What Happened?
On February 27, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an amicus brief in the 11th Circuit case Glover and Booze v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC arguing that certain convenience fees charged by mortgage servicer debt collectors are prohibited by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). This brief comes on the heels of an amicus brief Alston & Bird LLP filed on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). In its brief, the MBA urged the 11th Circuit to uphold the legality of the fees at issue.
While litigation surrounding convenience fees has spiked in recent years, there is no consensus on whether convenience fees violate the FDCPA. Federal courts split on the issue, as there is little guidance at the circuit court level, and the issue before the 11th Circuit is one of first impression. Consequently, the 11th Circuit’s ruling could significantly impact what fees a debt collector is permitted to charge, both within that circuit and nationwide.
Why is it Important?
Convenience fees or what the agencies refer to as “pay-to-pay” fees are the fees charged by servicers to borrowers for the use of expedited payment methods like paying online or over the phone. Borrowers have free alternative payment methods available (e.g., mailing a check) but choose to pay for the convenience of a faster payment method.
Section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA provides that a “debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” including the “collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The CFPB and FTC argues that Section 1692f(1)’s prohibition extends to the collection of pay-to-pay fees by debt collectors unless such fees are expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or affirmatively authorized by law.
First, the agencies contend that pay-to-pay fees fit squarely with the provision’s prohibition on collecting “any amount” in connection with a debt and that charging this fee constitutes a “collection” under the FDCPA. Specifically, the agencies attempt to counter Ocwen’s argument that the fees in question are not “amounts” covered by Section 1692f(1) because the provision is limited to amounts “incidental to” the underlying debt. They argue that fees need not be “incidental to” the debt in order to fall within the scope of Section 1692f(1). In making this point, the agencies claim the term “including” as used is the provision’s parenthetical suggests that the list of examples is not an exhaustive list of all the “amounts” covered by the provision. Further, the agencies attempt to counter Ocwen’s argument that a “collection” under the FDCPA refers only to the demand for payment of an amount owed (i.e., a debt). They argue that Ocwen’s understanding of “collects” is contrary to the plain meaning of the word; rather, the scope of Section 1692f(1) is much broader and encompasses collection of any amount , not just those which are owed.
Next, focusing on the FDCPA’s exception for fees “permitted by law,” the agencies contend that a fee is not permitted by law if it is authorized by a valid contract (that implicitly authorizes the fee as a matter of state common law). The agencies suggest if such fees could be authorized by any valid agreement, the first category of collectable fees defined by Section 1692(f)(1)—those “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt”—would be superfluous. Lastly, the Agencies argue neither the Electronic Funds Transfer Act nor the Truth in Lending Act – the two federal laws Ocwen relies on in its argument – affirmatively authorizes pay-to-pay fees.
What Do You Need to Do?
Stay tuned. The 11th Circuit has jurisdiction over federal cases originating in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Its ruling is likely to have a significant impact on whether debt collectors may charge convenience fees to borrowers in those states, and it could be cited as persuasive precedent in courts nationwide.