Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Loans

Georgia Amends its Residential Mortgage and Installment Loan Laws

A&B Abstract:

On May 2, 2022, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed HB 891 and SB 470 into law.  HB 891, effective July 1, 2022, updates various laws enforced by the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance (the “Department”) including, among other things, by amending (1) certain exemptions from licensure under the Georgia Residential Mortgage Act (“GRMA”), and (2) the Georgia Installment Loan Act (“GILA”) to impose a new licensing obligation to service installment loans subject to the GILA.   Similarly, SB 470, which took effect immediately, amends the GRMA’s provisions regarding felony restrictions for employees of mortgage licensees.

Changes to Licensing of Mortgage Lenders and Brokers

HB 891 made several changes to Title 7 of the Georgia Code, including several amendments to the GRMA, but perhaps one of the most notable changes with respect to mortgage lending involves the creation of a new exemption from licensure under the GRMA for persons holding loans for securitization into a secondary market.  Specifically, as of July 1, 2022, any person who purchases or holds closed mortgage loans for the sole purpose of securitization into a secondary market, is expressly exempt from licensing, provided that such person holds the individual loans for less than seven days. Note that the statute further defines “person” as any individual, sole proprietorship, corporation, LLC, partnership, trust, or any other group, however organized. As written, the new exemption language suggests that persons holding loans as part of the securitization process for longer than 7 days could not rely on the exemption. Note that the GRMA’s existing definition of a “mortgage lender” includes a “person who directly or indirectly…holds, or purchases mortgage loans” and the GRMA contains an existing exemption for any person who purchases mortgage loans from a mortgage broker or mortgage lender solely as an investment and who is not in the business of brokering, making, purchasing, or servicing mortgage loans.

HB 891 also amended an existing exemption from licensure applicable to certain natural persons under an exclusive written independent contract agreement with a mortgage broker who is, or is affiliated with, an insurance company or broker dealer. Under the exemption, as amended, a natural person otherwise required to be licensed is exempt from licensure as a mortgage lender or broker, when under an exclusive written independent contractor agreement with a licensed mortgage broker, so long as the mortgage broker satisfies certain expanded criteria, including, among others  (1) maintaining an active mortgage broker license, (2) maintaining full and direct financial responsibility for the mortgage activities of the natural person, (3) maintaining full and direct responsibility for the natural persons education, handling of consumer complaints, and supervision of the natural person’s mortgage activities, (4) having listed securities for trade and meeting certain market capitalization requirements, (5) being licensed as an insurance company or registered as a broker-dealer, and (6) being licensed as a mortgage lender or broker in ten or more states. The exemption previously applied to certain natural persons employed by the subsidiary of certain financial holding companies. Notably, to maintain the exemption, the natural person must, among other things (1) be licensed as a mortgage loan originator in Georgia and work exclusively for the licensee, the parent company if the licensee is a wholly owned subsidiary, or an affiliate of the licensee if both the affiliate and licensee are wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent company, and (2) be licensed as an insurance agent or registered as a broker-dealer agent on behalf of the licensee, the parent company if the licensee is a wholly owned subsidiary, or an affiliate of the licensee if both the affiliate and licensee are wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent company.

HB 891’s amendments to the GRMA’s licensing provisions follow SB 470, which provided welcome changes to the GRMA’s felony restrictions. As amended, Georgia law now provides that the Department may not issue or may revoke a license or registration if it finds that the mortgage loan originator, broker, or lender, or any person who is a director, officer, partner, covered employee or ultimate equitable owner of 10% or more of the mortgage broker or lender or any individual who directs the affairs or establishes policy for the mortgage broker or lender applicant, registrant, or licensee, has been convicted of a felony in any jurisdiction or of a crime which, if committed in Georgia, would constitute a felony under Georgia law.  Previously, Georgia law arguably prohibited a licensee from retaining any individual convicted of a felony that could be deemed an employee or agent of the licensee. As amended, the employee restriction is relaxed to apply only to a “covered employee,” a newly defined term that means an employee of a mortgage lender or broker “involved in residential mortgage loan related activities for property located in Georgia and includes, but is not limited to, a mortgage loan originator, processor, or underwriter, or other employee who has access to residential mortgage loan origination, processing, or underwriting information.” Notably, the restriction no longer applies to an “agent” of a licensee.

Changes to Installment Loan Licensing

HB 891 also amended the GILA to require licensure for persons engaged in servicing of installment loans.  Before the amendments, the GILA only imposed a licensing obligation on persons who advertise, solicit, offer, or make installment loans to individuals in amounts of $3,000 or less.  As amended, any person that services installment loans made by others, excluding loans made by affiliated entities, is also required to obtain a license. HB 891’s amendments also added a number of new exemptions from licensure, including for (1) retail installment transactions engaged in by retail installment sellers and retail sellers, as those terms are defined, and (2) transactions in which a lender offers a consumer a line of credit of more than $3,000 but the consumer utilizes $3,000 or less of the line, so long as there are no restrictions that would limit the consumer’s ability to utilize more than $3,000 of the line at any one time. Additionally, the GILA’s provisions relating to tax on interest has been repealed and reenacted and now requires that installment lenders remit to the Department a fee of 0.125 percent of the gross loan amount on each loan made on or after July 1, 2022, and such fee becomes due on the making of any loan subject to the GILA. This revised fee replaces the prior fee of three (3) percent of the total amount of interest on any loan collected. The statute clarifies that the per loan fee must be paid by the licensee and cannot be passed through to the borrower as an additional itemized fee or charge. The method by which a licensee pays the fee is subject to further clarification via Department regulations.

Takeaway

Mortgage lenders and brokers should review the GRMA, as amended, to determine whether, and if so how, the amendments impact their licensing obligations or their policies with respect to employee background checks in Georgia. Additionally, entities servicing installment loans subject to the GILA, which are originated by non-affiliates, must now obtain a license. Licensees should also take note of the new per loan fee requirements in lieu of prior tax payment regulations.

Eleventh Circuit Finds Monthly Mortgage Statement Containing Boilerplate “This Is An Attempt To Collect A Debt” Language Constitutes A Communication “In Connection With The Collection of A Debt” Under The FDCPA

A&B Abstract:

In Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 14013 (11th Cir. May 24, 2022) a panel of the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question “whether a required monthly mortgage statement that generally complies with the TILA and its regulations can plausibly be a communication ‘in connection with the collection of a debt’ under the FDCPA…if it contains additional debt-collection language.”  Relying almost exclusively on the single sentence in the monthly mortgage statement that read “[t]his is an attempt to collect a debt,” the panel in a 2-1 decision said “yes” and reversed the granting of a motion to dismiss in favor of the mortgage servicer.  While the majority explained that the decision was not contrary to those from other circuit courts and within its own circuit, the dissent pointed out how this decision was arguably inconsistent with such precedent.  Going forward, mortgage servicers face a risk (at least in the Eleventh Circuit) that monthly mortgage statements that otherwise comply with TILA and its regulations could subject the servicer to liability under FDCPA if the statement contains errors and includes language that “this is an attempt to collect a debt.”

Discussion:

In Daniels, the borrower sued the mortgage servicer under the FDCPA and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act alleging that several monthly mortgage statements contained errors.  In particular, the borrower alleged that the statements contained errors in the deferred principal balance, outstanding principal balance and the amount of the interest-only payment that was due.  The statements were consistent with the requirements of TILA and its regulations.  The statements, however, also included the following language – “This is an attempt to collect a debt.  All information obtained will be used for that purpose.”  The district court granted the servicer’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds that the mortgage statements were not communications in connection with the collection of a debt under the FDCPA.

In reversing that decision on appeal, the majority first noted that communications can have “dual purposes” – providing a consumer with information and demanding payment of a debt.  The majority then discussed two prior decisions involving letters from law firms, Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) and Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2014), where the court concluded that the letters were related debt collection for purposes of the FDCPA.

After reviewing the monthly mortgage statements in Daniels, the majority concluded that “viewed holistically, a communication that expressly states that it is ‘an attempt to collect a debt,’ that asks for payment of a certain amount by a certain date, and that provides for a late fee if the payment is not made on time is plausibly ‘related to debt collection.’”  In several places in the opinion, the majority reiterated that the servicer included the “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language that was not required by TILA or its regulations.  It is clear from the opinion that the inclusion of such language was the critical factor in the decision.  The majority noted that, while some portions of the monthly mortgage statements may have been for informational purposes, the communication can have “dual purposes.”  As such, the mere fact that the monthly mortgage statements were otherwise consistent with TILA and its regulations was not dispositive.

The majority recognized that two prior unpublished district court cases from the Southern District of Florida held that the inclusion of “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language did not convert a monthly mortgage statement into a communication in connection with the collection of a debt under the FDCPA.  See Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75886 (S.D. Fla. 2018) and Zavala v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201259 (S.D. Fla. 2018).  The majority, however, “respectfully disagree[d]” with the decision in both cases.

Notably, in a prior unpublished decision, Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 766 Fed. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2019), a prior panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that a servicer’s monthly mortgage statement did not “rise to the level of being unlawful debt collection language” when the statement did not contain any language “beyond what is required by TILA.”  The majority in Daniels distinguished Green by noting that it was unpublished and, most importantly, did not contain the “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language.  (Furthermore, the majority noted that Green reached the merits and held that the statement did not constitute an “unlawful” debt collection language, whereas the decision in Daniels merely held that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged an FDCPA violation.).

The dissent in Daniels took issue with the majority’s reliance on the “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language contained in a monthly mortgage statement that otherwise complied with the TILA and its regulations.  The dissent noted that this language “appears once on each statement, is not physically separated from other information in the statement, is not capitalized or otherwise emphasized and is printed using the same font and font size as the rest of the information contained in the statement.”

The dissent discussed Green and other prior decisions (including the district court decisions in Jones and Zavala) and concluded that the mere inclusion of the “collect a debt” language was not enough to render an otherwise TILA-compliant monthly mortgage statement a communication “in connection with the collection of a debt” for purposes of the FDCPA.  “[T]he majority’s conclusion that, by including this extra language – which is not required but is neither inconsistent with nor materially additive to TILA’s requirements – the periodic mortgage statements have become communications subject to the FDCPA is far too broad.”

The dissent in Daniels then discussed decisions from other circuits, including the Seventh Circuit and Eighth Circuit.  The dissent cited Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010), in which the court held that a communication stating that it was an attempt to collect a debt “does not automatically trigger the protections of the FDCPA, just as the absence of such language does not have dispositive significance.”  The dissent also discussed Heinz v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, 3 F.4th 1107 (8th Cir. 2021).  In Heinz, the court addressed “so-called Mini-Miranda statements” where the communication notes that it is from a debt collector and for the purpose of collecting a debt.  Relying on Gburek, the court in Heinz held that such “boilerplate Mini-Miranda statements” do not trigger the protections of the FDCPA.

Therefore, according to the dissent in Daniels and consistent with these decisions in other circuits, the mortgage servicer’s inclusion of “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language in the monthly mortgage statement should not trigger the protections of the FDCPA.  Instead, the dissent would require “stronger demands for full or partial payment and threats of consequences for failure to do so” before a monthly mortgage statement would give rise to a claim under the FDCPA.

On June 14, 2022, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc asking the panel for a rehearing of the case.  In the petition, the servicer recognized that “the majority holds that inclusion of the statement, ‘this is an attempt to collect a debt,’ transforms federal-required mortgage statements into debt-collection communications under the FDCPA.”  The servicer argued that the decision conflicts with prior case law inside and outside of the Eleventh Circuit, and “the well-reasoned dissent” was correct to conclude that such language should not render TILA-compliant monthly mortgage statements subject to the FDCPA.

Takeaway:

A mortgage servicer should strongly consider removing from its monthly mortgage statements any language that reads “this is an attempt to collect a debt.”  The relevant language is not required by the TILA or the CFPB.  At least in the Eleventh Circuit now after Daniels, the inclusion of such language will give borrowers pursuing FDCPA claims a much better chance to survive a motion to dismiss and move the case into the expensive discovery phase.

It should be noted that the majority decision in Daniels included an important qualification in a footnote – “We do not hold that the statements are, as a matter of law, communications in connection with the collection of a debt.  Our ruling is that [the borrower] has plausibly alleged that they are.”  Therefore, the mere inclusion of the “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language does not mean, even in the Eleventh Circuit, that a mortgage servicer’s monthly mortgage statements are necessarily subject to the FDCPA as a matter of law.  That said, as a practical matter, it will be difficult for a mortgage servicer to convince a district court that has already denied a motion to dismiss to change its mind at the summary judgment stage and conclude that the inclusion of such language does not render the mortgage statement a communication in connection with the collection of a debt.

Of course, even if the mortgage statement is a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, the borrower must still establish that the statement otherwise was and violated the substantive provisions of the FDCPA.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e and 1692f.  Daniels, however, is likely to help borrowers clear the threshold hurdle at the motion to dismiss stage.

New York Amends Contact Requirements for Certain Delinquent Borrowers

A&B ABstract: On February 24, Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law Assembly Bill 8771 (2022 N.Y. Laws 48), amending single point of contact requirements for certain delinquent borrowers.  What changes does the measure require for servicer protocols?

New York SPOC Requirements: As created effective January 2, 2022, Section 6-o of the New York Banking Law required a lender to provide a single point of contact (“SPOC”) to a borrower who: (a) is 60 or more days delinquent on a “home loan”; and (b) chooses to pursue a loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.  The obligation arose in response to a written or electronic request from the borrower, and required the lender (or a servicer acting on the lender’s behalf) to provide the SPOC within 10 business days of such request.

As amended by AB 8771 retroactive effect to its creation, the section: (a) applies the SPOC obligation to any borrower who is 30 or more days delinquent; and (b) no longer conditions the obligation on an affirmative request from the borrower.  The amended section also authorizes the Superintendent of Financial Services to establish rules and regulations relating to the SPOC requirement.

Impact of the Amendment: The amendment brings Section 6-o of the Banking Law closer to the language of New York’s Mortgage Loan Servicer Business Conduct Regulations (“Part 419” of the Superintendent of Financial Services Regulations).  Since its adoption in final form in December 2019, Rule 419.7 has required a servicer to “assign a single point of contact to any borrower who is at least 30 days delinquent or has requested a loss mitigation application (or earlier at a servicer’s option).”  (Emphasis added.)  As we have discussed, both requirements are in contrast to the CFPB’s Mortgage Servicing Rules, which requires assignment of a SPOC to borrowers who are 45 days delinquent.  However, there are a few notable distinctions.

First, Section 6-o does not define a “single point of contact,” leaving open whether only one individual may serve that role with respect to any particular borrower.  Part 419 provides the SPOC may be either “an individual or designated group of servicer personnel each of whom has the ability and authority to perform the responsibilities” of the SPOC as set forth in Rule 419.7(b).  Part 419 further clarifies, however, that if a servicer designates a group of personnel to fulfill the SPOC responsibilities, “the servicer shall ensure that each member of the group is knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation and current status in the loss mitigation process, including the content and outcome of any communication with the borrower.”

Second, Part 419 specifies the obligations of a servicer and a designated SPOC for a delinquent borrower.  Specifically, Part 419:

  • requires the SPOC to “attempt to initiate contact with the borrower promptly following the assignment of the single point of contact to the borrower;”
  • specifies the responsibilities of the SPOC with respect to the borrower’s participation in loan modification or loss mitigation activities;
  • requires coordination with other servicer personnel (in particular, to ensure that foreclosure proceedings are halted when required by Part 419); and
  • requires the SPOC to remain assigned and available to the borrower until either the borrower’s account becomes current or the servicer determines that the borrower has exhausted all loss mitigation options available from or through the servicer.

Section 6-o, by contrast, does not include such specifications.  However, by granting the Superintendent rulemaking authority, the amended section leaves open the possibility that such requirements may be established by rule.

Finally, the requirement under Rule 419.7 provides broad coverage, extending to any mortgage loan serviced by a servicer within the scope of Part 419 (i.e., all first- and subordinate-lien forward and reverse mortgage loans) where the borrower (a) is 30 days or more delinquent, or (b) has requested a loss mitigation application.  By contrast, the requirement under Section 6-o applies to a narrower subset of residential mortgage loans.  The obligation extends only to a “home loan,” defined under Section 6-l of the Banking law to be limited to forward mortgages secured by one- to four-family residential property that, at origination, do not exceed the Fannie Mae conforming loan limit (among other conditions).  Further, the obligation under Section 6-o requires both that the borrower meet the delinquency threshold (30 or more days) and have chosen to pursue a loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.

Takeaways:  Given the distinctions between the obligations to which a lender is subject under Section 6-o (and which it may delegate to a servicer), and those to which a servicer is subject under Part 419, we recommend careful review and coordination of loss mitigation procedures to ensure the proper fulfillment of SPOC obligations for delinquent borrowers in New York.  Further given the retroactive effective date of the measure, the need for such review is urgent.

Modern-Day Redlining Enforcement: A New Baseline

On October 22, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced an aggressive new initiative, in collaboration with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country, to combat the practice of redlining. Three days prior, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was said to be hiring up to 30 new enforcement attorneys to focus on redlining and other fair lending enforcement. While these developments are not surprising for an Administration that has emphasized the importance of promoting racial equity, particularly in homeownership, this swift and purposeful action by federal regulators signals that these agencies mean business. Indeed, as evidence of this new priority, federal regulatory agencies have issued two multimilliondollar redlining settlements against financial institutions just in the past two months.

Since the early 1990s, federal regulatory agencies have recognized redlining as a type of illegal “disparate treatment” (i.e., intentional) discrimination that violates federal fair lending laws such as the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). For example, in 2009, the agencies defined the term “redlining” as a form of disparate treatment discrimination where a lender provides unequal access to credit, or unequal terms of credit, because of the race, color, national origin, or other protected characteristic of the residents of the area where the credit seeker resides or will reside or where the residential property to be mortgaged is located. As recently as 2019, the DOJ continued to use the term “redlining” to refer to a practice whereby “lenders intentionally avoid providing services to individuals living in predominantly minority neighborhoods because of the race of the residents in those neighborhoods.”

To that end, the earliest redlining enforcement actions were brought against banks whose alleged intent to discriminate could be the only explanation for the bank’s geographic distribution of loans around, but not in, minority communities. As proof of a bank’s intent to discriminate, the DOJ produced brightly colored maps to support its position that a bank had unnaturally drawn its service area boundaries to circumvent minority neighborhoods from its mortgage lending and then painstakingly adhered to this “red line” to avoid serving these neighborhoods. In Atlanta, one bank allegedly drew a red line down the railroad tracks that divided the city’s white and black neighborhoods, while in the District of Columbia, another bank allegedly drew its own line down the 16th Street corridor. Years later, in Detroit and Minneapolis-St. Paul, still other banks were alleged to have served a virtual “horseshoe” encompassing white neighborhoods while carving out minority neighborhoods. And again, in Indianapolis, a bank allegedly drew an “Indy Donut” that encircled and excluded the minority areas in the center of the city. In these cases, given that the banks were required by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to define the areas they intended to serve, the DOJ pointed to the banks’ use of different, and in some cases, oddly shaped, service area boundaries (as opposed to existing legal borders or contiguous political subdivisions) as evidence of intent to discriminate.

Today, the majority of mortgage loans in the United States are made by nonbank mortgage lenders that, while not subject to the CRA’s requirements, remain bound by the antidiscrimination provisions of the Fair Housing Act and ECOA. In lieu of maps and service area boundaries, federal regulators now look to the loan application and origination data reported by the lender under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) as the starting point for a redlining investigation. If the HMDA data suggests that a mortgage lender’s generation of mortgage loan applications or originations in majority-minority census tracts might not be as strong as that of its “peers” (e.g., similarly sized competitors), a federal regulator may initiate an investigation to determine whether the lender has violated fair lending laws. Of course, because data about “racial imbalance” has been deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court to be insufficient for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, a federal regulator must supplement the data with evidence that the lender’s arguably weaker performance in minority neighborhoods may have resulted from an intent to discriminate by excluding or otherwise treating those areas differently.

Recently, however, the evidence cited by federal regulators to establish redlining has evolved and expanded significantly. Specifically, regulators appear to be relying on a “discouragement” theory of redlining that looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have been discouraged from applying for a loan product or service – perhaps regardless of whether the lender intended to discriminate. It is worth noting that this theory derives from ECOA’s implementing regulation, Regulation B, which extends the statute’s protections to “potential” applicants, and is not found in the language of ECOA itself.[1] While a lender is prohibited by Regulation B from making discouraging oral or written statements to an applicant on the basis of race or other protected characteristic, long-standing federal agency guidance indicates that a finding of discouragement necessarily requires some evidence of differential treatment on a prohibited basis. Traditional examples of discouragement have included the use of phrases such as “no children” or “no wheelchairs” or “Hispanic residence,” or a statement that an applicant “should not bother to apply.” In contrast, recent redlining enforcement suggests that federal regulators may be interested in the multitude of factors that could have contributed to a lender’s observed failure to reach minority neighborhoods, which, when taken together, may prove the lender’s intent to discriminate.

For example, federal regulators appear to be scrutinizing a lender’s marketing efforts and strategies to determine whether the lender has sufficiently prioritized minority areas. Prior to 2020, redlining cases highlighted the lender’s alleged failure to market in minority areas by intentionally treating these areas differently, either by allegedly excluding such areas from any marketing campaigns or using different marketing materials, such as solicitations or offers, for white versus minority areas.[2] The most recent redlining cases, however, suggest that lenders’ marketing strategies might need to go beyond treating white and minority neighborhoods consistently. Specifically, in its summer 2021 Supervisory Highlights, the CFPB called out a lender that had engaged in redlining by marketing via “direct mail marketing campaigns that featured models, all of whom appeared to be non-Hispanic white” and using only “headshots of its mortgage professionals in its open house marketing materials … who appeared to be non-Hispanic white.” Notably, the CFPB did not indicate that the lender had marketed to, and conducted open houses in, white neighborhoods while excluding minority neighborhoods, nor that the lender had used different marketing materials for white versus minority neighborhoods. Rather, the CFPB’s claim effectively acknowledges that residents of minority neighborhoods would have received the same marketing materials as any other neighborhood. Yet the CFPB’s position appears to be that the use of white models and white employees in these otherwise neutral marketing materials would have discouraged a prospective applicant in a minority area, regardless of whether the lender intended to discourage anyone or not.

Indeed, recent redlining enforcement suggests that not only will regulators allege it insufficient to treat all applicants and neighborhoods the same, but a lender must undertake affirmative action to specifically target minority neighborhoods. This approach attempts to impose unprecedented, CRA-like obligations on nonbank mortgage lenders to proactively meet the needs of specific neighborhoods or communities and ensure a strong HMDA data showing – or else be subject to redlining enforcement. For example, the July 2020 complaint filed by the CFPB against Townstone Financial Inc. claimed that the lender had “not specifically targeted any marketing toward African-Americans.” Along the same vein, the August 2021 settlement between the DOJ, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and a bank in the Southeast resolved allegations that the lender had failed to “direct” or “train” its loan officers “to increase their sources of referrals from majority-Black and Hispanic neighborhoods.” Of course, lenders understand that “specifically targeting” prospective customers or neighborhoods on the basis of race or other protected characteristic is not required by, and may present its own risk under, fair lending laws. Indeed, the CFPB has suggested that the industry might benefit from “clarity” of how to use “affirmative advertising” in a compliant manner. Similarly, the CFPB’s allegation that Townstone had “not employ[ed] an African-American loan officer during the relevant period, even though it was aware that hiring a loan officer from a particular racial or ethnic group could increase the number of applications from members of that racial or ethnic group” was not only irrelevant since the lender’s main source of marketing was mass market radio advertisements but also presumptive and problematic from an employment-law perspective.

Setting aside the legal questions raised by this expanded approach to redlining, mortgage lenders will also face practical considerations when assessing potential fair lending risk. Given the mortgage industry’s extensive use of social media, lead generation, artificial intelligence, and other technologies to carry out marketing strategies and disseminate marketing material, an inquiry by a federal regulator into potential discouragement of certain applicant groups or areas could be endless. Could every statement or omission made by an employee on any form of media be relevant to a redlining investigation? How many statements or omissions would it take for a federal regulator to conclude that a lender has engaged in intentional, differential treatment based on race or other protected characteristic? To that end, could personal communications between employees, which are not seen by the public, and thus could not have the effect of discouraging anyone from applying for a loan, nevertheless be sought by a federal regulator to further a case of intentional discrimination? The language of recent redlining cases suggests that a regulator may find these communications relevant to a redlining investigation even if they do not concern prospective applicants.

Ultimately, both federal regulators and mortgage industry participants must work together to promote homeownership opportunities in minority areas. But along the way, a likely point of contention will be whether enforcement should be imposed on a lender’s alleged failure to develop and implement targeted marketing strategies to increase business from minority areas, such as expanding the lender’s physical presence to minority areas not within reasonable proximity to the lender’s existing offices, conducting marketing campaigns directed exclusively at minority areas, and recruiting minority loan officers for the specific purpose of increasing business in minority areas. Such an approach might overstate the meaningfulness of physical presence and face-to-face interaction in the digital age, when lenders rely heavily on their online presence.

Of course, there may be legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for a lender’s chosen approach to its operations and expansion. It remains to be seen whether those reasons will be sufficient to assure a federal regulator that the lender’s arguably weak performance in a minority area was not the result of redlining. However, given that nearly all precedent regarding redlining has been set by consent orders and has yet to be tested in the courts, the outcome of any particular investigation will greatly depend on the lender’s willingness to delve into these issues.

[1] See 12 CFR § 1002.4(b), Comment 4(b)-1: “the regulation’s protections apply only to persons who have requested or received an extension of credit,” but extending these protections to prospective applicants is “in keeping with the purpose of the Act – to promote the availability of credit on a nondiscriminatory basis.”

[2] For example, the Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures identify the following as “indicators of potential disparate treatment”: advertising only in media serving nonminority areas, using marketing programs or procedures for residential loan products that exclude one or more regions or geographies that have significantly higher percentages of minority group residents than does the remainder of the assessment or marketing area, and using mailing or other distribution lists or other marketing techniques for prescreened or other offerings of residential loan products that explicitly exclude groups of prospective borrowers or exclude geographies that have significantly higher percentages of minority group residents than does the remainder of the marketing area.

Biden-Harris Administration Announces Extension of COVID-19 Foreclosure Moratorium

A&B Abstract:

Today, the Biden Administration announced an extension of the foreclosure moratorium for federally-backed mortgage loans (the “Presidential Announcement”). To implement the Presidential Announcement, the federal agencies (i.e., HUD/FHA, USDA, and VA) and GSEs (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) have announced (or are anticipated to announce) extensions of the foreclosure moratorium until July 31, 2021.

Presidential Announcement

According to the Presidential Announcement, the three federal agencies that back mortgages – the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and Department of Agriculture (USDA) – will extend their respective foreclosure moratorium for one, final month, until July 31, 2021. Similarly, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) will announce that it has extended the foreclosure moratorium for mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac until July 31, 2021.

The Presidential Announcement goes on to provide that once the moratoria end, HUD, VA, and USDA will take additional steps to prevent foreclosures on mortgages backed by those agencies until borrowers are reviewed for COVID-19 streamlined loss mitigation options that are affordable, while FHFA will continue to work with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure that borrowers are evaluated for home retention solutions prior to any referral to foreclosure.

In addition, the Presidential Announcement notes that HUD, VA, and USDA will also continue to allow homeowners who have not taken advantage of forbearance to date to enter into COVID-related forbearance through September 30, 2021, while homeowners with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac-backed mortgages who have COVID-related hardships will also continue to be eligible for COVID-related forbearance.

Finally, the Presidential Announcement indicates that HUD, VA, and USDA will be announcing additional steps in July to offer borrowers payment reduction options that will enable more homeowners to stay in their homes.

Federal Agency and GSE Announcements

In addition to the foregoing, the USDA and the GSEs issued the following guidance today implementing the Presidential Announcement:

  • USDA:  Today, the USDA issued a brief press release announcing a one-month extension, through July 31, 2021, of the moratorium on foreclosure from properties financed by USDA Single-Family Housing Direct and Guaranteed loans. Beyond July 31, 2021, the USDA indicated that it would continue to support homeowners experiencing financial hardship due to the pandemic by making loss mitigation options available to help keep them in their homes.
  • Fannie Mae LL-2021-02:  Today, Fannie Mae updated LL-2021-02 to extend the moratorium on foreclosures with respect to Fannie Mae loans through July 31, 2021.  Specifically, servicers must continue the suspension of the following foreclosure-related activities through July 31, 2021. Servicers may not, except with respect to a vacant or abandoned property: (1) initiate any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, (2) move for a foreclosure judgment or order of sale, or (3) execute a foreclosure sale.  All other guidance set forth in LL-2021-02 remains the same.
  • Freddie Mac Guide Bulletin 2021-23:  Similarly, today Freddie Mac issued Guide Bulletin 2021-23, which announces an extended effective date for the COVID-19 foreclosure moratorium.  Specifically, Freddie Mac is extending the foreclosure moratorium last announced in Guide Bulletin 2021-8. Servicers must suspend all foreclosure actions, including foreclosure sales, through July 31, 2021. This includes initiation of any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, motion for foreclosure judgment or order of sale. This foreclosure suspension does not apply to mortgages on properties that have been determined to be vacant or abandoned.

As of today, we are not aware of any formal announcement by HUD or VA regarding the implementation of the Presidential Announcement. However, we anticipate that both HUD and VA will issue guidance consistent with the above announcement in short order.

Takeaway 

The takeaway from today’s announcements is that, except with respect to vacant and abandoned properties, all foreclosure-related activities that could constitute the initiation of any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process, movement for a foreclosure judgement or order of sale, or execution of a foreclosure sale should continue to be paused until the expiration of the extended foreclosure moratorium.  Moreover, the Presidential Announcement suggests that additional guidance will be issued by the federal agencies permitting borrowers who have not yet taken advantage of a COVID-19 forbearance to do so through September 30, 2021 and announcing additional steps in July to offer borrowers additional payment reduction options to enable more homeowners to stay in their homes. Accordingly, servicers should continue to monitor for any additional guidance from the federal agencies and GSEs regarding the foreclosure moratorium or other COVID-19-related borrower relief.