What Happened?
On March 27, 2026, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law SB 8811 (Chapter 94 of the Laws of 2026), a chapter amendment relating to the Attorney General’s ability to protect New Yorkers from unfair, deceptive, and abusive business practices. As we highlighted in March following its introduction, New York’s Fostering Affordability and Integrity through Reasonable Business Practices (“FAIR”) Act represents a fundamental transformation of the state’s consumer protection framework, expanding enforcement authority beyond “deceptive” practices to include “unfair” and “abusive” acts. And, as we further noted, Governor Hochul, in initially signing the FAIR Act into law, noted an agreement with legislators to ensure the act “does not override” existing case law on the consumer-oriented standard. These amendments confirm that intent and make other changes to narrow and focus the scope of the law.
SB 8811 primarily revises the 2025 FAIR Act legislation (Chapter 708 of the Laws of 2025) by (1) removing the FAIR Act’s standalone “purpose and intent” provision, (2) refining the treatment of “substantial injury” under the unfairness standard, and (3) extending the Attorney General’s pre-suit notice response timeline.
Repeal of the Legislative Intent Section (GBL Section 348)
SB 8811 repeals Section 348 of the General Business Law, which the 2025 FAIR Act added as a “purpose and intent” statement for Article 22-A.
The repealed Section 348 was an unusually detailed statement of legislative purpose. Among other things, it declared that New York has a responsibility to protect New Yorkers from unfair, deceptive, and abusive business acts and practices, and that prior law, which focused on deception, was insufficient to protect New Yorkers and the New York economy. It emphasized that certain groups were left vulnerable to unscrupulous business practices. It also stated an intent for New York to adopt a comprehensive statute and “level the playing field” for honest businesses and non-profits that treat customers fairly.
The original intent provision also anticipated future unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts arising from new and emerging technology. It expressly framed the FAIR Act as eliminating court-imposed limitations that had constrained enforcement to conduct which is “consumer-oriented” or with a public-facing impact, while extending protections to businesses and non-profits as well as individuals.
What its removal may signal. SB 8811 is expressly described as a chapter amendment intended to “repeal the legislative intent,” “redefine the scope of substantial injury,” and make technical amendments. Against that backdrop, removing Section 348 may reflect a desire to reduce the extent to which broad purpose language could be used to push interpretive outcomes beyond the operative text of Section 349. Put differently, the Legislature may have concluded that the statute should stand or fall on the substantive prohibitions and definitions in Section 349, rather than a sweeping preamble that invites expansive arguments about scope.
From a practical perspective, this change may be read as tightening the language in response to stakeholder concerns about uncertainty and litigation risk. In particular, Section 348 explicitly spoke to eliminating “consumer-oriented” constraints and to protecting businesses and non-profits, and it also framed the law as a tool for both government and private parties. Its repeal may help the State defend the law as a more traditional, text-driven consumer protection update, while leaving the Attorney General to advance enforcement theories based primarily on the revised statutory elements rather than a broad statement of legislative purpose.
Refinement of the Unfairness Standard and “Substantial Injury”
SB 8811 amends the “unfair” prong in GBL Section 349(a)(1). The statute continues to define “unfair” acts or practices using the familiar three-part framework (substantial injury, not reasonably avoidable, not outweighed by countervailing benefits). However, SB 8811 ties “substantial injury” to the meaning of that term under the Federal Trade Commission Act and removes language that had expressly treated “substantial injury” to persons other than consumers as “substantial injury” for purposes of that section.
Notice and Response Timeline Extended
SB 8811 amends GBL Section 349(c) to revise the Attorney General’s pre-suit notice and response timeline. The Attorney General must still provide notice by certified mail and an opportunity to respond in writing before commencing an action or proceeding, but the response period is extended from five business days to ten calendar days after receipt of the notice.
Other Technical Repeals/Edits
The bill also repeals paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of GBL Section 349 and makes additional technical amendments to the 2025 chapter. Notably, paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of GBL Section 349 stated, “An act or practice made unlawful by this section is actionable by the attorney general regardless of whether or not that act or practice is consumer-oriented.” This language was notable because “consumer-oriented” has long been a recurring limitation in Section 349 case law. The paragraph functioned as a direct textual instruction that the Attorney General could bring Section 349 actions even where the challenged conduct was not consumer-oriented. By deleting the explicit “regardless of whether or not consumer-oriented” sentence, the Legislature removes a clear statutory hook that would have supported the broadest reading of the Attorney General’s authority in situations that look more like private commercial disputes or one-off transactions.
Why Does it Matter?
The FAIR Act’s headline expansion remains: New York’s consumer protection regime now addresses “unfair” and “abusive” conduct in addition to deception, with the Attorney General as the primary enforcer for unfairness and abusiveness. SB 8811 does not reverse that direction. Instead, it changes how the statute is likely to be argued and applied by removing an expansive legislative purpose statement that, by design, sought to broaden the interpretive lens.
With Section 348 repealed, parties should expect disputes about reach, especially around business-to-business implications and the continued relevance of prior “consumer-oriented” case law, to focus more heavily on the operative text of Section 349 (and any accompanying interpretive materials outside the now-repealed purpose clause).
By explicitly tying “substantial injury” to the FTC Act standard and deleting language that expressly deemed non-consumer injury to be “substantial injury” for purposes of the unfairness prong, SB 8811 may narrow certain theories that would otherwise emphasize harms to non-consumers under the “unfair” definition itself.
What Do I Need to Do?
Given the removal of the legislative intent provision, compliance programs should map controls to the operative statutory elements: what constitutes unfairness (including the “substantial injury” standard as tied to FTC Act concepts), what constitutes abusiveness, and what constitutes deception.
Even as federal enforcement priorities shift, New York’s framework continues to position the Attorney General as a central enforcement actor for unfair and abusive conduct. Companies operating in or touching New York should assume continued scrutiny, especially where practices can be characterized as causing unavoidable harm or taking unreasonable advantage of consumer vulnerabilities.
Alston & Bird’s Consumer Financial Services Team is actively monitoring these developments and can assist with impact assessments, updates to compliance management systems, and enforcement readiness planning in light of New York’s evolving consumer protection landscape.
