Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Eviction

Texas Court Strikes Down Federal Eviction Moratorium

A&B ABstract: On February 25, 2021, Judge J. Campbell Barker of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas entered a declaratory judgment that the nationwide eviction moratorium ordered by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is invalid under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.

The CARES ACT Moratorium

As we previously wrote, the CARES Act imposed a 120-day moratorium on certain residential evictions that elapsed on August 25, 2020.  With this date impending, on August 8, President Trump directed executive agencies to “take all lawful measures to prevent residential evictions and foreclosures resulting from financial hardships caused by COVID-19.” He also ordered the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to consider whether any measures “temporarily halting residential evictions” are “reasonably necessary to prevent further spread of COVID-19” between states.

The CDC Emergency Order

In response, on September 4, the CDC issued an emergency order imposing a nationwide moratorium on certain residential evictions through December 31, 2020 (“CDC Order”).  In doing so, the CDC coordinated with HHS and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). The CDC Order prevents the eviction of any tenant who certifies that he or she: (1) is “using best efforts to obtain all governmental assistance for housing”; (2) earns no more than $99,000 per year in income; (3) cannot pay rent in full due to a substantial loss in income or extraordinary medical expenses; (4) is “using best efforts to make timely partial payments”; and (5) would likely become homeless, or be forced to live in a shared living setting, if evicted.

Significantly, the CDC Order does not provide any compensation for landlords or property owners who are prevented from evicting non-paying tenants, nor does it establish any hearing process for challenges to a tenant’s Declaration.  Conversely, the Order also does not exempt tenants from their legal obligation to pay outstanding rent they accumulate.  The CDC has since extended the moratorium to March 31, 2021.

The Constitutional Challenge

One individual landlord and six property management companies operating in Texas filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the CDC order.  They claimed that it exceeds the federal government’s power to regulate “commerce” under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.  Given that this was a purely legal issue, the plaintiffs requested – and the Court agreed – that the matter should be decided on summary judgment briefing without need for discovery.

The Court’s Decision

In his decision, Judge Barker acknowledged that eviction moratoriums may be lawful as part of state laws managing eviction procedures generally and under states’ broad “police powers” to promote “the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare” of their citizens.  He contrasted such state-level actions to this federal moratorium, which he described as a significant expansion of federal power, stating (slip op. at 2):

The federal government cannot say that it has ever before invoked its power over interstate commerce to impose a residential eviction moratorium. It did not do so during the deadly Spanish Flu pandemic.  Nor did it invoke such a power during the exigencies of the Great Depression. The federal government has not claimed such a power at any point during our Nation’s history until last year.

The court also analyzed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce, as well as other constitutional provisions, and concluded that the moratorium exceeds the federal government’s authority.  In large part, this is because Judge Barker determined that the decision to evict a tenant is not an “economic” act within Congress’s power to regulate.

Importantly, the court did not enter an injunction against enforcement of the moratorium, but left open that possibility if the federal government does not abide by the declaratory judgment.  In the meantime, the government has already announced that it will appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Takeaways

This decision contrasts with those of other courts in Louisiana (Chambless Enters. v. Redfield) and Georgia (Brown v. Azar) that struck down other constitutional challenges to the CDC moratorium.  One might also argue that Judge Barker improperly disregarded several grounds cited in support of the CDC moratorium — for example, that a massive wave of evictions could drive up infections and further destabilize the economy.  Given the conflicting precedents, and the public health circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, there appears to be a reasonable likelihood that the decision will be struck down even by the relatively conservative Fifth Circuit.

Further, because Judge Barker did not issue an injunction, and because the declaratory judgment was limited to the plaintiffs, the decision does not extend nationwide.  As the Department of Justice noted in announcing its appeal, “[t]he decision . . . does not extend beyond the particular plaintiffs . . . and it does not prohibit the application of the CDC’s eviction moratorium to other parties. For other landlords who rent to covered persons, the CDC’s eviction moratorium remains in effect.”  Absent a broad injunction, the decision has very limited effect.  Nonetheless, the ultimate outcome of Terkel v. CDC could have important implications for other courts considering the scope of government action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly if it is upheld on appeal or ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.   

Delaware Governor Issues Order Restricting Residential Foreclosures and Evictions

A&B Abstract:

On March 24, 2020, Delaware Governor, John Carney, issued a Sixth Modification (the “Order”) to the Declaration of a State of Emergency (the “State of Emergency”) initially issued on March 12, 2020. The Order addresses a number of issues that impact residential mortgage loan servicers, including restrictions on residential foreclosures and evictions and certain fees or charges.

Restrictions on Late Fees and Excess Interest for Missed Payments

The Order provides that with respect to any missed payment on a residential mortgage occurring during the State of Emergency, no late fee or excess interest may be charged or accrue on the account for such residential mortgage during the State of Emergency.  One could interpret this language to mean that while no late fees or additional interest may be charged or accrued with respect to a missed payment, regularly scheduled interest due on the missed payment may be charged.  While not free from doubt, arguably this provision applies only to owner-occupied 1- to 4-family primary residential property, as this provision immediately follows the below restriction on the commencement of a foreclosure action, which is so limited.

 Foreclosure Restrictions

The Order imposes restrictions on a mortgage servicer’s ability to initiate or complete a foreclosure action or sale and to charge certain fees or interest.  Specifically, until the State of Emergency is terminated and the public health emergency is rescinded, the provisions of the Delaware Code relating to residential mortgage foreclosures, including Subchapter XI, Chapter 49 of Title 10, are modified in the following respects:

  • A servicer may not commence a residential mortgage foreclosure action with respect to any owner-occupied 1- to 4-family primary residential property that is subject to a mortgage; the Order excludes from this restriction any mortgage that is held by the seller of the subject property who does not hold more than five such mortgages;
  • For any residential mortgage foreclosure action initiated prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency, all deadlines in that action, including those related to the Automatic Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program established pursuant to § 5062C of Title 10 of the Delaware Code, are extended until 31 days following the termination of the State of Emergency and the rescission of the public health emergency and no late fees or interest may be charged to or accrued on the balance due on the mortgage that is the subject of the residential mortgage foreclosure action during this time period;
  • No residential property that is the subject of a residential mortgage foreclosure action, for which a judgment of foreclosure was issued prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency, may proceed to sheriff’s sale until 31 days following the termination of the State of Emergency and the rescission of the public health emergency; and
  • No residential property that was the subject of a residential mortgage foreclosure action, and which was sold at sheriff’s sale, may be subject to action of ejectment or writ of possession until 31 days following the termination of the State of Emergency and the rescission of the public health emergency.

Except as otherwise provided above, nothing in the Order is intended to relieve any individual of the obligation to make mortgage payments or to comply with any other obligation that an individual may have under a residential mortgage.  Note that Delaware is a judicial foreclosure state requiring a notice of intent to foreclose be sent to the borrower 45 days prior to the commencing foreclosure.  One could read the Order as prohibiting a servicer from sending such notices during the State of Emergency.

Restrictions on Evictions

Similarly, with respect to evictions, the Order provides that, until the State of Emergency is terminated and the public health emergency is rescinded, the provisions of Chapter 57, Title 25 of the Delaware Code (governing summary possession of residential rental units) are modified in the following respects:

  • No action for summary possession may be brought with respect to any residential rental unit located within Delaware;
  • With respect to any past due balance for a residential rental unit, no late fee or interest may be charged or accrue on the account for the residential rental unit during the State of Emergency;
  • For any action for summary possession for a residential rental unit located within Delaware, commenced prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency, all deadlines in that action are extended until at least 31 days after the termination of the State of Emergency and the rescission of the public health emergency;
  • No late fee or interest may be charged or accrue on the balance due on the account for the residential rental unit that is the subject of the action for summary possession during this time period; and
  • For any residential rental unit that was the subject of an action for summary possession, for which a final judgment was issued prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency, no writ of possession may be executed until the seventh day following the termination of the State of Emergency and the rescission of the public health emergency.

The foregoing restrictions do not apply to actions for summary possession based upon a claim that continued tenancy will cause or is threatened to cause irreparable harm to person or property.  Moreover, except as modified above, all other provisions of the Landlord Tenant Code (Chapters 51-59 of Title 25 of the Delaware Code) remain in effect in accordance with their terms and nothing in the Order is to be construed as relieving any individual of the obligation to pay rent or to comply with any other obligation that an individual may have under their tenancy.

Takeaway

As discussed above, the Order imposes a number of restrictions that impact a residential mortgage loan servicer’s ability to initiate or complete foreclosure actions and eviction proceedings as well as limitation on certain fees and charges.  Accordingly, mortgage servicers should carefully review the Order to determine their obligations with respect to impacted borrowers.