and Hispanic areas.” The agency criticized the bank’s “shortfalls in applications from individuals identifying as Black or Hispanic compared to the local demographics and aggregate HMDA averages.”

Undoubtedly, this approach utilizes nothing more than a quota-based metric, which the Supreme Court in Harvard squarely rejected. Indeed, the Supreme Court reasoned that race-based programs amount to little more than determining how “the breakdown of the [incoming] class compares to the prior year in terms of racial identities,” or comparing the racial makeup of the incoming class to the general population, to see whether some proportional goal or benchmark has been reached.

While the goal of meaningful representation and diversity is commendable, the Supreme Court emphasized that “outright racial balancing and quota systems remain patently unconstitutional.” And such a focus on racial quotas means that lenders could attempt to minimize or even eliminate their fair lending risk simply by decreasing their lending in majority-non-Hispanic-White neighborhoods—without ever increasing their loan applications or originations in majority-minority neighborhoods. Of course, this frustrates the essential purpose of ECOA and other fair lending laws.

Potential Constitutional Scrutiny of Race-Based Lending Efforts

If race-based state action, including the use of racial quotas, violates the Equal Protection Clause, it is possible that the race-based lending measures recently encouraged and even required by federal regulators may be constitutionally problematic. In addition to racially targeted loan subsidies and racially motivated loan officer hiring, regulators continue to encourage lenders to implement special purpose credit programs (SPCPs) to meet the credit needs of specific racial or ethnic groups. As the CFPB noted in its advisory opinion, “[b]y permitting the consideration of a prohibited basis such as race, national origin, or sex in connection with a special purpose credit program, Congress protected a broad array of programs ‘specifically designed to prefer members of economically disadvantaged classes’ and ‘to increase access to the credit market by persons previously foreclosed from it.’”

While SPCPs are explicitly permitted by the language of ECOA and its implementing regulation, Regulation B, as an exception to the statute’s mandate against considering a credit applicant’s protected characteristics, it is uncertain whether these provisions, if challenged, would survive constitutional scrutiny by the current Supreme Court.

Takeaways for Lenders

For the time being, lenders that offer SPCPs based on a protected characteristic should ensure that their written plans continue to meet the requirements of Section 1002.8(a)(3). As always, the justifications for lending decisions that could disproportionately affect consumers based on their race, ethnicity, or other protected characteristic should be well documented and justified by legitimate business needs. And if faced with a fair lending investigation or potential enforcement action, lenders should consider presenting to regulators any alternate data findings or conclusions that demonstrate the institution’s record of lending in MMCTs rather than focusing on the rates or percentages of other lenders in the geographic area.