Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Loans

District Courts Split on Convenience Fees Under Debt Collection Laws

By

A&B ABstract:

In a number of recent decisions, district courts have split on the issue of whether a mortgage servicer violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and related state debt collection statutes by charging a borrower a convenience fee for making a mortgage payment over the phone, interactive voice recording system (“IVR”).

FDCPA Sections 1692(f) and 1692a

Section 1692(f) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using unfair or unconscionable means to collect any debt, and enumerates specific examples of prohibited conduct.  Such conduct includes the “[c]ollection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement created the debt or permitted by law.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6).  Among other things, the term “debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person” or “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person….”  Id.

Overview of Convenience Fees

In addition to offering consumers several no-cost options to make a timely monthly mortgage payment, many servicers also offer borrowers a means to make an immediate payment on their mortgage by phone, IVR, or the Internet.  Servicers who make such services available to their customers may charge a fee, often referred to as a “convenience fee,” in connection with this service.  In a wave of recent cases, borrowers who have elected to use such payment methods and consequently incurred convenience fees have sued their mortgage servicers, alleging that the convenience fees violated the FDCPA.  Frequently, these borrowers also allege that the convenience fees violated other state consumer protection statutes, breached the express terms of their mortgage agreements, and ran afoul of common law.

Recent Decisions

This year, numerous courts across the country have ruled on loan servicers’ motions to dismiss convenience claims asserted by borrowers.  A clear split has now emerged regarding the viability of plaintiffs’ legal theories.

Some Courts Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA Claims, Finding Plaintiffs’ Allegations Concerning Convenience Insufficient to State a Violation of the FDCPA

Many courts, largely in district courts in Florida, have dismissed borrowers’ claims for failure to state a claim under the FDCPA and related state acts.  According to these courts, a convenience fee is neither a “debt,” nor is it properly characterized as “incidental” to the mortgage debt itself.  Moreover, these courts have also rejected the argument that the servicer is “debt collector” under the FDCPA unless the loan was in default when the borrower became obligated to pay the convenience fee.

One of the key decisions in this recent line of cases in Turner v. PHH Mortgage Corp. No. No. 8:20-cv-00137-T-30SPF (Feb. 24, 2020 M.D. Fla.).  There, PHH charged Turner for making mortgage payments via telephone or online.  Turner alleged those convenience fees violated the FDCPA, and its Florida counterpart, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”).  PHH responded by moving to dismiss those claims.  The court agreed with PHH, concluding that the convenience fees were not debts owed another as contemplated by the acts.  Further, the court found that even if the fees were debts, PHH’s optional payment services had separate convenience fees that originated with PHH—not with Turner’s mortgage.

Additionally, the court relied on the fact that when Turner became obligated to pay the convenience fees, she was not in default in her obligation to pay it.  Thus, according the court’s analysis, PHH was not acting as a debt collector under the acts because (1) the debt was not in default and (2) the debt originated with PHH.  A number of other courts have since dismissed the borrowers’ claims under similar reasoning, often citing Turner’s analysis as persuasive.  See, e.g. Estate of Derrick Campbel. V. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 20-CV-80057-AHS, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020); Reid v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 20-CV-80130-AHS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79378 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2020); Bardak v. Ocwen Loan Serv., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158874 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2020).

Some Courts Find that Borrowers’ Allegations Concerning Convenience Fees Are Sufficient to State a Claim Under the FDCPA

A number of other courts across the country, from California to Florida to Texas, have concluded that a borrower does state a claim for violation of the FDCPA (or an equivalent state statute) by alleging that the borrower was charged a convenience fee in connection with a mortgage payment made over the phone, IVR, or Internet.

In contrast to the decisions discussed above, these courts find that the convenience fee is “incidental” to the mortgage debt under FDCPA section 1692f(1).  These courts have rejected the servicers’ arguments that convenience fees are not incidental to the mortgage because they arise from separate services and obligations voluntarily undertaken by the borrower.  They have found instead that, regardless of the fact that the payment method is optional, it is still incidental to the mortgage debt because the servicers only collect convenience fees when borrowers make debt payments.  See, e.g., Glover v. Owen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38701 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2020).

Similarly, the court in Glover further found that the convenience fees were not permitted by Florida law because the court could not identify any statute or law expressly permitting such fees, nor were they explicitly allowed by the mortgage agreement.  A number of other courts have employed similar reasoning and refused to dismiss borrowers’ convenience fee claims under the FDCPA or corollary state statutes.  See, e.g., Torliatt v. Ocwen Loan Serv., No. 19-cv-04303-WHO, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141261 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 2020) (refusing to dismiss claims under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—California’s equivalent of the FDCPA—and California’s Unfair Competition Law); Caldwell v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 3:19-cv-02193-N (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2020) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the Texas Debt Collection Act).

Takeaway

There is a growing split among district courts regarding whether a borrower who is charged a convenience fee has a viable claim under the FDCPA.  This division is particularly acute within the Eleventh Circuit, and is one unlikely to be resolved in the Court of Appeals any time soon.  So, for the foreseeable future, we expect to see more lawsuits where borrowers seek to take advantage of the current state of legal uncertainty around convenience fees.

NYDFS Issues Guidance to Mortgage Servicers Regarding Assessment of Registration Fees

By ,

A&B ABstract:

On September 1, 2020, the Deputy Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), issued guidance (the “Guidance”) to New York State regulated mortgage lenders and servicers (collectively referred to as “Servicers”) regarding fees paid to register mortgages in default. The Guidance reminds Servicers of the restrictions on fees and charges set forth under Part 419 of the Superintendent of Financial Services Regulations (“Part 419”) and directs Servicers to reverse and/or refund and credit registration fees impermissibly charged to New York borrowers and to create a log of all borrowers who were either charged, or paid any registration fee to a Servicer.

Part 419 Fee Restrictions

In December 2019, the NYDFS finalized amendments to Part 419, nearly 10 years after its initial adoption. Part 419, which sets forth business conduct requirements for mortgage loan servicers operating in the state, was amended to include expansive obligations that, in certain instances, exceed obligations under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules.

Under Section 419.5 of the amended regulations, servicers may only collect certain specified types of fees from a borrower, subject to certain conditions.  Such fees include attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, and property valuation fees.  In addition, a servicer may collect a fee if it is for a service that is actually rendered to the borrower, reasonably related to the cost of rendering that service, and is: (1) expressly authorized and clearly and conspicuously disclosed by the loan instruments and not prohibited by law; (2) expressly permitted by law and not prohibited by the loan instruments; or (3) not prohibited by law or the loan instruments and is for a specific service requested by the borrower that is assessed only after disclosure of the fee is provided and the borrower expressly consents to pay the fee in exchange for the service.

NYDFS Guidance

The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS has become aware that “certain counties, cities and other municipalities in New York State, by ordinance or otherwise, are requiring mortgage lenders and servicers…to register mortgages declared to be in default…with the county, city or other municipality in which the real property is situated” and that some Servicers have charged borrowers, or collected from their account, the fee for such registrations.

The Guidance reminds Servicers that Section 419.5 of Part 419 “only permits [a servicer] to collect certain specified types of fees from a [borrower], consisting of attorney’s fees, late and delinquency fees, property valuation fees, and fees for services actually rendered to a mortgagor when such fees are reasonably related to the cost of rendering the service to the borrower.” Because a “[r]egistration [f]ee is neither an attorney fee, late or delinquency fee, property valuation fee, or fee for a service rendered to a [borrower],” Servicers are prohibited from charging or collecting such a fee from a borrower under Part 419.

Servicers subject to the requirements of Part 419 who, at any time, collected any registration fees from a borrower, are directed to refund and credit the full amount of such registration fees to the account of the borrower. If the registration fee was charged to a borrower’s account, but was not collected, the Servicer must remove and reverse any and all registration fees charged to the borrower’s account.

Finally, Servicers are directed to create a log of all borrowers that were either charged, or paid any registration fee to the servicer “at any time.” The log must contain details of the full amounts of the registration fees, whether such fees were collected or charged, and the date(s) the full amounts of collected registration fees were refunded and credited to or, in instances where the fee was charged but not collected, removed and reversed from borrowers’ accounts.  The Guidance indicates that the NYDFS plans to inspect the log during its next examination of Servicers.

 Takeaway

The Guidance is a reminder to Servicers to ensure compliance with the fee restrictions under the amended Part 419 regulations.  Servicers should review their portfolio of New York loans to ensure borrowers who paid, or were charged, a registration fee are provided appropriate remediation, as the NYDFS has already flagged this as an issue that will be scrutinized in upcoming servicing examinations.

A&B Attorneys Address “The Impact of COVID-19 on Mortgage Servicing Rights and Servicing Advances”

By

On August 11, a multidisciplinary group of Alston & Bird lawyers hosted the webinar “The Impact of COVID-19 on Mortgage Servicing Rights and Servicing Advances.”  Participants were Karen Gelernt and Katrina Llanes, Finance practice partners; Matthew Mamak, Corporate Transactions and Securities practice partner; and Nanci Weissgold, Financial Services & Products practice partner.

The webinar addressed the impact of COVID-19 on servicers generally, focusing on servicing rights, servicing advances, implications of the CARES Act, and forbearance moratoriums. Additional topics included: (1) the approaches of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to financing servicing advances, and servicing rights; (2)  industry consolidation; and (3) how M&A transactions in this sector will need to address additional concerns arising from changes brought about by COVID-19 and the government responses to the pandemic and resulting economic stressors.

Please click here to listen to the playback and here to view the presentation.

 

CFPB Institutes Redlining Action Against Non-Bank Mortgage Lender

By

A&B ABstract:

Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) brought its first ever redlining case against a non-depository institution. While the CFPB has yet to issue guidance regarding how it would evaluate a non-bank lender’s activities for potential redlining, the CFPB’s allegations in this case provide some insight to mortgage lenders regarding compliance expectations.

Discussion

On July 15, 2020, the CFPB filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Townstone Financial, Inc. (“Townstone”), alleging that the mortgage lender engaged in the redlining of African-American neighborhoods in the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) and, in turn, the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”).

The complaint does not assert any claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), as that fair lending statute is enforced by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Typically, “redlining” refers to a specific form of discrimination whereby the lender provides unequal access to, or unequal terms of, credit because of the prohibited basis characteristics of the residents of the area in which the loan applicant resides or in which the residential property to be mortgaged is located.

The Complaint

According to the complaint, during the January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2017 time period, Townstone “engaged in unlawful redlining and acts or practices directed at prospective applicants that would discourage prospective applicants, on the basis of race, from applying for credit in the Chicago MSA.” In support of this claim, the CFPB asserts that Townstone’s weekly marketing radio shows and podcasts included statements about African Americans and predominantly African-American neighborhoods (using terms such as “scary” and “jungle”) that would discourage African-American prospective applicants from applying to Townstone for mortgage loans.

Lack of Direct Marketing

Apart from the allegations regarding Townstone’s radio shows and podcasts, the complaint does not point to any intentional conduct or effort by Townstone to discriminate against African Americans or African-American neighborhoods. Rather, the complaint arrives at a general conclusion that Townstone “made no effort to market directly to African Americans.” In support of this statement, the CFPB notes that Townstone did not specifically target any marketing toward African-Americans and did not employ an African-American loan officer among its 17 loan officers in the Chicago MSA. As a result, Townstone received few applications from African-Americans and only a handful of applications from residents of majority African-American neighborhoods.

However, with respect to the allegation that Townstone did not specifically target any marketing toward African-Americans, the CFPB concedes that Townstone generated 90% of its applications from radio advertising on an AM radio station that “reached the entire Chicago MSA” and thus included residents of majority African-American neighborhoods. Further, with respect to the allegation that Townstone did not employ any African-American loan officers, it is unclear how the CFPB expects that the race of a particular loan officer would have increased the number of applications from members from the same racial group, since Townstone’s business model relied upon leads received through radio advertising rather than referrals.

Redlining

HUD and DOJ brought early redlining cases under a disparate treatment theory of discrimination, which requires evidence of a lender’s discriminatory motive or intent.  More recently, federal regulatory agencies have based redlining claims on statistical evidence that demonstrates a lender’s failure to market to, and infiltrate, geographic areas that have a strong minority presence.

Data Support

As further support for its claim against Townstone, the CFPB cites to data comparing the loan applications received by Townstone with those of its peer mortgage lenders. While only 1.4% of the loan applications received by Townstone were from African Americans, the average among peer lenders was 9.8%. Similarly, only between 1.4% and 2.3% of Townstone’s loan applications came from majority African-American neighborhoods, while the average among peer lenders was between 7.6% and 8.2%. In further support of its claim, the CFPB argues that African Americans make up approximately 30% of the population of Chicago, though fails to note the Chicago MSA’s African-American population of approximately 16%.

Given this data, the complaint asserts that Townstone acted to meet the credit needs of majority-white neighborhoods in the Chicago MSA while avoiding the credit needs of majority African-American neighborhoods.  As a result, the CFPB alleges that Townstone thereby discouraged prospective applicants from applying to Townstone for mortgage loans in those neighborhoods.

Townstone’s Response

In response to the allegations, Townstone has published a fact sheet defending itself against the CFPB’s claim and noting its efforts to “reach as broad a geographic area as possible” by considering legitimate, non-discriminatory factors such as signal strength, and referencing other marketing measures specifically targeted at the African-American community. Further, Townstone has hired a third-party expert to help demonstrate how Townstone is not an outlier among its peers.

Takeaways

The complaint illustrates the CFPB’s position that non-bank lenders can be held liable for redlining even though they are not subject to Community Reinvestment Act requirements regarding meeting the needs of an entire assessment area. Further, the complaint reminds lenders that their performance – measured primarily by number of loan applications received – will be compared against that of other lenders with similar size and loan origination volume. As such, lenders seeking to mitigate fair lending risk should evaluate the geographic distribution of their lending activity to determine whether, during a particular time period, they were significantly less likely to take loan applications from minority areas than non-minority areas.

CFPB’s Pursuit of Redlining Claim

More importantly, the complaint demonstrates the CFPB’s willingness to pursue a redlining claim absent the traditional allegation that the lender sought to draw a “red line” around a particular demographic group or geographic area. Townstone’s radio advertising was not restricted to a particular demographic group or geographic area, nor could Townstone have altered the radio signals somehow to include or exclude particular groups or geographic areas. Further, Townstone had no control over the demographics of the AM radio station’s audience or that of particular radio shows.

Rather than alleging a traditional claim of redlining (i.e., actively avoiding a particular demographic group or geographic area), the CFPB seeks to hold Townstone liable for failing to conduct affirmative outreach and marketing to African-Americans. For example, the CFPB points out that Townstone had no African-American loan officers. Yet a lender’s failure to perform affirmative outreach to certain demographic groups or geographic areas, including by hiring loan officers of a particular demographic group, does not constitute redlining – nor are such actions required by ECOA.

The only allegation that Townstone redlined, in the traditional sense, is that its employees made statements that may have been intended to discourage African-American consumers from seeking a loan from Townstone. It is unclear whether these statements were intended to be commercial speech or merely ad hoc commentary regarding local current events.

ECOA Claim

Finally, it is worth noting that ECOA prohibits a creditor from discriminating against any “applicant,” which Regulation B clarifies to include prospective applicants. While the complaint alleges that Townstone discriminated against both prospective applicants and applicants, the CFPB makes no claim that Townstone’s actions had any effect on consumers who already had applied for a loan.

Ultimately, the complaint appears to signal the CFPB’s return to more aggressive and creative redlining enforcement under ECOA, and the mortgage industry may need to consider a more comprehensive approach to compliance to avoid regulatory risk.

“RESPA Section 8 – the CFPB and President Should Act Now to Restore the Rule of Law”

By

The Heritage Foundation recently published “RESPA Section 8 – the CFPB and President Should Act Now to Restore the Rule of Law” by Alston & Bird’s Brian Johnson.  While no substitute for reading the full article, below is a brief summary and key takeaways of the article, as discussed on the Heritage Foundation’s website:

 Summary

For decades, companies providing real estate settlement services relied on well-established rules and guidance from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to establish business arrangements in accordance with the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). But when Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and made it responsible for RESPA, the new agency used enforcement actions rather than rules to announce new RESPA legal standards and then hold companies retroactively liable for violating them. This was just one manifestation of the “regulation by enforcement” doctrine espoused by the CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray.

In its 2016 PHH Corp. v. CFPB decision, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals thoroughly repudiated the CFPB’s approach, finding that the agency flouted RESPA and violated due process. However, nearly four years later, much work remains to be done in order to repair the damage inflicted by the CFPB. The CFPB Director and the President can each take concrete actions now to restore the rule of law at the CFPB.

Key Takeaways
  • The CFPB’s aggressive departure from settled law and long-standing agency guidance in RESPA enforcement actions violated due process and upended the rule of law
  • The DC Circuit Court of Appeals repudiated the CFPB misinterpretation of RESPA, but more must be done to restore the rule of law at the CFPB
  • The CFPB Director and the President can take concrete steps to repair the damage done, such as issuing interpretative rules to clarify the legitimate meaning of RESPA Section 8 and terminating guidance and supervisory or enforcement actions premised upon its prior misinterpretation of law